There were a man and a woman. Alive during the dictatorial regime of the 1970s, both secretly dreamt of another world. The two met at an evening school, where they educated workers as voluntary teachers in Gwangju, a southwestern South Korean city. While working hard to educate workers, the woman died in an accident. It was 1978. The woman, Kisoon Park, was 21.

After dictator Park Chung Hee was assassinated in 1979, and another dictator, Chun Do Hwan grabbed power through a coup d'état. Martial law was imposed nationwide. Students in Gwangju protested the repression of their democratic rights. The military suppressed them violently. In reaction average citizens rose up. They were met with horrible violence, beaten and shot to death. Civilians bore arms and occupied the city hall. The man joined them and was shot dead there. He had been the spokesman and one of the leaders of the civil troops. It was 1980. The man, Sangwon Yun, was 30.

In 1982, there a wedding was held at a graveyard. The man and the woman were spiritually bound together as bride and groom. A song entitled, "March for the Beloved", was written and dedicated to them. After, it spread secretly among students, workers, and ordinary citizen.

March for the Beloved

Our love, our honor, our name, not leaving anything behind

Our solemn vow to march together throughout our lives

Though the comrade is gone, the flag still flutters

Let us not waver until a new day is here

Time passes by but the mountains and streams remember

The ardent cry of the awaken ones

Survivors, follow as I march ahead

Survivors, follow as I march ahead

With the march of the democratization movement in South Korea, this song has come to be sung at the opening of every rally. Once in 2010, when the Lee Myung bak administration refused to play "March of the Beloved" in the annual ceremony commemorating the Gwangju Democratization Movement, twitter users voluntarily organized a campaign to sing along it. The song has come to represent social movements in South Korea. "March of the Beloved" also has impressed many activists around the world. The song has been adapted and sung in many countries including Hong Kong, Thai, Myanmar, and China.

*March for the Beloved

* Twitter users singing along the song (sound only)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qnh3CyDkIpM

* Migrant workers’ band playing the adapted song in China

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vSUIj3Rp0fc&feature=fvst

On March 25, thousands of Korean anti-war activists, union members and ordinary citizens gathered Seoul Plaza for a series of massive people's rallies. The protesters gave voice to many demands related to the livelihood and safety of ordinary Korean people: repeal of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, the cessation of the construction of the Jeju naval base, the guarantee of workers' rights to a living wage and job security.

The first part of day was devoted to one issue in particular: The Second Nuclear Security Summit, held in Seoul from March 26 to 27. Protesters shouted "No to the Nuclear Security Summit," and called for promises of "Not 'nuclear security', but a nuclear-free world."

Many people are not familiar with the Nuclear Security Summit. Most Koreans had not even heard about it until the Lee Myung-bak administration began advertising it as the 'largest international meeting ever to be held in South Korea" a few months ago. Even after the billboards and television adds appeared, few have a clear sense of what the summit is about, given that that the government has done little to explain its details. The rally on March 25 provide anti-war and anti-nuclear activists a chance to spread awareness about the true character of the summit as a means for the U.S. and other nuclear weapons states to defend their nuclear hegemony and for the South Korean government to promote the development of its nuclear industry and export of nuclear power plants.

What is the Nuclear Security Summit?

The Nuclear Security Summit is a meeting of the heads of states and representatives of international organizations (the UN, the IAEA, the EU) to discuss the prevention of nuclear terrorism and the securing of nuclear materials and facilities. U.S. President Barak Obama first proposed the summit a speech in Prague in April 2009. In the same speech, Obama called for a world free of nuclear weapons, while paradoxically also promising that the U.S. "will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies," as long as nuclear weapons exist. The first Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington D.C. in 2010, and the second in Seoul last month.

The ideas of 'nuclear security' and a summit of world leaders to discuss it sound good. In fact, however, the term and the meeting are part of the United States' efforts to maintain its nuclear weapons dominance, while also appearing to take steps towards a nuclear-free world. The premise of nuclear security is that the greatest nuclear threat comes not from nuclear weapons themselves, but from the possibility that nuclear materials, the main ingredients for nuclear weapons, will fall into the hands of terrorists or other 'irrational' non-state actors. While the Nuclear Security Summit discusses cooperation for securing such nuclear materials, it does not address the fact that over 20,000 nuclear weapons, enough to destroy humanity several times over, already exist in the possession of governments who have not ruled out their use.

Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Weapons Hegemony

'Nuclear security' is a fairly new word in U.S. foreign policy vocabulary. Until recently, the focus has been on 'nuclear non-proliferation'. The concept of 'nuclear non-proliferation', enshrined in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) [1970], is that states without nuclear weapons will be blocked from obtaining them while nuclear weapons possessing states will take steps towards nuclear arms reduction and eventual elimination. In fact, however, the U.S., along with the other acknowledged nuclear weapons states under the NPT (Russia, the U.K., France and China) have used the NPT and the concept of non-proliferation to pressure and control non-nuclear states, while refusing to give up their nuclear arsenals.

Recently, the Obama administration has made small steps towards nuclear arms reductions. These including the signing of a deal to reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads with Russia (the New Start Treaty) in 2010, and consideration of further reductions currently underway. In fact, however, the U.S. is currently spending hundreds of billions of dollars to modernize nuclear weapons production facilities and develop new nuclear weapons that are more precise, less powerful and, therefore, more useable. The U.S., moreover, has repeatedly stated it considers a preemptive nuclear strike against its enemies an open possibility.

Far from preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the drive of the U.S. and other nuclear weapons states to maintain their nuclear hegemony has provoked other countries to develop their own nuclear weapons programs. Of particular importance in Asia, North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003, citing the United States' failure to fulfill its promise to provide fuel and light water reactors to replace its existing nuclear program. It has since carried out two nuclear tests.

Nuclear Security, PSI and the Escalation of Nuclear Tensions

In the face of growing critique of the contradictory nature of the NPT system and its inability to stop proliferation, the U.S. has recently begun to stress nuclear terrorism as the main nuclear threat. It proposes international cooperation towards 'nuclear security' as the best response. Like non-proliferation, however, nuclear security measures leave the United States and other nuclear weapons states' arsenals intact while further provoking countries deemed 'capable' of leaking nuclear materials to terrorists. Given that North Korea is high on the list, this policy contributes to heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula and, by extension in the East Asian region.

A representative example of international nuclear security cooperation is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). PSI calls on participating states to stop and inspect aircrafts or ships 'suspected' of transporting nuclear materials or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and authorizes the use of military force in the process.

PSI specifically targets North Korean vessels. It has thus been taken by North Korea as an act of aggression, even more so since South Korea became a full PSI member under the present administration. Many scholars have also criticized PSI as a violation of international law because no international treaty regulates it and because it goes against the internationally guaranteed right of free passage across open seas.

In 2004, the U.S. sought to provide PSI with at a degree of legal backing through the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Resolution 1540 requires UN member states to take and enforce effective measures against the spread of WMD, their means of delivery and related materials.

Resolution 1540 has been a subject of both Nuclear Security Summits. A working paper submitted to the first summit called for its full implementation. During the second summit, France announced plans to host an international conference on implementation by the end of the year. Given the resolution's implications, these discussions can only be taken as acts of provocation by North Korea.

Safe Nuclear Power... Really?

In addition to talk of 'nuclear security', the Lee Myung-bak administration had another very specific goal for the Nuclear Security Summit: promotion of the South Korean nuclear power industry in line with its plans for nuclear power plant export. As a side event to the Nuclear Security Summit, the Lee administration held a 'Nuclear Industry Summit' on March 23. At this meeting, 200 industry leaders came together to discuss "safety measures" for nuclear power plants.

It has only been a year since a nuclear disaster the size of Chernobyl struck Fukushima, Japan, devastated the surrounding community and releasing radioactive materials that will effect residents and the environment for years to come. Just last month a dangerous blackout occurred at a nuclear power plant at the southern end of the Korean peninsula leading to an attempted cover up by South Korean authorities. Despite the very obvious continued dangers, the Lee administration's publicity materials for the summit blatantly referred to it as "a chance to rebuild trust in the atomic energy industry, which has diminished in the wake of Fukushima." The day after the Nuclear Industry Summit, participants were taken on a tour of Korean nuclear power facilities, a blatant sales pitch on the part of the government.

The Real Solution: A Movement for a Nuclear Free World

There is no such thing as safe nuclear power or secure nuclear materials or weapons. As long as nuclear power is generated, as long as nuclear weapons exist, we face a grave nuclear threat. In addition, the more the U.S. persists in its policy of preemptive nuclear strike and threatens North Korea with 'security' measures like PSI, the more likely it is that the Korean peninsula will become a staging ground for nuclear war. The real task before us, then, is not the prevention of nuclear terrorism, but the elimination of the more fundamental threat: nuclear weapons, nuclear power plants and policies that stimulate their development. That the U.S. and South Korea have held Nuclear Security Summits while refuses to acknowledge these realities is not only contradictory, it is highly perilous.

The rally on March 25 offered an opportunity to raise these issue before the Korean public and criticize the hypocritical and dangerous nature of the Nuclear Security Summit. It is now up to Korean anti-war activists to organize a more sustained grassroots ant-nuclear movement in Korea and connected it other similar movements around the world.

There are over 400,000 janitorial workers in South Korea. Of these, only 7,853, roughly 2%, were members of labor unions as of 2011. Only 2% of some 400,000 janitorial workers in Korea are organized. Despite this low figure, Korean janitorial worker' struggle has received considerable attention for many reasons. In particular, Korean janitors have refused to be satisfied with South Korea's miserable minimum wage. They have fought for and won a collective bargaining agreement that guarantees them wages above the legal standard. In addition, Korean janitors have built solidarity across workplaces and succeeded in carried out joint collective bargaining.

Last year, janitorial and security workers organized by the KCTU-affiliated Korean Public Service and Transportation Workers Union (KPTU) at 3 universities (Korea University, Yonsei University and Ehwa University) and one hospital (Korean University Hospital), made the first attempt at a multiple worksite struggle and joint collective bargaining. The general strike of these workers - the majority elderly women - carried out on March 8, International Women's Day, made a lasting impression on the Korean labor movement. Through their struggle, these workers won a collective agreement guaranteeing them an hourly wage of 4,600 won (roughly $4), 240 won above the current legal minimum. The effects of that victory were felt throughout Korean society. Notably, 4,600 won served as a standard for the tri-partied minimum wage committee in its deliberations on a new standard for 2012.

Janitorial and security workers

This year the janitorial and security workers have expanded their struggle. Workers at Hongik University and Kyung Hee University have joined the four other worksites to fight for a joint collective agreement. The workers began by demanding an increase to 5,410 won half the average for all workers. As of now, they have reached a preliminary agreement for 5,100 won.

Unfortunately, this year the janitorial and security workers face new challenges. This is because of a revision to the Korean labor law that went into effect on July 1, 2011, which allows more than one union to be formed at a workplace, but require that their be only one bargaining representative. After the law was passed, yellow unions were formed and the school administrations and subcontracted cleaning companies have used them as an excuse to refuse to bargain with the democratic unions.

The yellow union at Hongik University is becoming a major obstacle to the workers' goals. The yellow union has agreed to a low wage with the employer and is trying to convince the KCTU-KPTU union members to agree to accept the same standard. The employer is using this as an excuse to refuse negotiations with the democratic union.

Workers at all worksites have agreed that they will not leave their comrades at Hongik University behind. They began the fight together and will end it together and so are confronting the Hongik yellow union and will not sign a collective bargaining agreement unless it includes the Hongik democratic union members.

Throughout history, Korean labor law has been used to repress workers. And throughout history, Korean workers have fought back in the fact of that repression. The story of the janitorial and security workers is one and the same.

After more than 1000 days of struggle, workers dismissed from Ssangyong Motor's Pyeongtaek factory in 2009 have yet to be granted negotiations with the company's Indian management. Workers were dismissed in the process of structural adjustment in preparation for Ssangyong Motor's sale to the Indian conglomerate Mahindra Group. At that time, dismissed workers were joined by their still-employed colleagues in a 77-day strike and factory occupation under the slogan, "We will live and survive together."

Ssangyong Motor workers

The Korean government responded to the 2009 struggle with brutal and bloody suppression. It mobilized armed special police forces and helicopters, which rained pepper spray on the desperately struggling workers.

The struggle ended with the company agreeing to reinstate the dismissed workers after a year of unpaid leave. Yet neither the government nor the company has shown any accountability in the aftermath. Not even a small part of the agreement reached between the workers and management has been implemented. In the meantime, 22 workers and their family members have committed suicide due to deep sorrow and desperation.

Continuing the struggle, the Korean Metal Workers Union Ssangyong Motor Branch and many social movement organizations including PSSP have pitched 'Hope Tents' in front of the Ssangyong Motor factory in Pyeongtaek since December 2011. They organized national demonstrations called 'Day of Siege against Ssangyong Motor' three times in December, January and February. Thousands of people participated. On April 21, they will hold the 4th 'Day of siege'.

The Ssangyong Motor struggle epitomizes key issues faced by Korean workers, including mass layoffs, state violence and speculative foreign capital. We must build broader and firmer solidarity and strengthen our struggle if we are to win reinstatement of the dismissed workers, prevent further deaths and confront the wider social problems that Ssangyong Motor represents.

On 3 January 2011, the South Korean Immigration Service, an agency of the Ministry of Justice, began an unprecedented program for the 'alleviation of hardships' for undocumented overseas Koreans residing in South Korea. Under this program, which will go on until the end of June, a large portion of the undocumented overseas Koreans ineligible for F-4 (overseas Korean visa) visas now living in South Korea, the vast majority of whom are Chinese Korean, are allowed to apply for and receive a D-4 visa (general trainee visa). After completing a 9-month occupational skills training program conducted by the Overseas Korean Technical Training Foundation, these individuals will be permitted to change their visa status to H-2 (working visa) and thus be allowed to work legally in one of the 36 industries now open to overseas Koreans under the South Korea's Guest Work System for a period of 4 years and 10 months. The primary targets of this program are Chinese and other overseas Koreans who have resided in South Korea for over 10 years along with their spouses and direct decedents. In addition, undocumented overseas Koreans who have spouses who have obtained citizenship or permanent residency, those who require treatment for the aftereffects of industrial accidents, those who are married to Korean citizens and those who have become undocumented after entering Korea on H-2 visas are also eligible. Overseas Koreans who were born before 1 October 1949 will not have to participate in the training program and will be granted F-4 visas, giving them a status near permanent residence that is now granted to overseas Koreans from Japan and the United States under the Law on Overseas Koreans. In reality, the vast majority of those who will benefit from this program fall in the first category. The Ministry of Justice has estimated that the program applies to roughly 6,000 Chinese and other overseas Koreans. Migrant-related NGOs, on the other hand, say the number could be as high as 20,000.

Reaction to this program has been mixed. Understandably, the Chinese Korean community and some of the NGOs serving it have welcomed the measure. Other forces in the migrant workers movement, however, have been highly critically. These groups (which include the Joint Committee with Migrants in Korea (JCMK) and the Alliance for Migrants Equality and Human Rights) have called the program racially discriminatory because it is not open to migrants of not of Korean decent. JCMK collecting over 500 petitions from non-Korean migrant workers, both those who have resided in South Korea for over 10 years and those who have not, and submitted them to the National Human Rights Commission on March 21, International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. On the same day JCMK and the Alliance for Migrant's Equality and Human Rights held a press conference in front of the Human Rights Commission to call attention to the discriminatory nature of the program and racism in South Korean society, and demand legalization for all migrant workers. The press conference statement presented this day, which was written by JCMK, also criticized the legalization program for effectively concealing the fact that while the National Assembly approved the application of the Law on Overseas Koreans to Koreans from China and countries in the former Soviet Bloc in 2004, this measure has not been implemented. It called on the government to replace the 'deceitful' legalization program with guarantee of freedom of travel, employment and residence in accordance with the Law on Overseas Koreans for these overseas Koreans.

That migrant rights groups used March 21 to call attention to the discriminatory nature of the legalization program is commendable. If the South Korean movement is gong to take on racism as a serious issue, however, we need a more nuanced understanding of the implications of the legalization program and how it fits into the government's overall policy towards overseas Koreans and other migrant workers in South Korea. The passing of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination seems like a good occasion to start building this analysis.

Let's begin by looking at the interests and intentions behind the Program to Alleviate the Hardships of Overseas Koreans. The Ministry of Justice says the program is being implemented out of humanitarian consideration for the difficulties faced by (non-F-4) overseas Koreans due to their lowly economic and social position. We can guess with fair certainty that this is not the whole story. On the one hand, the program is a response to lobbying efforts by the NGOs serving Chinese Koreans. While it does not go far enough to meet their ultimate demand - the application of the Law on Overseas Koreans - the program is likely to placate them to a certain degree. In addition, the program is a means to address labor shortages in particular industries shunned by native workers with a cheap labor force that is more highly trained and socially assimilated than temporary non-Korean migrants who enter Korea under the Employment Permit System (EPS). Through the required training program and the granting of work permits, the government will be able to channel undocumented overseas Koreans, who may now be employed in any number of occupations, into specific industries where the need for labor is high while keeping them out of industries were native workers are facing high unemployment rates, most notably construction.

The Guest Work System, a program exclusively open to overseas Koreans, was first introduced in 2007. It allows for a 4 year 10 month period of residence. For the first group of workers who entered South Korea through this system, this residence period will be up in 2012. Since it is likely that many of these workers will remain in South Korea in an undocumented status, the government faces a potential social crisis next year. We can guess, therefore, that the current legalization program is also a means to test out the effectiveness of extending expired H-2 visas as a method for averting a rapid rise in the undocumented population.

The 'hardship alleviation' program comes in the wake of an announcement by the Ministry of Employment and Labor of an increase in the quota for new E-9 (EPS) visas in consideration of the vast numbers of undocumented migrant workers that have been deported and improvement in the economy. The quota has been increased by 14,000 over last year to a total of 48,000 for 2011 with the possibility of further increases later in the year. At the same time the Ministry has announced its plan to maintain the target number of H-2 visa holders in South Korea at the same level as last year (303,000), meaning that few new over Korean migrants will be permitted to enter South Korea under the Guest Work System this year. Given the implementation of the legalization program, it appears most new H-2 visas will go to long-term residents, not new arrivals. Clearly, the government envisions different roles for overseas Korean migrants and migrants of non-Korean decent. The latter are to be the most short-term, most expendable workers, with the more seasoned EPS workers pushed out at the same time as a never-ending supply of new recruits is brought in. The former, on the other hand, will be a well-trained, more assimilated and more stable, but still cheap, labor force.

The 'hardship alleviation' represents clear partiality towards 'fellow countrymen'. It, along with the recent granting of voting rights to overseas nationals and the introduction of a written pledge of allegiance to South Korea's liberal democratic system in naturalization procedures, is part of a trend towards strengthened nationalism in South Korean policymaking. Nationalist favoritism towards overseas Koreans, however, has a strong utilitarian element and is applied differentially based on wealth. The legalization program currently under way still falls short of granting F-4 visas to the majority of Chinese Koreans. The ultimate result of the benefits it grants will be to further solidify Chinese Koreans' position as second-class citizens who exist somewhere between migrant workers of non-Korean decent and Korean citizens (and overseas Koreans from developed nations) in the social hierarchy. This positioning is accompanied by an ambiguous racialization: Although Chinese Koreans are referred to as 'countrymen' [dongpo] in policy discourse and the media, overseas Koreans from China and the former Soviet bloc are still maintained as a temporary workforce tied to particular industries and are, as such, a target of government management and regulation. These overseas Koreans are still 'others' who have to register as aliens, while Japanese and American Koreans are allowed to simply notify the government of their residence in South Korea. In the workplace and in daily life as well, Chinese Koreans are treated as 'other's, lumped together with other 'Asian' migrants. (In South Korean racial discourse, native Koreans are generally excluded from the category 'Asian', which is used to refer to people from South and Central Asian countries.)

The government's utilitarian nationalism and discriminatory policies are contributing to the institutionalization of a racialized hierarchy in South Korean society where Korean citizens are at the top, Chinese Koreans in the middle and migrants of non-Korean descent from 'Asian' countries at the bottom. This hierarchy is part of a system of social control that operates through a mixture of appeasement and oppression. It also deepens divisions among the working class that keep workers from coming together to demand their rights. Chinese Koreans are being placated and incorporated as countrymen, or at least good 'migrants' who are deserving of humanitarian relief yet who will always be second-class citizens and the objects of regulation. Non-Korean migrants, on the other hand, remain outsiders and the most expendable form of labor, controlled under the EPS system or demonized as 'illegal' and 'criminal'. Meanwhile, native Korean workers are encouraged to see social belonging, political rights and employment as their unique birthrights and blame migrants, including and sometimes especially Chinese Koreans, for taking their jobs or creating downward pressure on working conditions. Being positioned at different places in this racial hierarchy makes it different for workers of different backgrounds to see their collective interests in fighting labor exploitation and the racism that facilitates it.

The 'hardship alleviation' program will be beneficial to some Chinese Koreans in the immediate. In the end, however, the racialize hierarchy it is helping to institutionalize is good neither for Chinese Korean workers nor for non-Korean migrant workers nor for native Korean workers. Accordingly, breaking this hierarchy down must be a goal and a struggle shared by all workers, regardless of their nationality and their position within it. The labor movement needs to be an anti-racist labor movement, one that finds ways to empower racialized groups that are systematically disempowered in South Korean society and the labor movement itself, at the same time as it strives to build unity between migrant and native workers. The migrant rights movement needs an analysis of racial capitalist and the place of different groups of migrants within it.

Together, we need to formulate demands that disrupt this racial hierarchy rather than perpetuating it. In this respect, the demand for application of the Law on Overseas Koreans to Chinese and Koreans from Soviet bloc countries is not helpful. While respecting the fact that these overseas Koreans are discriminated against with respect to Korean Japanese and Korean Americans, we must replace it with a call for pathways to long-term residence and political participation that applies equally to all migrants. The migrant rights and labor movements must join forces to develop concrete strategies for organizing Chinese Koreans, non-Korean migrants and native Koreans together to demand full legalization, equal labor rights, and ultimately equal citizenship rights for all.

-The Western power must cease their attack on Libya immediately!
-Libya’s liberation must be achieved by the Libyan people!

On 17 March 2011, the UN Security Council quickly adopted Resolution 1973, the second resolution imposing sanctions against Libya. Shortly thereafter, U.S., U.K. and France-dominated coalition forces began a military strike against Libya that has now gone on for several days without stop. The UN Security Councils speaks of the attack in humanitarian terms saying its goal is the protection of civilian life. We are certain, however, that the ultimate goal of the Resolution 1973 and the attack on Libya is to serve the imperialist goals of Western powers.

1. Libya’s anti-government forces and even the UN Security Council are not the ones who get to decide whether the attack will be limited to the goal of “protecting civilians” or not. It is the participating Western powers who decide the targets of military operations and the ultimate war aims. Libyan anti-government forces have no say whatsoever concerning the form, means or scope of military operations.

2. The Western powers are currently considering the next steps in their attack, including the possibility of sending in ground troops. It is true that Resolution 1973 does not allow for occupation of Libya. We only have to look a few years back, however, to know that this means little. With Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. said occupation was not the goal, but we all know what the result of the wars perpetrated on these countries were.

3. If the Iraq and Afghanistan experiences are repeated in Libya, then Libya’s future is dark regardless of whether it is the anti-government forces or the Western forces who ultimately depose Gaddaffi. The Western country’s power to make war is overwhelming, but their ability to bring peace, political security and economic prosperity to the countries that are the victims of their wars is sorrowfully weak. In addition, we can be sure that the elites the western governments help to bring to power will be the ones most beneficial to western oil companies, the ones most ready to deliver up Libya’s underground resources.

4. Contrary to what some claim, it has already been proven that western intervention is not the best means to prevent civilian casualties. The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 was disastrous, only serving to increase animosity and fear. In its wake the most horrible of racial cleansing campaigns occurred in Kosovo.

The ultimate goal of the Western power’s military action is to suppress the Arab people’s movement against western imperialism. We condemn the western power’s hypocritical talk of humanitarianism and call on the United States, the United Kingdom and France to end their attack on Libya immediately.

Starting on January 25 the world watched with baited breath for 18 days as the people of Egypt took to the streets, chanting, praying, battling security forces and, above all, calling for the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak. And then it finally happened. On Friday, February 11 the president and his family left Cairo for their home by the Red Sea. Shortly afterwards, Egyptian Vice President Omar Sulieman, appointed 12 days earlier in an attempt to appease protestors, announced that Mubarak had passed all authority to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. The military authorities responded with their third statement in two days in which they promised to, "conduct free and fair presidential elections," and "sponsor the legitimate demands of the people."
The mainstream media has portrayed the January 25 Revolution (as it is now being called) as a spontaneous revolt sparked by the uprising in Tunisia that toppled the government of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on January 14. That Egyptians drew great inspiration from Tunisia is undeniable. In fact, however, the January 25 Revolution has strong roots in the political and socioeconomic structure of Egyptian society. Far from spontaneous, it was the culmination of the organizing of Egyptian democratization activists, young people and worker over the last several years. Understanding this background is important to grasping the true meaning of the January 25. This article investigates January 25th's domestic origins as a basis for assessing the possibilities for structural change the revolution has opened up.

1) Origins of the Revolution: 30 Years of Neoliberalism and Dictatorship
What was it that sent millions of Egyptians into the streets on January 25 and kept them there, and especially in Tahrir (liberation) Square, for the next 18 days? The most immediate cause was the call for a mass protest against police corruption and human rights abuses put out by several opposition and youth organizations. The plan was to rally in front of the Ministry of the Interior on January 25, Egypt's National Police Day, asking for the Minister's resignation. Demands for the day also included restoration of a fair minimum wage, limitation of the presidency to two terms, and repeal of the repressive Emergency Law (explained in detail below). These demands, and the organizers hopes that January 25 would become "something big", grew out of mounting frustration with economic disparity and the repression of democratic rights that have defined Egyptian society for the last several decades.
In Egypt, class polarization, dictatorship and the alliance with the United States are closely intertwined. This configuration of state and society has its origins in the years following the death of Egypt's first president, Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970 during which time the nationalist foreign policy and authoritarian populist system of government that had defined Nasser's rule were dismantled. During the 1970s Nasser's successor, President Anwar Sadat, began an open alliance with Egypt's newly rising urban capitalist class, a product of Nasser's state-led industrialization, and opened the economy to foreign investment. He also concluded a peace agreement with Israel and established an alliance with the U.S. based on acceptance of latter's role as strongman in the region in exchange for billions in military aid and economic assistance. Following the neoliberal agenda promoted by the U.S., IMF and World Bank, Sadat began privatizing public enterprises and cutting public expenditures on healthcare, education, public sector salaries and social security.
Mubarak, who came to power in 1981 after Sadat was assassinated, strengthened the alliance with the U.S. and continued the implementation of neoliberal policies. Economic reforms during the last three decades have included a reduction of food subsidies established during the Nasser era, the rollback of land reform and liberalization of the rural land market, further privatization of state-owned enterprises, greater openness to international financial markets and foreign investment and the establishment of special economic zones (SEZs) where investors enjoy tax concessions and weak labor regulations. The end of land reform sent much of the rural population to the cities, which soon became over-crowed with the poor and unemployed. Privatization was accompanied by layoffs, a reduction in real wages, deterioration of working conditions and labor flexibilization. The SEZ, established through Law No. 83 of 2002, have furthered these downward trends. As Columbia University historian Timothy Mitchell notes, Mubarak's policies put public funds in fewer and fewer hands, diverting resources away from labor-intensive industry, agricultural development and education into the pockets of financers and speculators.
The Mubarak regime developed a strong relationship with a small group of businessmen, whom it favored with government contracts and in the sale of public enterprises. This relationship has been especially tight in recent years, due to the influence of Mubarak's son, Gamal Mubarak, and Ahmad Nazif, Prime Minister from 2004 to January 2011. The business elite has been the main benefactor of Egypt's rather impressive economic growth, (GDP averaged 7% growth per year between 2005 and 2008), which thinly masks rampant poverty and stark class polarization: Some 40% of Egyptians live on less than $2 a day while a hundred families own more than 90% of the country's wealth. Egypt's unemployment rate is near 10% and much higher for youth: 30% of university graduates are unemployed. 60% of all workers are employed in the informal economy.
Mubarak protected the wealth of a few and maintained his regime through widespread repression of democratic rights. An Emergency Law justified as a measure needed to defend against terrorism has been in place consistently since Sadat's assassination in 1981. It grants vast powers to the police, suspends constitutional rights, legalizes censorship, allows the government to imprison individuals indefinitely without charge, sharply restricts street demonstrations, and prohibits unapproved political organizations. Egypt's most recent general elections are known to have been particularly corrupt. In the lead up, the government carried out widespread repression, baring candidates from running, preventing citizens from voting, and arresting a thousand members and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's largest opposition organization, which had made significant gains in the previous elections in 2005.
This deeply entrenched economic disparity and political repression led to ever-increasing anger and was the main impetus behind the revolution. A wide, cross-class segment of the population had come to see the government as acting in the service of someone other than them: itself, the neoliberal elite, the U.S., Israel. The protesters who brought Mubarak down did so based on a complex mix of socioeconomic and political grievances against this government that had turned its back on them and the system it represented.

2) Agents of the Revolution: Youth and Labor
The media has cast a spotlight on Egypt's well-educated youth as the main force behind the protests. It has also highlighted the role of facebook and twitter in mobilizing millions. This emphasis on online social networks makes youth participation in the protests appear highly spontaneous, lacking planning and organization. While it is true that many out in Tahrir square had never been to a demonstration, others had prior experience and have been organizing themselves as a political force over in recent years. The April 6 Youth Movement, one of the main organizers behind the first rally on January 25 and throughout the protests, was originally formed to support workers striking in Mahalla al-Jubra, a textile manufacturing center in the Nile Delta in April 2008. Another group, the We Are All Khaled Said Movement, was organized last year in respond to the police murder of a Khaled Said, a small businessman who posted pictures of cops dividing up drugs they had confiscated during a bust on his personal blog. The group quickly began mobilizing an all out campaign against rampant police violence and corruption. While groups such as these take the form of fluid networks, held together largely though online communication, they are not without leaders, and definitely not without power. Rather, Egypt's youth has found in online media a new mobilizing tool and a form of organization that is adequate to a situation of widespread repression and in tune with the cyberspace age.
Two other forces have received considerable media attention: the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, and the liberal National Association for Change, particularly its leader, Mohammed ElBaradei. In addition to being the largest opposition organization in Egypt, the former has been highlighted because it raises the specter of radical Islam, particularly for the Americans. This despite the fact that it has, for several years, eschewed armed resistance in favor of working within the legal system and was largely tolerated by the regime until the last general elections. ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA until the end of 2009, has received wide coverage because he became the official representative of the protesters in negotiations with the government and because his aspirations to the presidency are well known. In fact however, neither the Muslim Brotherhood nor ElBaradei played a central role in organizing or leading the January 25 Revolution. Both took a wary stance towards the original demonstration on January 25, ElBaradei saying that, while he supported the protests, he hoped they would not "degenerate."
There is another important agent in this struggle, one that has received much less attention than it deserves. This is Egyptian labor. Between February 9~11, tens of thousands public and private sector workers from a wide range of industries (textile, military equipment, postal, shipping, hospital, administration, etc.) went on strike. The labor actions were greeted with great enthusiasm by the protestors in Tahrir Square, who recognized their significance in putting pressure on the regime. In international labor circles, these strikes are credited with turning the tides decisively against the regime.
When we say Egyptian labor here, it is important to be clear about whom we are talking. We are not talking about the government-controlled Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF). Since its establishment as the Egyptian Workers Federation in 1957 (it was later reorganized as the ETUF in 1961), the ETUF has been controlled by the government and used as a tool to quell labor unrest. It should be no surprise, therefore, that the ETUF took a stance against "the calls of destruction" and in "full support for legitimacy for President Hosny [sic] Mubarak.. .. as a great leader keen to the interests of his people and his nation" during the protests.
By law, all local unions in Egypt are required to affiliate to the ETUF. The workers who went on strike during February 9~11, however, did so outside of the ETUF structure, forming strike committees to lead and represent them. This sort of labor organizing is by no means without precedent. Since the mid 1980s, Egyptian workers have struck in reaction to the results of Mubarak's neoliberal agenda. Since the mid 1980s, Egyptian workers have struck in reaction to the results of Mubarak's neoliberal agenda. From 1984-1989 Washington Consensus policies, such as a doubling of mandatory wage reductions for healthcare and pension plans, were met with a series of protest actions, which involved tactics as radical as the blocking of traffic, arson and the destruction of train cars. From 2004 to 2009, over 1.7 million workers participated in more than 1,900 strikes and other actions, during which time workers electing strike committees similar to those that led the actions during February 9~11. These actions climaxed with the textile strikes in April 2008 that inspired the formation of the April 6 Youth Movement. Along with mass protests against the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, they are credited by some with having "inculcated a culture of protest in Egypt" and contributed centrally to "the formation of a consciousness of citizenship and rights."
Labor action over the last several years has developed into a nascent democratic union movement. A strike by 55,000 municipal tax collectors in December 2007 not only won its economic demands, but also led to the formation of the Independent General Union of Real Estate Tax Authority Workers, the first union completely outside the ETUF, in 2009. On January 30, in the midst of the early days of the Revolution, independent unions and workers committees declared the formation of the Egyptian Federation for Independent Unions (EFTU), an alliance complete independent of the ETUF.
While some workers who struck last week limited their goals to the achievement of economic demands, a substantial number called for the downfall of Mubarak's regime. Some have gone even further to make demands that suggest a desire for a deep political, social and economic transformation. Steel and iron workers, for example, issued a statement calling for: 1) Immediate resignation of the president and all men and symbols of the regime, 2) confiscation of funds and property of all symbols of the regime and everyone proven corrupt, 3) dismantling of the ETUF and the formation of independent unions, 4) confiscation of public sector companies that have been sold, closed down, or privatized; nationalization of the public sector "in the name of the people" with new management by workers and technicians, 5) formation of workers' monitoring committees in all workplaces to monitor production, prices, distribution and wages, 6) the convening of constitutional assembly with representatives from all sectors, to revise the constitution. The newly formed EFTU's demands include: a minimum wage of 1200 LE (roughly 4 times the official minimum set in 1984) and a maximum wage no more than 10 times the minimum, the right to adequate social security, healthcare, housing, education, pensions and benefits and freedom of association. The articulation of these demands indicate an important direction for the Egyptian democracy movement and suggest that workers and independent unions role will be as vital in the days to come as it was before Mubarak's resignation.

3) The Place of the Military
With Mubarak gone, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is now in command of the country. The officer on top, Council Chairman Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi was Mubarak's Minister of Defense until February 11. He is known to be strident opponent of political change, although he did gain favor with protestors by mingling with them in Tahrir Square and other populist gestures. The military authorities now in charge had strong ties to Mubarak's regime, and the United States, and gained considerably from these alliances. All of this makes one wonder why the majority of protestors were adamant that the military step in the days leading up to Mubarak's departure.
The army's restraint during the demonstrations was an important factor in winning protesters' approval. Moreover, the military has been granted a great deal of legitimacy since Nasser's time, when it gained respect for confronting Israel and the West. In addition, common soldiers and junior officers have watched their real wages fall in recent years, making their complaints very similar to those held by other Egyptian young people. In fact, however, the military elite benefit greatly from the established system. The military has been the beneficiary of nearly $40 billion in American aid over the last 30 years, which it has put to good use. It not only controls security and a growing defense industry, but also owns companies in several industries, including cement, construction gasoline, olive oil and water. It has developed huge areas of desert and coastal property into shopping malls, gated cities and beach resorts, which cater to local and international consumers and tourists. Clearly, therefore, the military authorities have a deep investment in a quick conclusion to the protests and a status quo, which may be one reason they have been reluctant to turn any authority over to opposition political leaders.
On the other hand, many demonstrators appear convinced of their ability to push the military, and any government that follows it, in the right direction. Asked by a reporter what the demonstrators would do if the military sought to impose its own brand of rule, one organizer responded, "We know the way to Tahrir Square."

4) What comes next?
The military authorities have now dissolved the Parliament, largely deemed illegitimate, and promised to hold elections in 6 months in keeping with protesters' demands. They have also now convened a panel of legal expert charged with drafting amendments to the Constitution, after originally saying they would keep the task for themselves. Significantly, the panel includes members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition groups and has been met with approval by protest leaders. On the other hand, the military authorities have announced a ban on meetings by labor unions, effectively forbidding strikes, and have maintained the Emergency Law. Many protesters are generally pleased with the clear timeline proposed for the transition to civilian rule. Strikes continue despite the, however, and a group of protesters has refused to leave Tahrir Square, claiming they will remain until all their demands are met.
With nothing to check the power of the military authorities aside from protests, the Egyptian people face the immediate task of forcing them to keep their promises. But even if they are able to do this and power is transferred to a democratically elected civilian government this will not, by any means, guarantee fundamental change. It will take determined efforts to dismantle the power of the business and military elite and a reversal of the neoliberal policies now entrenched in the Egyptian economy, to address Egypt's vast inequalities. It is unlikely that liberal politicians like ElBaradei have the political will to carry out such measures without strong pressure from below. As one Egyptian journalist noted, Elbaradei is "not the man for" a radical redistribution of wealth. Neither is he likely to break off the relationship with the United States, particularly while the military is still an influential player in Egyptian politics.
Some international commentators are rather skeptical about Egypt's future. John Weeks, a professor of economics at the University of London, for instance, comments, "Extremists are likely to come to power in Tunisia and Egypt, extremists of the neoliberal variety." He notes that this has been the case in Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe and South Africa, where the transition from dictatorship to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s led to rise of governments that were, "neoliberal to the core." "When progressive forces are weak," he writes, "the agents of capital are strong, and prepared as they always are to step into the power vacuum. . . The IMF is not far behind."
South Korea's experience says a lot about the difficulties that may lie ahead. The 1987 June Uprising, a movement of similar proportions to the January 25 Revolution, made possible the transition from military dictatorship to a liberal democratic form of government. This was a great achievement of the Korean people's struggle. One the other hand, the democratization movement was not able to set is sights far beyond the demand for the holding of direct elections, seeing this as the most feasible means for ending the dictatorship. When the government consented to direct elections on June 29, the movement turned its attention towards debates about which opposition candidate to support, rather than pushing for more fundamental change. In the end, the opposition failed to unite. Direct elections provided legitimacy for the presidency of military general Roh Tae Woo came to power the following year. Through this process, and the subsequent merging of political parties, the military reached a compromise with the opposition through which it maintained a good deal of its power. The socioeconomic system that supported this power remained basically intact. The presidents who have come after, including Kim Dae Jung, have pursued neoliberalism to the determent of workers' livelihoods and rights.
The June Uprising opened up importance space for Korean workers, represented by the massive strike waves that followed. July and August of 1987 brought not only determined struggles for wage increase, but also the advance of democratic unions. The development of democratic unionism was an important continuation of the democratization movement in South Korea, as it will be in Egypt. Unfortunately the Korean labor movement was not united or experienced enough to organize as a decisive political force. It was also regretfully unprepared to confront the IMF when it arrived in full force in 1997-1998. If the Egyptian democracy movement can learn anything from the experience of South Korea, it is the importance of a good understanding of history, a long-term perspective on revolution, a correct analysis of neoliberalism and the strength to work through internal divisions.

5) Not the end of the Revolution, but the Beginning
But for Egyptians, this should be a time not for pessimism, but for hope and renewed determination. During the days leading up to Mubarak's departure, the possibility of something different became clearly visible. Protesters in Tahrir Square got a taste not only of their own power, but of what democracy feels like. They set up their own clinics, sound stages, security teams and clean-up crews. Christians guarded Muslims while they prayed and vise versa. Women came out in surprising numbers and some played leadership roles. Workers began practicing democracy through strike committees and the establishment of an independent union federation. On top of all this, the people of Egypt have made far-reaching demands that aim, not only at the replacement of the regime, but also the eradication of a corrupt elite and economic equality. It is now up to them to articulate the relationship between the redistribution of wealth and real democracy and create a sustained long-term struggle-a revolutionary one-that can achieve both.
The international labor and people's movement can play a role as well. Throughout the last three weeks unions and left organizations have supported the people of Egypt, organizing solidarity protests and getting information out past Mubarak's censorship and putting pressure on home government that, in turn, put pressure on the regime. These efforts must not stop simply because Mubarak is gone. Exchange, solidarity and international protest must continue as Egyptians continue to demonstrate. The nascent independent union movement must develop into a real political actor and strong force for protecting workers' rights. Exchange with unions in other countries and the support international unions can greatly further this goal. Finally, the international left must take to heart the message of the people of Egypt, a message which is now resonating across Northern Africa and the Middle East: Revolution is not easy, but it is possible.

Wol-san Liem
Research Institute for Alternative Workers Movements

This December 18 with be the 11th International Migrants Day. Founded in December 2000, International Migrants Day marks the anniversary of the General Assembly’s adoption of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of the Families (hereafter, the Convention) on December 18, 1990. Around the world, migrant workers and their supporters will use this day to demand changes in national policies, work conditions and social practices that are discriminatory and oppressive towards non-nationals, and call on governments to ratify the Convention, which sets minimum basic standards states must respect.

In the last several decades, recognition of migration as a global phenomenon and the importance of migrant labor to the global economy has increased significantly. Most governments now at least give lip service to the need to protect migrants’ human rights. Nonetheless, only 43 countries, the majority of which are countries of origin, have ratified the Convention. South Korea is among the countries that has not.

If we look at South Korean policies towards migrant workers, this fact is not surprising. The Convention states that, &Migrant workers and members of their families shall be entitled to effective protection by the State against violence physical injury, threats and intimidation, whether by public officials or by private individuals, groups or institutions& (Article 16, clause 2) and that they &shall not be subjected individually or collectively to arbitrary arrest or detention& (Article 16, clause 4). The South Korean government’s sole method for dealing with undocumented migration, however, is to carry out indiscriminate and often violent immigration raids, detain all of those arrested and deport them with out trial. The tragic death of a migrant workers as a result of these policies last month, shows just how brutal they are. On October 29, immigration officers raided a factory in the Gasan district of Seoul during a concentrated immigration crackdown carried out ahead of the G20 Summit. When Trinh Cong Quan, a 35-year-old Vietnamese worker and the father of a 4-month old daughter, found all exits blocked he tried to escape through a second story window. Quan fell and was severely injured. After lying in a coma for several days, he passed away on November 3. Far from taking responsibility, the Seoul Immigration Service simply claimed it had followed legally prescribed procedures and therefore owed nothing to Quan’s bereaved family.

In the area of labor rights, the Convention states that migrant workers shall not be discriminated against with respect to work conditions, remuneration, rest, health and safety measures and termination of the employment relationship (Article 25, clauses 1-3). In contradiction to these principles, the South Korean government’s Employment Permit System, maintains strict restrictions on the freedom to change workplaces and gives the power to employers to terminate labor contracts at will. By exacerbating the unequal relationship between employers and workers, this system enabling a wide range of rights violations, including under and non-payment of wages, forced overtime and lack of respect of health and safety standards.

Ratification of the International Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers signifies acknowledgement by states of their responsibility to work actively to eradicate this sort of discrimination. Thus, demands for ratification have important symbolic meaning. Ratification, however, does not guaranteed change, only a general acceptance of the need for change. Moreover, the standards prescribed in the Convention are highly limited, given that they represented the lowest common denominator to which the General Assembly could agree. Even more important, therefore, than demands for ratification are the struggles of migrants themselves to gain recognition as workers, as members of society and as the subjects of rights.

Many times the demands made in these self-determined struggles go beyond the rights guaranteed in the Convention. The Convention, for example, guarantees the right to basic education for all migrants (Article 30), but acess to educational institutions equal to that of nationals only to documented migrants (Article 43). In the United States, undocumented migrant youth are demanding more. They have fought for several years for passage of the Dream Act, which would guarantee them the right to attend college, access to financial support for higher education and pathways to legal permanent residence. This fight has not yet been won and the legitimacy of the Act has recently been tarnished by its attachment to the National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2011 and the inclusion of a provision that would require young people who could not go to college to serve in the military to achieve permanent residence. Nonetheless, the Dream Act struggle has empowered undocumented migrant youth as a real political force in American society and made their situation impossible to ignore. It has already given birth to dozens of talented young activists who will lead the fight for migrants rights in the United States well into the future.

In South Korea, migrant workers have been fighting for the right to freedom of association since 2005 through the Seoul-Gyeonggi-Migrants Trade Union (MTU). The Convention only protects the migrants’ rights to freely join trade unions and participate in their activities (Article 26). Since its founding, however, MTU has insisted that migrants have the right not only to join but also to form their own unions, a right which under the South Korean Constitution applies to all workers, regardless of social status. Through their persistent organizing in the face of government repression, the members of MTU have demonstrated that they are in fact the subjects of this right regardless of what the South Korean government says. Their efforts, in conjunction with the efforts of migrant worker in other countries, have led to international recognition. In November 2009, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) and the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) issued recommendations to the South Korean government, clearly recognizing the right of migrant workers, documented and undocumented to form and join trade unions of their choosing and calling on the government to immediately recognize MTU’s status as a legal union.

In addition to these unequivocal statements, the ILO and UN recommendations also recognized the South Korean governments’ continued targeting of MTU officers for arrest and deportation under the pretext of immigration law violations as contrary to the principle of freedom of association, and called for an end to such attacks. Despite these recommendations, however, the South Korean government has not stopped its efforts to undermine MTU. Following the arrest and deportation of MTU officers in 2007 and 2008, the Immigration Service is again after the union’s leadership. It has issued a summons to MTU President Michel Catuira, a documented migrant worker, claiming he has not maintained a legitimate employment relationship and has engaging in political activities prohibited under the Immigration Control Law. In the meantime, the East Seoul Branch of the Seoul Regional Ministry of Employment and Labor has cancelled the employment permit granted the President Catuira’s employer clearly seeking to give credibility to the Immigration Service’s charges.

These measures are an obvious effort on to undermine MTU. If President Catuira is found to have violated the Immigration Control Law, he will lose his visa and become immediately deportable. It can only be assumed that this is precisely what the Immigration Services has in mind.

Sadly, the pressure being placed on President Catuira has received very little attention in the wider South Korean labor movement. Perhaps this is because of the general weakness of the movement at present, or perhaps its is because such attacks on MTU’s leadership have become so commonplace. Whatever the reason, the lack of response is unfortunate for several reasons. First, given that MTU is an affiliate of the KCTU Seoul Regional Council and President Michel a KCTU officer, these actions by the government represent an assault on KCTU as a whole and the freedom of association rights of Korean workers in general. Second, as migrant workers make up an increasingly significant part of the South Korean labor force organizing them becomes ever more important if the labor movement is to regain its power and ability of to defend workers wages, conditions and rights. MTU, as a union organizing migrant workers, must therefore be protected. Finally, the attack on President Catuira is representative of the racist nature of the South Korean state, whose policies reproduce the low social and economic status of non-white foreigners. In that racism serves to divide us--to keep us from uniting as workers and common people--it is a structure of oppression that victimizes all of us.

Migrant workers and migrant support organizations will mark International Migrants Day with a protest at Marronnier Park on Sunday, December 19. Labor and social movement actors can show their support for the rights of migrants by coming at in force. As we celebrate the day and call for ratification of the UN Migrants convention, we should also make a strong demand for an end to the attack on President Catuira and the continued violation of migrant workers freedom of association rights. In the long-term. if we are to reverse the entrenchment of racial hierarchy in South Korean society and enable the unity of all workers and common people, migrant and non-migrant activists must use our collective wisdom to find new ways to organize and empower migrant workers as a social and political force.

During the assembly, which lasted for several hours, participants shared their experience as women in the workplace with one another. The women were diverse in terms of occupation, including: public servants, educators, office workers, service workers, factory workers, care workers and cleaning workers. While the details of their jobs differ, however, the women found they have a common experience of oppression and discrimination as women living and working in a patriarchal society. The majority were irregular workers, suffering from low wages and lack of job security. Many shared experiences of being discriminated against, belittled and/or sexually harassed by colleagues or bosses who saw them simply as easy victims. Rather than remaining silent about these experiences, the women at the assembly chose to raise their voices to condemn the maltreatment and call for change.

The Assembly program also included speeches by women from unions currently on strike, including KEC Semi-conductors and Jaeneung Education. Performances by women union members, including singing by cleaning workers and a dance by care workers, were received enthusiastically by the audience as was a skit that illustrated the realities of women workers' lives.

By the end of the assembly participants had made a firm commitment to one another to work together to overcome discrimination and improve their work conditions. The also vowed to leave the periphery of their unions to become central actors in the workers movement and proclaimed the importance of a feminist perspective to union revitalization.

While the first Women Union Members' Assembly was held in Seoul many people have suggested that it be expanded to a national scale in the future. PSSP agrees with this proposal and hopes to work with other organizations and unions for its realization.

Wol-san Liem
Research Institute for Alternative Workers Movements

Yesterday (December 9), members of the Hyundai Motors Irregular Workers Chapter of the Korean Metal Workers Union (KMWU) left factory 1 of the Hyundai Plant in Ulsan. Their departure marked the end of a 25-day long occupation, which they had endured without adequate food, water or bedding.

Today, representatives from the Hyundai Motors Irregular Workers Chapter, the Hyundai Motors Local Branch (regular workers), and the KMWU sat down with representatives from Hyundai Motors and its in-house subcontractors. In accordance with an agreement reached between the President of the Irregular Workers Chapter, Lee Sang-su, President of the Local Branch, Lee Gyeong-hun and President of the KMWU, they presented the following 4 demands: 1) Cancellation of damage suits and charges against workers who participated in the occupation, and payment of medical bills; 2) guarantee of reinstatement for those who participated in the occupation, 3) protection for strike leaders, and 4) a plan for negotiations concerning the regularization of illegal dispatch workers.

While negotiations have begun, it will be an uphill battle to get demands met, and take even more determination before the ultimate goal of regularization for illegal dispatch workers is achieved. Past experience including a similar struggle in 2005, has shown that without the pressure of a factory occupation it is not likely that Hyundai Motors will yield much ground. For this reason many of the striking workers had not wanted to leave factory 1 until after their demands were met in full, and originally pledge to continue the occupation until Hyundai agreed to employ them directly as regular workers.

In reality, however, the striking irregular workers have faced increasingly difficult conditions in the last several days. In addition to repression at the hands of Hyundai Motors, they have been put under growing pressure by the leadership of the Hyundai Local Branch to bring their struggle to a speedy conclusion. While the KMWU Delegates Assembly voted in favor of a general strike in support of the irregular workers struggle on December 22, it had not set a firm date. Meanwhile, President Lee Gyeong-hun of the Hyundai Motors Local Branch determined to put the general strike to a second vote at a Branch general assembly, despite the fact that the KMWU Constitution gives the delegates assembly the right to call for a general strike. When the Hyundai Motors Local Branch leadership could have been educating its members on the importance of regular-irregular workers solidarity and preparing for the general strike, it was instead suggesting to its members that it was time for struggle to be over.

With knowledge of the negative result of the Branch general assembly, and the reality that the second vote signified the cancellation of general strike plans and the loss of support from the Branch, the irregular workers set to heated debate within the factory about whether to go one with their occupation or agree to leave and begin negotiations with a set of less than satisfactory demands. In the end, they chose to accept the demands listed above as a basis for negotiation and entrusted the decision to continue or end the occupation to the Chapter leadership. After meeting with the KMWU and Branch presidents, Lee Sang-su declared an end to the occupation.

Sadly, the conclusion of the occupation demonstrates clearly the limits of the solidarity between regular and irregular workers developed in the beginning of the strike and, even more so, the lack of will on the part of the Hyundai Motors Branch's leadership to support a strike that it should have recognized as the struggle of all Hyundai workers.

Nonetheless, there have been important victories through this struggle. The consciousness and daring of a few irregular workers quickly spread throughout the Irregular Workers Chapter and from Ulsan to Asan to Jeonju. The hundreds who participated in the strike have been transformed through the experience, coming to recognizing their common cause and developing the power and courage to demand their right to be treated equally. They constructed and made use of democratic decision-making structures even in the midst of the cruel conditions of their factory occupation, and formed a still growing sense of class-consciousness. Despite the fact that they will return to work on December 13, Hyundai irregular workers have vowed to continue organizing among their colleagues and preparing for the next phase of the struggle for regularization. As one reporter commented, the end of the factory occupation at the Ulsan plant represents, "a victory for the Hyundai irregular workers themselves, but a loss for the labor movement as a whole."

It is the power of class-consciousness and unity that makes struggle possible. The struggle, therefore, will surely go on.