Peace Build Bomb Destroy

Let's Make Asis Nuclear Free

* 다음의 자료는 올해 2월 18일부터 20일까지 사흘 동안 방글라데시 다카에서 열린 <다카회의>의 관련자료들입니다. <평화는 건설하고 폭탄은 파괴한다: 아시아를 비핵지대로 만들자>라는 행사 제목에서 알 수 있듯이 아시아지역의 평화 NGO들간의 국제회의였으며, 14개국의 150명이 넘는 평화운동가와 학자들이 참가했다고 합니다. 그리고 이 회의는 □Focus on the Global South□와 □Communtity Development Library□(CDL)이 공동으로 주최하였습니다.

* 자료들은 이번 국제회의의 <기본개념>, <CASAP의 제안>, <핵심 문헌> 등으로 구성되어 있습니다.

* □Focus on the Global South□의 홈페이지(http://www.focusweb.org/nuclear/index.html)에서 모든 자료들을 보실 수 있습니다.

* 자료중의 일부 한글번역본은 □평화인권연대□가 발행하는 격주간 소식지 □평화연대□에 실린 글을 퍼온 것들입니다.

* 또한 다카회의 한국참가자 김용한 선생과의 인터뷰 역시 평화인권연대 소식지에서 퍼온 글입니다. (이번 다카회의에 대한 간략한 소개가 담긴 글입니다.)

<Concept>

Concept of the South Asia-Southeast Asia Activists' Conference on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament

<CASAP>

CASAP Proposal for a New Architecture: the South Asia Chapter

<List of key documents>

1. □ALTERNATIVE VOICES□

Adilur Rahman Khan

2. □Building a Nuclear-free Zone in Korean Peninsula and Japan□

Ph. D. Kim, Yong-Han

(한글번역 포함)

3. □Networks for the Year 2000 and Beyond□

Romulo D. Peralta (Co-Coordinator, Conferential Network on Peace Disarmament and Symbiosis In The Asia-Pacific, PDSAP)

4. □China's Security Policy□

Tao Wenzhao (Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

5. □Alternative Security□

Hiromichi Umebayashi (Executive Director The Peace Depot, Japan. International Coordinator

Pacific Campaign for Disarmament and Security)

(한글번역 포함)

6. □De-Nuclearization Challenges in Asia for the 21st Century□

Roland Simbulan (Professor, University of the Philippines. National Chairperson, Nuclear-Free Philippines Coalition)

7. □Diplomatic Judo: Using the NPT to Make the Nuclear-Weapons States Negotiate the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons□

Zia Mian & M. V. Ramana

8. □Kwajalein Atoll and the new arms race Ballistic Missile Defence and the Asia-Pacific Region□

Pacific Concerns Resource Center Inc.

(한글번역 포함)

9. □Law and Civil Society: Resources for Nuclear Disarmament□

John Burroughs (Hague Appeal for Peace., International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, Lawyers□ Committee on Nuclear Policy)

10. □Living with South Asian Nuclear Reality□

Iftekharuzzaman

11. □Living with South Asian Nuclear Reality□

Dr. Joseph Gerson (American Friends Service Committee)

12. □The Peace Movement, sunny side up, please□.

Sonia Jabbar

*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*

다카회의에 관한 짧은 인터뷰

■

인터뷰/ 최정민 (평화인권연대 상임활동가)

답변 / 김용한 (문학박사, 주한미군기지반환운동연대, 집행위원장)

1. 다카 회의에 대해서 소개를 부탁드립니다. (회의 성격, 역사, 참가단체 등등,,,)

다카회의는 지난 2월 18일부터 20일까지 사흘 동안 방글라데시 다카에 있는 □푸르바니 호텔 인터내셔널□이라는 곳에서 열렸습니다. 열네 나라에서 150명이 넘는 평화 운동가와 학자들이 참가했지요.  <평화는 건설하고 폭탄은 파괴한다 : 아시아를 비핵지대로 만들자>는 행사 제목에서 알 수 있듯이, 아시아 지역 평화 NGO 회의였습니다. 그런데 그냥 아시아 지역이라기보다 주로 남아시아 문제를 중심으로 다루었습니다. 지난 98년 5월 인도와 파키스탄이 핵 실험을 한 뒤 남아시아 지역이 핵 위협을 가장 심각하게 받게 되었기 때문이죠.  99년 2월 파키스탄에서 평화 NGO들이 평화회의를 열었는데, 이번이 남아시아서 열린 두 번째 평화회의였던 셈입니다. 주최는 잘 아시는 포커스(Focus on the Global South)와 CDL(Communtity Development Library)이 함께 했습니다.

물론 방글라데시와 인도, 파키스탄에서 가장 많이 참가했습니다. 그밖에 포커스 공동대표 월든 벨로 교수와 마르코, 짐,  CDL의 하룬 대표, 미국 AFSC(친우봉사회)의 죠셉 거슨, □Abolition 2000□의 죤 버럽스, 중국 사회과학대학 미국학 연구소의 타오 웬차오, 필리핀 비핵동맹(NFPC)의 코라손 파브로스, 인도의 람다스 장군, 파키스탄의 지아 박사, 일본 피스 데포의 우메바야시 히로미치, 일본 원폭피해자단체협회의 다나카 테루미 부대표, 피지 PCRC의 닉 맥럴런, 프랑스의 하르쉬 카푸르, 그밖에 네팔, 말레이시아, 스릴랑카 같은 나라에서도 많이 참가했습니다.

2. 이번 회의에서 주로 논의된 내용과 성과물은 무엇입니까?

아침 저녁으로 전체 모임을 가졌고, 매일 서너 개의 분임조를 만들어 토론을 벌였습니다. 토의 주제만 보면 이렇습니다.

- 핵무기, 남아시아의 현실과 남아시아 지역의 위협, 국가들의 무감각과 국민들의 반응

- 현재 막다른 골목에 다다른 전 세계의 핵/가로막힌 CTBT와 START

- 비무장을 다시 의제로 끌어들이기: 평화 운동의 역할

- 핵무기, 군국주의, 인권 그리고 민주주의

- 핵무기에 반대하는 정치, 사회적으로 포괄적인 논쟁

- 핵무기 비무장을 향하여: 포괄적 접근, 핵무기조약(NWC), 핵확산금지조약(NPT) 개괄 등

- 증가하고 변화하는 척도들: 비핵무기지대(NWFZs), FMCT, Freezes 등

- 전 세계의 연대 건설, 2000년을 위한 대안 네트워크 창설, 전략과 행동

- 반핵 메시지를 전파하기 위한 자료 생산, 전략과 행동

- 안보의 대안 개념: 핵무기는 끝났다. 전략과 행동

- 대중 교육을 위한 특별 전략, 지역과 국가의 지원, 교육 자료 생산

- 전 세계의 맥락 속에서 남아시아를 전략화하기, 아이디어, 도구, 그리고 작업 계획

- 남아시아 반핵 연대를 향하여

- 전 세계가 비핵화를 향해 첫 발을 내딛게 하기 위한 아시아의 기여

각 분임조에서는 서너 명이 기본 발제를 한 뒤 토론을 했으며, 저는 월든 벨로와 함께 마지막 날 전체 토의 자리에서 발제를 맡았고, 그 내용은 <평화인권연대> 지난 호 소식지에 실렸습니다.

이런 토의 결과를 바탕으로 발표한 <다카 선언>이 바로 다카 회의의 가장 큰 성과물이라고 할 수 있겠습니다.  이 선언에서 우리는 인도와 파키스탄의 핵무장 프로그램을 강력하게 반대함은 물론, 미국, 영국, 프랑스, 러시아, 중국 같은 이른바 5대 핵강국들에게도 핵확산금지조약 (NPT)에서 규정한 비무장 의무와  국제사법재판소 1996년 결정을 따르라고 요구했으며, 특히 그들이 사용하고 있는 핵실험 기지들을 폐쇄하고, 새 무기 개발도 중단할 것이며, CTBT를 비준하고, 그 정신에 따라 행동하라고 강력히 요구했습니다.

3. 지난 헤이그 평화회의에서도 아시아 지역의 비핵지대화란 주제를 가지고 여러 가지 포럼이 열렸던 것으로 알고 있습니다. 이 포럼들에는 북한에서도 참여하여 몇 가지 문제점들을 제기하였다고 들었는데요 이번 회의에서 이 부분에 대한 언급이 있었는지, 어떤 식으로 북한의 참여를 유도할 수 있을 것인지에 대해서 말씀해 주십시오.

뒷 질문부터 답하자면, 이번에는 북한 문제나 북한 인사의 동참 문제에 대해 거의 언급하지 않았습니다. 헤이그에서도 제가 같은 주제로 발제를 한 일이 있지만, 그 때는 주최가 <피스 보트>였고, 북한 대표도 초청하여 긴장감이 돌았던 게 사실입니다. 일본 사회당의 도이 다카고 당수가 그 역사적 광경을 보러 직접 참석했을 정도니까요. 하지만 이번에는 그런 긴장감이 없었습니다. 그래도 방글라데시는 남북이 함께 수교를 맺고 있기 때문에 우리 정부에서 신경이 쓰였는지, 나중에 CDL 대표한테 들어보니, 다카 주재 한국 대사관에서 전화로 저에 대해 자세히  물었다더군요. 그뒤 회의장에 다녀갔다는데, 저는 못 봤습니다. 그건 그렇고, <피스 보트> 관계자들은 남북한 평화운동가들이 한 자리에 앉을 수 있는 기회를 꼭 만들겠다며 저에게 몇 번이고 다짐했습니다. 저도 헤이그에서 사적으로만 만나고 공식 토론회장에서 못 만난 게 너무 아쉬웠는데, <피스 보트>의 교섭력을 믿고 기다리고 있습니다. 헤이그에서 제가 제안한 □2000년 8월 동해 선상회의□를 성사시키기 위해 노력하고 있다고도 들었습니다. 잘 하면 올해 안에 가능하지 않을까 싶습니다.

4. 아시아 지역의 비핵지대화를 위해서 다자간 안보조약의 체결 등 많은 대안들이 논의되고 있는 것으로 알고 있습니다. 구체적으로 어떤 내용들인지 소개를 부탁드리고 어떻게 활동을 아시아 지역에서 벌여나가고 있는지, 한국의 활동가들은 어떤 방식으로 개입하고 활동해야 하는지 의견을 부탁드립니다.

혼자 비핵지대를 선언한 나라도 있고, 몇 나라가 공동으로 조약을 맺은 경우도 있습니다. 92년 한반도 비핵화 공동 선언이나, 97년 발효된 동남아비핵지대조약이 그렇습니다. 동북아시아 지역도 그런 조약이 필요한데, 문제는 러시아와 중국, 미국 같은 핵 보유 초강국들이 반대한다는데 있습니다. 비핵 지대에서는, 자기들의 핵 잠수함이 마음대로 다니기 힘들기 때문이죠. 해결책은 두 가지라고 봅니다. 하나는 5대 핵 강국의 기득권을 인정하지 않고는 아무 것도 안 되니, 그들의 양해를 얻을 수 있는 방안을 찾자는 것이고, 다른 하나는 원칙을 제시하고 그 5대 강국까지 압박하자는 것입니다. 이 문제를 깊이 연구하고 있는 우메바야시 선생의 주장은 3+3 방식, 그러니까 남북한과 일본 세 나라가 공동으로 비핵지대를 선언하고, 미국, 러시아, 중국 세 나라가 보장하는 방식입니다. 저는 그 주장의 현실성을 인정하면서 이미 세계 여러 곳에 있는 비핵지대 조약을 바탕으로 NGO 차원에서 □아시아 지역 비핵지대 조약□ 초안을 만들고, 각 정부가 서명하도록 압력을 넣자는 것입니다. 거의 같은 주장 같지만 전혀 다른 접근 방식이라더군요. 어쨌든 여러 차례 토론을 벌여 가장 현실적이면서도 훌륭한 방안을 찾아야겠죠. 이 문제에 관심을 갖는 한국 활동가들은 초기 단계이니만큼 PCDS, PCRC, NFPC 같은 단체의 도움을 받으며 자주 만나야 되지 않을까 싶네요.

5. 2000년 많은 국제회의와 행사들이 준비되고 있지만 그 중 7월에 오끼나와에서 개최되는 G8 회담에 많은 관심이 집중되고 있는 것 같습니다. 다카회의에서 7월 전략들이 논의가 되었는지, 어떻게 논의가 되고 있는지 궁금합니다.

별다른 이야기가 없었습니다. 오히려 9월 유럽, 11월 일본에서 비핵지대 회의를  준비하고 있고, 제가 10월 서울에서도 했으면 좋겠다는 제안을 한 정도입니다. 다만 오키나와는 하나의 준비위원회를 꾸려 한 곳으로 집중하는 방식이 아니라, 수많은 주제를 가지고 수많은 단체가 □따로 또 같이□ 여는 방식이 될 듯합니다. 오키나와는 일본 영토의 0.6%밖에 안 되는 섬인데, 주일 미군 기지의 75%가 몰려 있기 때문에 미군 문제가 중심이 될 것으로 보입니다.

6. 끝으로 바쁘신 와중에 인터뷰에 응해주셔서 대단히 감사드립니다.

제가 오히려 감사드립니다. 발표된 문건은 굉장히 많은데 아직도 완전히 정리하지 못했습니다. 그래서 꼭 코끼리 다리만 만져보고 코끼리에 대해 인터뷰 당한 기분이군요. 어쨌든 국제 평화 운동의 한쪽 흐름을 조금이라도 이해하시는데 도움이 됐으면 좋겠습니다. 감사합니다. ◑

<CONCEPT>

Concept of the South Asia-Southeast Asia Activists' Conference on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament

More than one and a half years after India and Pakistan crossed the nuclear threshold, the nuclear danger has increased, it has not decreased, in both Asia and the world as a whole. The two states remain locked in unrelenting rivalry, mutual suspicion and hostility. Their 10 weeks-long bloody confrontation across the Kashmir border at Kargil, during which they repeatedly exchanged covert nuclear threats, has gravely aggravated the situation. The military takeover in Pakistan has further complicated matters.

India has ignited a new nuclear arms race in Asia by signalling through its Draft Nuclear Doctrine an intention to develop an extremely ambitious, open-ended, huge, nuclear arsenal with land, sea and air capabilities. The Pakistani and especially the Chinese responses to the move confirm some of the worst fears that the peace movement has had of a potentially uncontrollable disastrous arms race in the region.

At the global level, there have been two other major setbacks: the enlargement of NATO with an extremely offensive nuclear doctrine despite the end of Cold War rivalry; and the U.S. Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty put up to it for ratification. Moves are afoot to develop a highly destabilising Theatre Missile Defence system in East Asia, and to undermine the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty so as to permit "Star Wars" technology development on a large scale. Today, there is every danger that the post-Cold War momentum in favour of nuclear restraint and disarmament will be arrested and reversed.

The development of a global mass-scale nuclear disarmament movement has become a major imperative. This casts a special responsibility on the peace movement worldwide and in South Asia and Southeast Asia in particular. Indian and Pakistani activists are now called upon to agitate and mobilise public opinion in their own countries, and also to interact and develop campaigning strategies jointly with activists from other regions, especially in Asia They must together use every available forum for advocacy and lobbying in favour of nuclear disarmament.

There is a new and growing interest in nuclear issues among peace and human rights activists in Southeast Asia, as reflected in, among other things, a campaign against superpower military bases in the ASEAN region. There is growing awareness of the importance of nuclear weapons-free zones and of implementing the Bangkok Treaty for such a zone in Southeast Asia.

Activists in the Asian continent are called upon to play a pivotal role in reversing the negative developments of the recent past, and in advancing the cause of nuclear disarmament and peace.

At a July 1998 Conference on Alternative Security, organised by Focus on the Global South in Manila, a proposal was floated for holding a South Asian-Southeast Asian Activists' Conference on nuclear weapons and disarmament. Since then, the proposal has been discussed at various levels within different countries and among diverse groups in Asia. It has drawn an enthusiastic response. It is urgently necessary to hold such a Conference within the South Asian region as soon as possible.

The Basic Objectives of the Conference are to:

□ Develop a collective critique of the nuclear policies of all nuclear weapons-states, and evaluate the prospects for nuclear restraint, leading to the complete abolition of nuclear weapons throughout the world;

□ Analyse the impact of nuclearisation on Indian and Pakistani societies, economies and politics, and on those of the smaller countries of the region which have become hostage to India-Pakistan rivalry especially the likely impact in the form of heightened ethnic and communal tensions, adverse effects on human rights, women, education, political positions and practices, and growth of militarism, etc.

□ Study the likely shape of the nuclear arms race triggered by India's Draft Nuclear Doctrine and the Pakistani and Chinese responses to it, within the overall global context.

□ Exchange views and experiences among disarmament and peace activists in different parts of Asia and the world;

□ Promote active solidarity among the peace, disarmament, anti-militarist, pro-democracy and human rights movements in the Asian continent;

□ Explore possibilities for joint work and close cooperation among the participants on common campaign issues;

□ Help activists develop sharp perspectives and strategies for the struggle for nuclear weapons abolition;

□ Develop non-military and non-nuclear concepts and alternative security paradigms and perspectives for South and Southeast Asia, in conformity with rational development priorities for these regions;

□ Explore practical means of promoting peace and security in South and Southeast Asia within a cooperative framework at both sub-state and state levels;

□ Evolve effective instruments and tools for advocacy and lobbying on peace and disarmament-related issues at the regional, Asian and global levels;

□ Campaign for changes in educational curricula to promote the cause of peace and disarmament and raise the level of nuclear literacy;

□ Generate educational and cultural resources (e.g. booklets, pamphlets) as inputs into school curricula; also produce visual materials, performing arts and video programming of direct relevance to the struggle for peace and nuclear disarmament in Asia.

□ Create a durable Asia-Pacific forum for anti-nuclear activism, which maintains a continuous presence into the coming decade.

The Conference will provide an invaluable opportunity to disarmament activists from India and Pakistan to meet together in an organised and structured way for the first time after the February 1999 Pakistan Peace Conference.

Similarly, they would be able to interact with activists from elsewhere in South Asia. This will help focus their energies and forge common campaigns in the region in mutually reinforcing ways, generating and shaping public opinion.

Through the Conference, South Asian activists will be able to interact fruitfully with activists from Southeast Asia. They could then hope to form the nucleus of a strong Asian regional NGO forum for disarmament and peace.

<CASAP>

CASAP Proposal for a New Architecture: the South Asia Chapter

1. Summary of Proposal:

This is a proposal requesting financial support to fund exploratory meetings and related activities that will have the main aim of laying the groundwork for launching an integrated, region- wide activity that promotes a new security architecture for South Asia. This initiative will be closely linked with the already existing and operating Council for Alternative Security in the Asia-Pacific and will place particular emphasis on the need to proceed with a comprehensive plan for nuclear disarmament in the sub-continent.

Funding is requested to make possible a meeting of peace and human rights activists from the region to explore and begin looking at ways to develop and put forth a security framework that is not dominated by nuclear deterrence.

The development of a global mass-scale nuclear disarmament movement has become a major imperative. This casts a special responsibility on the peace movement worldwide and in South Asia and Southeast Asia in particular. Indian and Pakistani activists are now called upon to agitate and mobilize public opinion in their own countries, and also to interact and develop campaigning strategies jointly with activists from other regions, especially in Asia They must together use every available forum for advocacy and lobbying in favor of nuclear disarmament.

The South Asia-Southeast Asia Activists' Conference on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament, that will be held in Dhaka, Bangladesh, between the 18th and the 20th of February 2000, will offer the ideal caucus to build up solidarity linkages among peace activists throughout Asia and to start strategizing future anti-nuclear activities. Although only the participants at the conference will eventually decide what kind of networks, structures and strategies will be deemed appropriate for reaching the set objectives, the Preparatory Committee has already shown its interest in expanding the same successful model of CASAP to South Asia.

2. What is the Council for Alternative Security in the Asia-Pacific?

The Council for Alternative Security in Asia Pacific was founded at the Second Annual Conference on Alternative Security Systems. It is an outgrowth of a network created at the First Annual Conference on Alternative Security in Bangkok 1997. The network, a group of regional scholars, activists, and policy analysts who agreed to become an informal body looking critically at security issues established itself as CASAP in 1998. Focus on the Global South volunteered to act as the general secretariat for the body.

Members and advisors include Wade Huntley (Nautilus Institute) , Patti Willis (PCDS), Tao Wenshao (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), Praful Bidwai (Columnist), Ivanica Vodanovich (University of Auckland), Walden Bello (Focus on the Global South), Lester Ruiz (New York Theological Seminary), Kozue Akibayashi (Columbia University), Jim Heddle (Options 2000), Marybeth Bragnan (Options 2000), Joseph Gerson (AFSC), Corazon Valdez-Fabros (NFPC), Roland Simbulan (NFPC), Hiro Umebayashi (PCDS), Gigi Francisco (DAWN), Nic Maclellan (PCRC), Myrla Baldonado (Task Forces for Bases Cleanup), Romulo Peralta (PDSAP), Joseph Camilleri (La Trobe University), Duong Quoc Thanh (Institute for International Relations, Vietnam), and Anuradha Mittal (Food First).

CASAP's main aims include:

To closely examine the relationship between hard and soft security and come up with a common set of advocacy points

To share information and to disseminate it among the other CASAP's networks

To reach out to movements and people's organizations on peace and security issues.

The overall aim of CASAP is therefore to launch an integrated, region-wide activity that promotes a new security architecture for Asia Pacific and particularly pushing for the withdrawal of foreign military bases and related foreign military access agreements in the Asia-Pacific. The first concrete steps in this direction have already been moved through the organization of a meeting of representatives of the leading regional security and anti-bases organizations in the region, held in Seoul between Jun 26 and 27, 1999.

That meeting, sponsored by Green Korea United, National Campaign for Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea and Focus on the Global South, concentrated in fact mainly on the role and impact of US and other foreign military bases in Asia-Pacific, and on the "freshly" endorsed New Defense Guidelines and Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the US and, respectively, Japan and the Philippines.

The Council, however, tries also to elaborate and propose a broader definition of security that includes as much as possible "hard and soft" aspects of the concept of security. In terms of the more traditional understanding of security issues, the main focus of CASAP has been already highlighted. With regard to the soft side of security instead, CASAP strives to include in the broad security discussion concerns related, for example, to gender, culture, human rights, and natural resources.

CASAP also committed to initiate or participate in projects related to:

The ASEAN Regional Forum

Nuclear Weapons Free Zones.

South Asian Conference on Comprehensive Security

The Hague Appeal for Peace

Human Security Working Group

It is precisely in accordance to one of these commitments that the idea of convening the Dhaka Conference on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament and of planning a South Asia chapter of CASAP was originally conceived.

Conceptualization of the South Asia Chapter of CASAP

One of the most expected and relevant outcomes of the Dhaka conference will hopefully be the establishment of a South Asian chapter of the actual CASAP network. The way this new entity has been insofar envisioned, will imply a physical extension of the existing structure and work of CASAP as such. Ideally, therefore, there will be not a separate body just replicating CASAP's principles and modus operandi in South Asia, but rather a further link expanding and strengthening the existing CASAP structure.

The original CASAP framework will therefore have to be geographically expanded and reshaped in order to allow a broadening and at the same time specialization of issues. The umbrella body that currently we define as CASAP will probably need some readjustments in its name and organizational structure. The most probable development being the creation of an overarching steering committee that will have to coordinate all the different initiatives undertaken by the regional chapters.

The initial tasks and activities of CASAP South Asia, or CASSA (Council for Alternative Security in South Asia), will probably include:

Convening regular meetings of representatives of the leading anti-nuclear and peace movements from South Asia to explore the possibility and frames of reference for a coordinated anti-nuclear movement.

Preparing initial analyses and materials explaining how the abolition of a nuclear race in the region will increase human security.

A proposal for a South Asia working group to propose credible security alternatives that would replace the nuclear deterrence dominated disorder.

An outline of an integrated and coordinated campaign, including next steps in engaging still more national movements and organizations, calling for the immediate abrogation of nuclear tests.

Please note our new administration email address is admin@focusweb.org

<key documents> 1

ALTERNATIVE VOICES

Adilur Rahman Khan

Introduction:

Since the seventies, there has been a growing trend in militarization in South Asia. The Countries, which are notoriously known for their widespread poverty; the enhancement of their conventional war machinery; the increase in their armed forces; their procurement of high- tech weapons; and above all, the fact that two of them developed, enhanced and subsequently tested their ballistic missiles and nuclear capabilities.

The nature and magnitude of militarization can be understood from the defense expenditures of these countries. Pakistan has recently shelved its earlier plans for military downsizing whereas India's new BJP Government is expected to hike its defense spending by about US$ 1.8 billion. In both these countries the army is reported to be the largest beneficiary, enjoying a significant chunk of the budgetary increase in order to fund the local manufacture of war machines as well as higher allowances for the armed forces. It must be noted here that this is a region where most of the people live well below the poverty level and health and sanitation facilities are grossly inadequate.

South Asia remains a region divided - between the ambitions of the rich and the despair of the poor. A region where the richest one-fifth earn almost forty percent of the income, and the poorest one-fifth make do with less than ten percent. A region where today begins with the struggle of survival for 515 million poverty ridden destitutes, and tomorrow threatens the future of 395 million illiterate adults. Where women are often denied basic human rights and minorities continue their struggle against prejudice and discrimination.□

Blind Eye Towards Mishaps:

Different reports suggest that neither India nor Pakistan has so far taken any effective precaution against any possible nuclear accident. Various inside reports suggest that insufficient safety manuals may cause accidents similar to one that occurred in a uranium processing plant in Japan last month.

According to Mr. Gopala Krishna, former Chief of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) of India, "excessive secrecy in Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and inability of AERB to function independently alone took care of the safety of nuclear installations in India". He further added, "with a captive AERB from which the DAE can

in effect withhold information as they wish, coupled with the shelter the DAE enjoys through invoking the national security bogey and the official secrets Act, we are likely to face a serious nuclear accident in the not too distant future".

Reports suggest that India has had two close calls of nuclear accidents - one in 1979, `when primary coolant pipes in Tarapur reactor burst and the other one in 1993, where the explosion of leaking hydrogen blew up the turbine building of the atomic plant at Narora and the resulting power blackout stopped the coolant pump.

Similar accidents may occur at any time also in Pakistan. Mr. Zia Mian, in one of his recent articles has given some examples. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission appears to be indifferent to the concerns shown by different quarters regarding possible accidents which may occur at Chashma Nuclear Power Plant in Pakistan. The major concern was the plant, which will be made ready to produce power by the end of March 2000, is located in an area which is very much earthquake prone and furthermore, the plants reactor sits on the banks of the Indus river, which will automatically contaminate entire livelihood which are dependent on the flow of this river in the event of any major accident generated from an earth quake.

The Realities - Human Rights Under Siege:

South Asia being the home of a large population, many of whom live below the poverty line, has already suffered massive human miseries for many times. The Partition of 1947 generated a situation of mass exodus for both the states of India and Pakistan and also for the present Bangladesh. Political decision for the resettlement of human beings on the basis of their religious identity could not bring peace. People of this region have proceeded to assert their ethnic identity butonly the people of East Pakistan have successfully given birth to a country of their own named Bangladesh, which is overwhelmingly based on their ethnic identity.

Bangladesh, being the first country of this region almost entirely composed of ethnic origins has inspired other nations of South Asia to raise their issues of national identity and the questions of their right to self determination at the appropriate levels. But the militaristic response to their struggles for the right to self-determination have given rise to human rights abuses in one hand and increased the flow of refugees on the other.

South Asia is one of the most militarized regions in the world; it is also one of the poorest. Yet South Asian Governments continue to redirect scarce resources towards building new weapons of mass destructions. Such non-productive investments, in the name of national security, are taking a high toll on human security while people' lives,

the means as well as the ends of all development concerns, are left unheeded.□

The Jammu and Kashmir Public Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, the Disturbed Areas Act, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958 of India, the Prevention of Anti National Activities Act, 1974 of Pakistan, the Special Powers Act of 1974 of Bangladesh, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1979 of Sri Lanka are all aimed against political opponents or the people who are defending their rights against the repressive systems or political set ups in Kashmir, Punjab, North east, Sindh, Chittagong Hill Tracts or in Jaffna. The option for militaristic solutions for ethnic, religious, caste and environmental problems has generated a situation of conflict and total insecurity.

Internal issues have become the issues of more than one state of the region. The struggle for self determination of the people of Kashmir has now become the nuclear issue for the states of India and Pakistan. Armed conflict in Chittagong Hill Tracts, North East of India and Tamil issue in Sri Lanka have already contributed to push refugees on the other side of the international borders. The Tamil-Sinhala issue in Sri Lanka has already brought the physical presence of India for once without any solution to the very basic issue. Communalism and communal attacks on people belonging to the religious minority communities have increased very much in the recent years.

The destruction of Babri Mosque in Ayodhaya, India has added more fuel to the fire. After the destruction of Babri Mosque, India was put into a situation of communal riots again. Thousands of people belonging to the minority Muslim community were killed on the streets of India. Women were dishonored and the property belonging to Muslims were destroyed. The religious fanatics like Shiv Sena, RSS and other members of the Sang Parivar were militantly active in all these attacks. After the assassination of Indira Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India more than three thousand members of the minority Sikh Community were assassinated. Just before and after the recent general election in India, whereby the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) returned to power, the minority Christians are the new targets. Different state governments of India led by BJP are coming forward with their different agenda, which, if implemented, will essentially violate the rightsof religious minorities.

In Pakistan, the minority Christian, Hindu and Ahmadiya sect of Muslims are facing attacks almost every day. Even the attempt of the previous Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, to introduce Sharia Law was infact designed to bring people belonging to the religious minority groups down to a sub-servient level.

In Bangladesh the Vested and Non-Resident Property Act of 1974 has already contributed in taking away property from people belonging to the minority Hindu community. Apart from this, whenever there has been a communal riot in India, the minority communities in Bangladesh have been made vulnerable targets by the religious fanatics and the various Governments have done little to punish the instigators.

The Tamil separatist movement led by LTTE have already displaced many thousand liberal Tamils and Muslims from their controlled areas and pushed them towards south western part of Sri Lanka as internally displaced people. Furthermore, in the only Hindu Kingdom, Nepal, minority communities face constant pressure from state and non state actors of society.

South Asia which has either given birth or has acted as a host to all the major religions of the world, has unfortunately been put in a situation of religious confrontation by religious fanatics and fascist groups who operate in different countries of South Asia. Moreover, the states are acting in such a chauvinistic way, where only people belonging to the majority community will be the sole beneficiaries of the state, thereby making the minorities foreigners in their own homeland.

Human Rights violations under the caste system and organized violence of armed groups belonging to the upper castes have also increased in the recent years. Attacks on people belonging to the lower caste group in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra have increased. In recent years, in Bihar alone, killings by Ranabir Sena (armed group belonging to the upper caste) have been reported in the major newspapers of India. Children are also under constant threat of the actions by armed forces religious fanatics and vigilantes, supported by the establishment. Burning of widows and downy killings although banned, have occasionally and secretly taken place in different parts of India. Incidents of honor killings have also been reported from Pakistan.

The crimes of bonded labor and trafficking in women and children cannot be ignored. Along with all these major human rights abuses, poverty is the greatest concern of all and the source of many of the abuses. South Asia houses the largest concentration of the poverty stricken population of the world. In the name of democracy, Family□ control over the political parties and political institutions have made the practice of democracy a joke. In India, Pakistan, Bangladesh alone, the various political 멶ynasties□ - Nehru, Bhutto Mujib and Zia , have made party politics and power a thing to be inherited on the death of the family head and leader. Absence of actual participation of the people in decision making processes and lack of participatory approach in the grass-roots level has made democracy inoperative. Everything is done in this region from the top. Criminalisation of politics and bad governance have made mockery of the term democracy.

In Pakistan, where the political leadership is controlled by several families who either belong to the traditional groups, zamindars or rich land owning social class. In their areas, most of the people are either poor peasants or landless cultivators. The ordinary people did not miss much when the so called democracies were over thrown by military take- overs, as they have nothing to contribute in an upper class controlled, top heavy system known as democracy. The situation is similar in Bangladesh. Where the two main political leaders are taking the country towards a situation of total confrontation, the ordinary people in the periphery have nothing to loose if the system, which is alien to their understanding, comes to an end.

he International Nuclear Club?

In the international level, in 1945 the world witnessed the dropping of atom bombs on two Japanese towns, Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States which at the expense of so many man, women and children have become a super power and have also become one of the founders of United Nations by declaring itself as one of its five permanent members. Other four permanent members of UN followed the same path by building, testing and developing their own nuclear arsenal.

Gradually many industrialised and third world□ countries, including India and Pakistan, opted for nuclearisation. Many western countries including Germany, Sweden, Canada contributed in the development of nuclear capability in third world countries for sheer business interest, at the expense of the poverty in the latter. Moreover, they have polluted the environment, agriculture and natural resources of many other Southern countries, which are politically and technologically not equipped to resist the nuclear aggression of these western super powers.

People of Polynesian islands have protested for long against all kinds of nuclear testing in their Pacific region, which are particularly done by the United States and France. In the name of fertilizer or by giving bribes to some corrupt third world governments, nuclear wastes have been transported or have been attempted to be transported to the third world countries of Africa and Asia. People of Ronchlap and Three Miles Islands are still knocking at the doors of the courts of the United States for compensation against loss of livelihood, their exposure to radiation and the destruction of their home and environment due to nuclear tests done by the government of United States in 1954 and 1979 respectively. Flora, fauna and marine lives are also deeply effected by continued nuclear tests by the western super powers.

The recent entry of India and Pakistan in the nuclear club has made the situation worse. These poorer members of the nuclear club□ are not only either unaware or callous in handling the safety precautions, they are also hostile to each other in all respects. Being in such a situation they have every potentiality to transform the South Asian region into a high sensitive conflict zone. This has already been to some extent, dress - rehearsed during the Kargil conflict last year.

Since 1990, the alarming developments in India and Pakistan' nuclear and ballistic missile programs have further threatened to undermine the region' stability. Rather than improving each country' national military security, full nuclearisation and new missile tests have upset the ability of conventional forces to provide adequate territorial defense, and have eroded the relatively safer non-weaponised nuclear deterrent on the subcontinent. A nuclear swore perilously hangs over the more than one billion people of South Asia.□ As has been mentioned earlier, India and Pakistan having very poor safety systems against any nuclear disaster and having war monger fanatics sitting at the top with absolute power to decide the fate of billions of people of this region, have put the region into a situation of May day.

Conclusion:

The only way to save the passengers of this sinking vessel is to build up an immediate people to people communication system at all levels and declare an all out movement against the four enemies of a civil society:

a. Militarism

b. Communalism

c. Caste System and

d. Poverty.

Since the enemies of the people are the friends of the power mongers, the alliance of the people need to develop a popular mechanism to frustrate and end nuclear and anti-people technologies for a nuclear free world. To quote a section from Human Development in South Asia, 1999, published by the Mahbub ul Huq Human Development Centre, 밫he use of nuclear weapons, with their potential for ultimate evil - the mass annihilation of innocent civilians and environment - will become a distant possibility when a concerned and knowledgeable global civil society demands from governments□the complete abolition of these armaments and the establishment of a new global regulatory framework.□

Notes:

1. The author is a lawyer practicing in the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh and a member of Odhikar :a coalition for human rights.

2. The Mahbub Ul Huq Human Development Centre. Human Development in South Asia 1999. P 2.

3. Times Of India 22 October 1999: N-accident may Occur any time in India: Expert. Article taken from the Network South Asian Citizens Web, dated 22 Oct. 1999.

4. Zia Mian: Chashma - Almost Too Late. Princeton November 24, 1999. Article taken from the Network South Asian Citizens Web, dated 27-28 Nov. 1999.

5. Supra note 1. P 17.

6. Supra note 1.p 20.

<key documents> 2

Building a Nuclear-free Zone in Korean Peninsula and Japan

Ph. D. Kim, Yong-Han

South Korean government doesn't seem to have any official program regarding the NEA-NWFZ currently. Common people in Korea don't recognize the importance of making Korean peninsula the NWFZ.

There are people who even agree with the idea that either South or North Korea should have nuclear weapons. The underlying reason is that they want to see strong Korea facing neighbor countries with confidence and self-dignity.

It cannot be denied that considerable number of Koreans have the suspicion that the former President Park, Jeong-Hee was killed by the instigation of U.S. CIA because he tried to have nuclear weapons against the will of U.S. Government.

A few years ago, a novel which contained such a story obtained great popularity in Korea.

Recent survey of public opinion done in September, 1998 shows that the number of people who agreed with the idea of nuclear-free zone of Korean peninsula□as a precondition of reunification is only 13.8%. I have the actual Knowledge, from activities against U.S. military bases in Korea for several years, that the common people in Korea are not aware of the devastating danger of nuclear weapons so far.

It is well known Japan is the victim of the nuclear weapons, but nobody is not interested in the fact that Korea is also a serious victim of Hiroshima a Nagasaki.

Korea is surrounded by the strongest countries in the world with lots of nuclear weapons such as the United States, Russia and China. They don't like the idea of the NEA-NWFZ. Especially, U.S. has insisted to keep its tactics to do nuclear attacks to North Korea prior to the conventional attacks from North Korea. According to the so-called Op-plan 5027-98. Omori, the Minister of Justice of Japan, said in June 1998, "It is not unconstitutional for Japan to possess nuclear weapons." Because of these continuing statements from Japanese high-ranking officers, we have sufficient reason to believe that it is possible for Japan to have nuclear weapons in the near future despite its so-called peace constitution.

Kim, Dae-Jung, the President of South Korea, had said the following stories before he was elected the President; The nuclear proliferation must be prevented not only in North Korea, but also in all other countries. However, 5 countries including U.S., China, Russia, U.K., and France have never showed any intention to abolish their nuclear weapons to make the nuclear-free world. On the other hand, these countries have strongly objected the possession of nuclear weapons by the other countries. Now is the best time to earnestly investigate the possibility of the NEA-NWFZ and the multi-lateral security issues of the six countries including South and North Korea, U.S., Japan, China and Russia.□ But now, he reads US face. For example, he could not meet Jody Williams a novel prize-winner as an elected president.

Pan, Ki-Mun, the South Korean Ambassador to Austria, as a chairman of the CTBTO, has been urging the National Assembly to ratify CTBT bill since the cabinet approved the treaty on April 13, 1999.But it became hopeless because U.S. senate did not ratify the CTBT.

Some golden rules set by the Joint-Statement□on July 4, 1972 and Joint Declaration on the De-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula□on January 20, 1992 are still valid.

Some experts like Hiro Umebayashi, S. Harrison suggested their opinions regarding the hopeful ways to make NEA-NWFZ. My opinion is that either 3 + 3 or 3+ 4 multi-lateral treaties may be available as an access to ultimate solution, Now that nobody have the trust in the other countries□ nuclear policies. And we can not believe the governments□policies. We must try to obtain trust from other countries and thereby we must be able to believe the other countries□ policies. And we can charge nuclear policies only to the governments.

My suggestions are as following:

1. To organize a preparatory committee for the NEA-NWFZ between NGOs of South and South East Asia.

2. To draw a draft of multi-lateral NEA-NWFZ treaty and to have each government to sign it.

3. To have an international conference on these issues in Seoul during the NGO Forum for ASEM 2000 (October, 18-21, 2000)

We organized the Korean NGO Forum for ASEM 2000□ last year. There are 4 sub-committees fixed now such as human rights, peace culture□ and women□subcommittee.

The peace subcommittee□ is composed of 12 Korean NGOs such as Korean National Congress for Reunification, U.S. Military Bases return Korean Committee, Peace Making Women and so on. We had a meeting on February 11 right before I came here.

We decided that I propose to you to have another international conference on this NWFZ issue in Seoul with us this October.

We have a preparatory meeting in Seoul with foreign NGOs, like TNI, Focus on the Global South and AFRC from February, 23-24, right after this Dhaka conference.

We the Korean Peace Activists are interested in the following issues:

The reunification of Korea□

U.S. Armies in Asia and EU

Women

Nuclear weapon free zone

Arms trade

Multi lateral security system

Human security□

Mine

War crime□

(comfort women, massacre of the innocent people during wars, Vietnamese by Korean army, Koreans by U.S. army).

We are looking for to your participation in this Korean NGO Forum for ASEM 2000?

<한글번역본>

한반도와 일본의 비핵지대 건설

방글라데시 말을 조금 배웠습니다. 그 조금 배운 방글라데시 말로 인사 드립니다. □여러분, 안녕하십니까? 저는 한국에서 왔습니다. 제 이름은 김용한입니다.□ 이게 제가 아는 방글라데시 말의 전부입니다.

먼저 저는 다음과 같은 한 마디 말을 하러 이곳 다카에 왔습니다. 인도와 파키스탄의 평화운동가 여러분 만세! 그리고 아시아를 비롯한 여러 지역에서 온 평화 운동가 여러분 만세!

저는 문학박사라고 하지만, 책상에 앉아 있는 시간보다는 길에서 더 많은 시간을 보내는 사람입니다. 미군기지 앞이나 미국 대사관 같은 데서 시위하는 게 체질입니다. 그런 점에서 저는 오늘 이 곳에서 다루는 주제의 전문가는 아닙니다. 그래서 오늘을 위해 특별히 달리 준비한 내용이 없습니다. 그저 지난 해 5월 헤이그에서 열린 <Hague Appeal for Peace>에서 발표했던 내용을 다시 말씀 드리고자 합니다.

우선 남한 정부는 현재 동북아시아 비핵지대화 문제와 관련하여 어떤 공식적인 프로그램도 갖고 있지 않은 것 같습니다. 심지어 일반 국민들 가운데는 남한이든 북한이든 핵무기를 가져야 된다는 생각을 하는 사람들까지 있습니다. 강한 □코리아□가 돼서 이웃 나라들을 자신만만하게 대하고 싶어하기 때문입니다. □박정희 전 대통령이 미국의 의지와 달리 핵무기를 개발하려고 했기 때문에 CIA의 사주에 의해 살해되었습니다□라고 믿는 사람이 많은 것도 부인할 수 없는 사실입니다. 몇 년 전에 그런 내용을 담은 소설이 불티나게 팔린 적이 있습니다.

1998년 9월에 실시된 여론조사 결과를 보면, 한반도 통일의 전제 조건으로 □한반도의 비핵지대화□를 꼽은 사람은 겨우 13.8% 밖에 되지 않았습니다. 저도 개인적으로 지난 10년간의 주한미군기지 반환운동의 경험에 비추어 볼 때, 남한의 일반인들은 핵무기의 가공할 만한 위험을 전혀 인식하지 못하고 있습니다. 일본이 핵무기의 피해자라는 것은 잘 알려져 있지만, 남한도 히로시마와 나가사키의 심각한 피해자라는 사실에 관심을 기울이는 사람은 거의 없습니다.

남한은 미국, 러시아, 중국처럼 엄청난 양의 핵무기를 보유하고 있는 세계 최강대국들에 둘러싸여 있습니다. 그런 나라들은 동북아 비핵지대화 문제에 대해 아무 생각도 갖고 있지 않습니다. 특히 미국은 북한이 재래식 무기로 남침하기 전에 미리 북한을 핵무기로 공격하겠다는 □작계 5027-98□이라는 전략까지 세워놓고 있습니다.

일본의 오오모리 법무부 장관은 1998년 6월에 □일본이 핵무기를 보유하는 것은 헌법에 위배되지 않는다□고 말했습니다. 이 같은 일본 고위 관리들의 계속되는 발언 때문에 우리는 일본이 소위 평화 헌법을 갖고 있음에도 불구하고 가까운 장래에 핵무기를 갖게 될 것이라고 믿고 있습니다.

남한의 김대중 현 대통령은 대통령으로 당선되기 전에 다음과 같이 말했습니다.

□핵 확산은 북한에서뿐만 아니라, 다른 나라들에서도 마찬가지로 막아야 합니다. 하지만 미국, 중국, 러시아, 영국, 프랑스 같은 5대 강국은 핵이 없는 세계를 위해 자기들이 갖고 있는 핵무기를 없애려는 어떤 노력도 하지 않으면서, 다른 나라들이 핵무기 갖는 것만 강하게 반대하고 있습니다. 그러나 지금은 동북아 비핵지대화의 가능성과 남북한, 미국, 일본, 중국, 러시아를 포함하는 6개국 다자간 안보 협정을 진지하게 검토해 볼 시기가 되었다고 봅니다.□

그러나 대통령이 된 뒤 그는 미국의 눈치만 살피고 있습니다. 예컨대 그는 대통령에 당선된 직후 한국을 방문한 노벨평화상 수상자 조디 윌리암스조차 미국의 눈치를 보느라 만나지 못했을 정도입니다. 주오스트리아 대사 반기문씨는 CTBTO 의장이었을 때, 1999년 4월 13일 내각이 CTBT 조약을 승인한 뒤 국회도 그 조약을 비준해야 한다고 강력히 종용한 바 있습니다. 그러나 그것도 허사가 되고 말았습니다. 미국 상원이 그 조약을 비준하지 않았기 때문입니다.

한반도에는 1972년 7월 4일 조인된 □7.4 남북공동성명□이나 1992년 1월 20일 발표된 □한반도 비핵화 공동 선언□ 같은 금과옥조가 마련되어 있으며, 그 기준은 지금도 여전히 유효합니다.

우메바야시 히로미치나 셀리그 해리슨 같은 전문가들이 동북아 비핵지대화와 관련하여 희망적인 몇 가지 방법을 제시해 놓고 있습니다. 저도 그분들의 의견처럼 궁극적인 해결을 위해 □3+3□이나 □3+4□ 같은 다자간 조약을 맺는 것이 좋다고 생각합니다.

그러나 문제는 요즘 어느 누구도 다른 나라의 핵 정책을 믿지 않는다는 것입니다. 게다가 우리는 각 나라 정부들이 갖고 있는 핵 정책을 믿을 수가 없습니다. 그러므로 우리는 먼저 다른 나라들의 신뢰를 얻어야 합니다. 그리고, 다른 나라들의 핵 정책을 우리도 믿을 수 있어야 합니다. 아울러 우리는 핵 정책을 정부들에게만 맡겨 놓을 수가 없다고 봅니다. 그래서 저는 다음과 같이 제안하고자 합니다.

① 먼저 아시아의 NGO들 사이에 비핵지대화를 위한 준비기구를 꾸리자.

② 그 NGO들이 다자간 비핵지대화 조약 초안을 만들고 각 정부로 하여금 서명하게 하자.

③ 올 10월 서울 ASEM 2000 NGO 포럼에서 이 문제 갖고 또 한 차례 국제 회의를 열자.

우리 한국 NGO들은 이와 관련하여 작년에 <ASEM 2000 한국 NGO포럼>을 꾸렸고, 그 아래 인권, 평화, 문화, 여성 같은 분과를 두었습니다.

평화 분과에는 지금까지 □민족회의□ □미군기지반환운동연대□ □평화를만드는 여성회□ □평화인권연대□ 같은 12개의 단체가 모여 있습니다. 우리는 지난 2월 11일 제가 이곳 다카에 오기 직전에 회의를 갖고, 여러분에게 올 ASEM 기간에 서울에서 비핵지대 관련 국제 NGO 회의를 갖도록 제안하기로 했습니다.

또한 이와 관련하여 □TNI', □FOCUS on the Global South', □AFSC' 같은 외국 NGO 관계자들과 이 다카 회의가 끝나자마자 23일부터 24일까지 서울에서 준비모임을 갖기로 했습니다.

끝으로, 우리 한국의 평화운동가들이 관심을 보이고 있는 분야는 다음과 같습니다.

· 한반도의 재통일

· 아시아 유럽 주둔 미군 문제

(환경 파괴, 미군범죄 등)

· 여성

· 비핵지대

· 무기 거래

· 다자간 안보 체제

· 인간 안보

· 대인지뢰

· 전쟁범죄

(종군위안부, 한국군의 베트남 양민학살과 미군의 한국 양민 학살)

· TMD, NMD, BMD ….

여러분의 <ASEM 2000 NGO 포럼> 참가를 기대합니다. 감사합니다.

<key documents>3

Networks for the Year 2000 and Beyond

Romulo D. Peralta

Co-Coordinator, Conferential Network on Peace Disarmament and Symbiosis In The Asia-Pacific (PDSAP)

The Context

Following the end of the Cold War, peoples around the world expected to reap the dividends of human security based on a just and lasting peace, There were great expectations that humankind will at last be able to devote more time to the attainment of sustainable people-oriented development leading to more equitable relations between and among economies and societies. We looked forward to better inter-cultural understanding so that we could all work together for the promotion of efforts that would sustain the unleashing of greater human potential for creativity.

This is not to be. Indeed, at this conference, as with many other similar conferences, we are confronted with a global reality characterized by widespread conflict and combat. Particularly alarmingis the unprecedented proliferation of light weapons which are being employed for the promotion of narrow national and communal interests as well as for global economic and political hegemonism. More and more the use of nuclear and chemico-bacteriological-viral weapons also looms over us as a not-too-farfetched probability.

Why is this so when the so-called superpower rivalry, which in the past was blamed for the proliferation of conflict and the weapons has become history? Is it because, as some people say, war is politics by other means, in much the same manner that economics is war by other means? And politics and economics are part of our daily existence.

Ernie Regehr of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in Canada, writing for the Sweden-based Life and Peace Institute a few years back, referred to the politics of small arms as "the militarization of despair□particularly in countries or areas of lesser economic and political development the Third World. He observed that during the Cold War, the superpowers used the supply of major and small arms to manage security conditions within and between their spheres of influenc." While, in the post-Cold War period, virtually any state can use the supply of small arms to manipulate domestic and sub-regional political and security conditions. He also noted that n macro-economic terms, small arms are not key to a successful military-industrial complex and, for governments, supplying arms is more politics than economics.

There is a great deal of truth to Regerh's observations. However, we will have to take note of the fact that nuclear weaponry was also used for exactly the same purpose even during the Cold War. The development of nuclear weapons by the U.S.S.R. and China were largely in response to American threats. Evidence suggests that when China started its nuclear-weapons development program, the U.S. encouraged India to take a similar tack as a counterfoil to China and to wean India from what was perceived as pro-Soviet leanings. Later, India did get into the nuclear game for reasons of its own and so did Pakistan. But the deeper roots of the nuclear race between these two South Asian countries may be traced not be so much to their internal and bilateral politics as to the quid-pro-quo need to protect the flow of trade and American-controlled Middle East oil to South and East Asia which, in the early 1990s, was already greater than Western European demand at 14.5 million barrels of oil per day. Even the war in Afghanistan may not be far-removed from these events. In the post-Cold War, the remaining superpower and other powers as well have created conditions that virtually call for the increase of weapons manufacturing, including nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction as additional tools in the management of their security concerns.

The supplying of arms is also not just a matter of 뱈ore politics than economics? A study by the Stockholm International Peace Institute shows that during the period 1994 to 1998, the sales of the United States as an arms exporter amounted to US$ 53.9 billion. This is followed by Russia with $12.3 billion, then by France with $10.6 billion. The ranking arms exporters, excluding the U.S . Russia, France, Britain, Germany, China, the Netherlands, Italy, Ukraine, Canada, Spain, Israel, the Czech Republic, Belarus, and Belgium together solda total of $ 53.2 billion. Their combined sale may still trail behind that of the U.S. but they nonetheless would be seen as respectable economic performers. And here we are only talking of conventional arms. This does not cover long- range missile systems nor tactical or strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and the facilities for their manufacture and maintenance. To be sure the total arms sale amounting to US$ 107 billion is not an insignificant figure. And there is more to come.

The Cold War was really a matter of competition between two antagonistic economic systems, i.e. the capitalist and the socialist systems, and the political systems that sustained each economic system. The failure of the soviet socialist experiment has created a situation where capitalism and its major promoters is more or less free to do what it pleases. Unfortunately, the nature of capitalism is such that each player also wants to do what it pleases. The bigger players of course have the bigger economic, political and military clout. Dissenters better watch out for the one with the bigger clout.

If we look at the seemingly disparate causes and geographical locations of current conflicts, it would not be too difficult to notice that the root cause invariably is division of the economic goodies. Other factors such as religion, ethnicity, culture, history, etc., though important and in fact hyper-projected by the mainstream media as principal causes of it all, are really basically contributory factors, and used as the spark and/or as the apparent fuel for the conflict.

A close look at the post Cold War situation would show that conflicts fall within the framework, or are the logical outcome, of one prevailing economic order: the so-called New World Order characterized by the globalization of the unfettered market in aqua-agriculture, manufactures, intellectual property, finance capital, commodified labor and the trafficking in human bodies, either live or in the form of genetic material and by- products. The buzz words are deregulation, liberalization and privatization.

Consider the statement of US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers at the recent globalists□ forum in Davos, Switzerland in which unabashedly proclaimed that the 뱓he greatest threat to U.S. economic security comes from those who oppose the expansion of free trade? We may ask: 밼ree trade□ in what, by whom and for what? Summers expounds further, 밃 strongly-integrated global economy provides the best and most cost-effective forward defense of United States core interests? This statement follows logically from the early 1990s G-7 position that 뱈arket-oriented constitutionalism is the only tolerable form of governance.□ Implicit in this is the not-so-subtle threat that those who oppose this doctrine will be subjected to total warfare in whatever form necessary to achieve the desired end.

Consider now that Taiwan is the world뭩 number-one arms customer purchasing over the last five years US$ 13.3 billion worth of arms from the United States and France. Next to Taiwan are Saudi Arabia, Turkey and South Korea. Consider also the U.S.뭩 openness to once again allow the purchase of arms by India and Pakistan. Or the initial steps in the 밷alkanization□ of an Indonesia whose anti-China Javanese irredentism propped up by US-trained, foreign-armed military establishment started to pose a threat to the unimpeded flow of American-controlled oil to East Asia. Or the corruption of the Philippine political system to allow the implementation of a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which is a thinly-disguised anti-East Asian strategy mainly targeting China뾞t least for the time being but which could be used to bear against all of Asia, including Japan.

What Is To Be Done?

During the Cold War period, especially at the height of the anti-colonial movements and the struggles for national liberation, great support and advocacy movements working with each other swept the world, cutting across the North and South. The targets then were clear and the objectives unambiguous such that they could be perceived beyond ideological and doctrinal clouds. It was not difficult for Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, atheists, liberals, Marxists, whites, blacks, yellows, browns or a mixture of these races to support the anti-colonial and anti-racism struggles in Africa, the American civil rights movement, the resistance of the Vietnamese people against U.S. imperialism or even the anti-dictatorship and human-rights movements in the Philippines and South Korea. Was it because the exigencies of the times forced people to overlook certain impediments?

The situation is a great deal more problematic now. While threats to human security are still as brutal and real as before, the presentation or interpretation of said reality for popular consumption has become more sophisticated such that somehow these threats no longer arouse the same gut-wrenching reaction as before. The  discipline and preparation required for comprehending the  complexities of economic and political warfare also plays a major part as many experts in this field tend to employ largely esoteric language and are unable to translate what is happening in easily  understandable terms. Moreover, the arena for effective advocacy has significantly narrowed down due to widespread disillusionment over great ideological and political expectations especially among those not directly involved in the day-to-day struggles for structural change.

Nevertheless, the need for militant and effective advocacy at the global level is just as urgent as before. There is the need to form regional and global coalitions, or at least clearing houses and communications points that cut across national boundaries and ideological and political predispositions, bearing in mind that the overriding requirements of human security and survival must necessarily transcend national and ideological differences. Such platforms will need to create conditions which will encourage advocates to root out the causes of conflict such as poverty, economic and political injustice, and marginalization or exclusion of peoples. Venues need to be created allowing various groups to participate in immediate action such as crisis intervention, medium-term programs such as political and economic advocacy, as well long-term structural change. It goes without saying that these platforms should be based on a real partnership between North and South.

Global cooperation among NGOs and people's organizations will necessarily have to contend with dominant political and economic policies that pose threats to human security as well as the sources of weaponry that prop them up. These policies need to be clearly identified if they are to be addressed at the national, regional and global levels. I have earlier mentioned that one of the current problems faced by many advocates of human security is the lack of a clear target. I happen to work with both church and non- church groups in the Philippines and in some countries in Asia, North America and Europe. A point of unity among us is the necessity to confront the globalization of the unfettered market as it wreaks havoc on peoples lives, even in the advanced industrial societies. Confronting globalization and its military aspect could be a start for us here. It will also be just as necessary to objectively assess both the strengths and weaknesses of human-security advocates--organizationally and attitudinally so that whatever gains there are can be consolidated and and errors rectified.

In practical terms, it is important to draw up a list of pioneer organizations which can help work out initial concepts of coordinative programs of action. I can think of the PDSAP and CASAP as possible organizations. The Conferential Network for Peace Disarmament and Symbiosis in the Asia-Pacific (PDSAP) is a grouping of progressive parliamentarians and government policy makers, representatives of NGOs and people's organizations, and academicians from countries in the Asia-Pacific that seeks to explore viable alternatives to existing political institutions and prevailing security systems in the Asia-Pacific. The Council for Alternative Security in the Asia-Pacific (CASAP) critiques current security policies in the region even as it proposes alternatives. I am sure that we can identify more. I think there are many of us here who, as individuals, can start things going. Perhaps at this meeting we can make a start by looking at the possibility of how this can be done in concrete terms, work out a concept for planning group and see how we can all work together to get it off the ground financially. It is with this note of optimism in the possibility of such a global forum for advocacy in human security that I wish to end this short  presentation..

<key documents> 4

China's Security Policy

Tao Wenzhao

Institute of American Studies

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

I) Security Situation in the World and China's National Goals

1. World security situation after the end of the Cold War

Speaking in general, the security situation after the end of the Cold War has been approving, and tension has been relaxing. The influence of military conflicts and limited regional wars on the whole world has been decreasing. International politics is developing towards multi-polarity. Maintaining world peace and stability and enhancing economic development and social progress has become an irresistible historical trend.

But it does not mean that world is all peaceful. Actually, the Cold War thinking still exists. Hegemony and power politics has even got new development in some aspects. Some military blocs still seek further expansion and strengthening. Military interventionism has gained new momentum. International politics has witnessed expression of new "gunboat diplomacy". This is the major source

of threat to the peace and stability of the world. Regional disputes and conflicts caused by territorial, ethnical and religious differences take place everywhere in the world. Lasting world peace has not materialized yet.

Economic globalization has been accelerating, which causes more fierce competition and widens the gap between the poor and the rich countries. World-wide struggle for economic rights for market and resources has become more intense. Unfair and unreasonable old international economic regime still does harm to the developing countries. And the contradiction between the development and environment protection has been outstanding as never before. Sustainable development has become a new pressing problem before the humanity. Now more and more countries regard the economic security as an important aspect of the national security.

2 .China has two national goals in the 21st century: modernization and reunification. China's security policy serves these two goals.

II) China's Security Policy

1. China maintains that the old security concept and regime of the Cold War based on military alliances and military establishments could not make peace and is out of date. During the post Cold War era we need a new security concept and means. The key of the new security concept is mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation. The new security concept may include at least the following major points:

- Relationship between countries should be based on the five principles of peaceful co-existence: mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's domestic affairs, equality and mutual benefit, peaceful co-existence. This is the political base and prerequisite of global as well as regional security.

- Mutual beneficial economic cooperation should be strengthened among countries. They should open to each other. Inequality and discriminatory policy should be abolished, and measures should be taken to narrow the gap between the poor and rich countries and seek a co-prosperity of all countries. This is the economic base of global as well as regional security.

- Mutual understanding and trust among countries should be strengthened through dialogue and cooperation. Differences and disputes among countries should be solved through peaceful means rather than using force. This is the practical way to safeguard the peace and security.

2. A major goal of China's diplomacy is to create a lasting peaceful international environment conducive to China's modernization drive. China needes and cherishes such an environment, especially neighboring environment. As a country of Asia-Pacific region, China attaches great importance to security, stability, peace and development of the region. China's security strategy for the region has three goals: China's own stability and prosperity, peace and stability of the neighboring areas, dialogue and cooperation with all countries in the region.

3. China has border disputes with a number of neighboring countries. These are historical problems and should be solved in a conciliatory spirit and through consultation and negotiations. Recently, China solved its border dispute with Russia, and entered into agreement with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikstan on strengthening military trust in the border areas. Last year China and Vietnam solved land border problem, and this year they will solve sea border problem. China has cleared up all mines in the Sino-Vietnamese border areas. If the conditions for solving the border disputes are not mature yet, China takes a low profile and prefers to shelve the differences until the conditions become more mature.

4. China stands firmly against hegemony and power politics in the international relations. China opposes so-called "humanitarian intervention", as NATO did in Kosovo. NATO, a military block, bypassing the United Nations, taking a large scale military actions against a sovereign state, has violated The Charter of the United Nations and generally accepted norms and principles of international relations, and created a dangerous precedent in the international affairs. China does not agree with so called principle " human rights are above sovereignty".

5. China joins the international community in preventing the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. China has signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention, None Proliferation Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and seriously perform the relevant obligations.

China opposes Theater Missile Defense (TMD) by the United States in general, Taiwan's inclusion into it in particular for the following reasons. Firstly, TMD is a kind of proliferation of missile technology. The US claims that it is purely defensive. But defensive technology can easily be transformed into offensive technology, and it is sometimes difficult to make clear distinction between defensive and offensive technology. Secondly, it will give some encouragement to arms race. As a natural law, when some people get stronger shields, other people will try to possess sharper spears to puncture the shields. Thirdly, TMD is not just a few weapons. It is a complex system, including many sub-systems such as early warning, exploring, launching, transportation, storage, and so on. So it is a whole military system with character of military alliance. With inclusion of Taiwan into the system, the military interdependence between Taiwan and the US would be deepened, and their relationship would certainly be upgraded to the quasi-alliance level. This would be a naked and serious interference in China's domestic affairs intolerable to the Chinese people. And this would further encourage the independence trend in Taiwan, complex the political and military situation, enhancing the insecurity and instability in the Taiwan Strait.

6. China's policy of national defense is aimed at protecting its own country and people, resisting against aggression from outside, and participating in nation's modernization drive. China dos not seek expansion and will not do so even when it becomes stronger. The major points of China's national defense policy can be summarized as follows. Firstly, to resist any foreign aggression and protect country's sovereignty, territorial integrity and security. Secondly, defense construction should be subjugated to and in coordination with economic construction. The level of defense modernization can be upgraded only gradually and with increase of economic power. Thirdly, China's strategic principle is self-defense and winning by striking only after enemy stroke. China's nuclear weapons are purely for defensive purpose. China must be prepared for a high tech warfare. Fourthly, to scale down the quantity and improve the quality of the Chinese troops is the basic principle of modernization of the troops. Fifthly, to maintain the world peace and opposes aggression and expansion wherever and whenever it happens. China sticks to independent foreign policy, develops military to military exchanges with foreign counterparts, without joining any military alliances. China does not seek military expansion and does not deploy its troops in foreign countries, does not possess any military bases abroad.

7. China maintains that active regional economic cooperation can be of help to every country of the region and make great contribution to the establishment of a fairer and more reasonable world economic order. China participates in and pushes forward the regional economic cooperation. During the ten years of APEC's development the Asian and Pacific countries have already accumulated rich experience, namely, to recognize the economic diversity of different countries and take flexible measures according to each country's concrete conditions; to reach consensus through dialogue and consultation, without imposing something on certain countries; to put emphasis on economic and technological cooperation, and enhance scientific and technological exchanges and cooperation, thus putting APEC on two wheels: liberalization of trade and investment and economic and technological cooperation. And relevant countries should also have frequent exchange of information and discussion and to take necessary measures to prevent financial risk, to preserve normal financial order.

8. China holds that the United Nations can play very important role in creating a fairer and more reasonable world political and economic order. The UN's authority must be protected and its role be consolidated. The principles of the UN Charter are still valid today. Under the present circumstances the role of the Security Council is still irreplaceable in maintaining world peace and security. Any military block can not replace it. The UN and international financial organizations should work out frameworks for preventing financial risk and other economic risk.

9. China joins the international world in cracking down terrorist activities, drug trafficking, and other organized international crimes which threatens the security and stability of the region and world at large.

10 .China's policy towards the Korean peninsula can be summarized in the following way. Firstly, China's major interests in the Korean peninsula is to keep peace and stability there. Whatever happens, if peace and stability can be kept there, it's okay. China works for relaxation of tension on the peninsula. Secondly, China supports the peaceful reunification of the peninsula, supports the sun shining policy of the South. Thirdly, China supports non-nuclearization of the peninsula. China certainly does not want to see a nuclear power emerge from Northeast Asia and break down the balance of power there. Fourthly, China maintains traditional friendly relations with the North, while developing political, economic, cultural and military relations with the South. Fifthly, China respects the sovereignty of the North, and holds that the North has every right to choose its own way of development and opposes any outside pressure on it. Meanwhile, China encourages the North to make reform and open to the outside world whenever it sees appropriate.

<key documents> 5

Alternative Security

Hiromichi Umebayashi, Executive Director

The Peace Depot, Japan, International Coordinator

Pacific Campaign for Disarmament and Security

In my presentation I am going to cite examples of traditional approaches to regional security in the Northeast Asia, identify elements of the concept of people-centric alternative security, and propose  actions that could be taken by non-governmental organizations towards realizing such an alternative security.

People's Insecurity

Just a few short weeks ago, at eight o'clock in the morning on Monday, January 24th, the roaring sounds of US jet fighters struck the townspeople of Kadena, Okinawa, where businesses had just opened for the week. Jet noise with sound levels greater than 70 db -- the noise standard set by the Japan Environmental Agency -- were recorded 245 times on that day, and similar noise levels continued for several more days. An Emergency Town Assembly was convened and it unanimously adopted a resolution to request that the US base commander immediately stop the aircraft drill. After the adoption of the resolution, all the Town Assemblymen came out of the town hall, climbed a tiny hillside close to the Kadena airfield, which is aptly calledby local people "The Hill to View the Japan-US Security Treaty," and raised their voices in protest, their fists in the air. Eighty-three percent of the total area of Kadena Town is occupied by US military bases.

The base commander explained that as many as twenty-five aircraft had flown to Okinawa from the US 7th Fleet aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk, which is homeported at Yokosuka (Mainland Japan). Their purpose was to conduct an emergency drill to train forces for combat readiness with other aircraft permanently stationed at Kadena. In fact, other sources revealed that the drill was possibly part of a mock war conducted by the US Airforce in Korea in response to a hypothetical Scud missile attack against the ROK (Republic of Korea, or South Korea) by the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea). The aircraft used the Okinawa training area to stage a simultaneous drill for the purpose of simulating war.

Officials of the Japan Defense Agency rejected the petition of the Kadena Town Assembly saying that the operation was authorized by the Japan-US Security Treaty and indicated no intention of asking the US to stop it. The unendurable jet noise is just one example of the insecurity imposed upon the Okinawan people by the Security Treaty. Among others are aircraft crashes and near misses; recurring crimes committed by military personnel including murders, assaults, rapes and hit-and-run cases; environmental destruction caused by drills and construction; and, cultural erosion as a result of militarism. Economic dependence of Okinawa upon US bases is also a cause of insecurity as it has destroyed, and is preventing the future development of, Okinawan indigenous economy. Moreover, the island has turned into a military target because of the presence of offensive military bases and is subject to the threat of missiles and bombs that islanders would not otherwise be faced with.

Obviously the Japan-US Security Treaty, a treaty meant to promote security, is damaging the peaceful daily life and threatening the security of the people of Okinawa. In addition, it must be stressed that the primary role of US forces on Okinawa is not considered to be for the protection of Japan, needless to say the protection of Okinawa, but rather its purpose is to project US power into the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf areas. A US General Accounting Office (GAO) report of 1991 describes the role of the US Marine Forces on Okinawa, which constitutes the majority of the Okinawa-based US forces, as follows: "Although located in Japan, its (Okinawa Marine Force's) units could be deployed for contingencies both within and outside the Pacific theater of responsibility."

The Prevailing Traditional Approach

Undeniably, there is tension in Northeast Asia which originates from past events such as the invasion and colonization by Japan and the north-and-south division of the Korean Peninsula. These tensions are intensified by actions such as the US war game described above which provoke strong reaction on the part of North Korea. It has repeatedly condemned "war deliberations" of the triangular military alliance of the US, Japan and the ROK. An article in the Rodong Sinmun published in October 1999 just before Foal Eagle, a joint military exercise between the US and South Korea, reads: "The war game is the manifestation of an unpardonable criminal attempt to attack the DPRK...We vehemently denounce the Foal Eagle...as a grave military provocation and an undisguised threat on the DPRK." Such denunciation is often followed by a kind of retaliatory remark such as appeared in the statement of a DPRK Foreign Ministry official in November 1999: "The Korean people and army are in full preparedness with maximum vigilance over the new war preparations of the US and south Korean authorities. If the aggressors unleash war of aggression,we will take the opportunity to wipe out the enemies at one stroke."

New "security" measures taken by the US and Japan are typical of the traditional approach to regional security. In 1996, they agreed to update the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, a war manual shared by the two countries. The new Guidelines are designed to mobilize Japanese military forces beyond their territory in order to support US military operations in regional contingencies, called "situations in areas surrounding Japan." From the view point of the United States, the updated Guidelines are meant to provide the political authority for bilateral war planning to respond to such situations. New Japanese legislative bills based on the Guidelines were enacted in 1999. They stipulate military operations by Japanese forces shall be allowed in order to support US war engagement operations including transport of ammunition close to areas where actual combat is taking place, search and rescue of injured combatants, and rear area repair and maintenance of aircraft, vessels and vehicles. All of these actions are considered unconstitutional by a majority of Japanese Constitutional scholars.

Another "security" measure which typifies traditional security thinking is the US-Japan co-development of a theater missile defense (TMD) system to cope with the alleged ballistic missile threat of the DPRK and China. The desire for such a system fails to take into consideration the unrivaled predominance of US missiles in terms of their numbers deployed and their technological advancement. In addition to such long-range ground- or submarine- launched strategic ballistic missiles, the US has high-tech cruise missiles forward deployed on ships and submarines. In fact, up to 500 vertical launchers of cruise missiles, which can hit targets in North Korea and China with pin-point accuracy, are deployed aboard US surface ships homeported at Yokosuka Japan. Nevertheless, even with such overwhelming superiority, the missile threat is loudly trumpeted in order to rationalize this new, so-called, "security" measure.

The consequence of both these traditional approaches to regional security has only been to increase regional tension, not to mention that neither were able to solve the real security problems. For example, not only did China and the North Korea harshly criticize the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, but South Korea has also expressed concerns about the potential extraterritorial expansion of Japanese military activities. In regard to this extraterritoriality question, China is on increased alert to potential intervention in Taiwan issues as a result of the Guidelines and the Japanese legislative bills which enable them. In terms of TMD, its development will destabilize the fragile regional military balance in such a way as to trigger a total arms race in the region. A Rodong Sinmun article (November 1999)reads: "Japan seeks, through the establishment of TMD, not only to possess long-range ballistic missiles but also to develop various missile technologies so as to equip itself with latest war equipment for overseas aggression." In addition, TMD is an element of the controversial Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program of the United States, which has recently become a headline topic related to global arms control and the prevention of an arms race in space.

Alternative Approaches to be Pursued

The traditional approaches to security have not resulted in the easing of military tension, nor have they secured peaceful lives for people in the region. Traditional security measures have been designed to defend the interests of elites in power or the system in which they operate; therefore, such measures are deeply dependent upon military force, which tend to adversely affect the most vulnerable in society on all sides. Security, in its most fundamental sense, is based upon the aspiration of people to live in peace and safety, so we must seek an alternative approach to security which is, in its essence, people-centered.

There are at least two basic elements of such a people-centered security system: the system must be democratic in nature and cooperative in process. First, people's sense of security must serve as the basic criterion of security; therefore, the maintenance and enlargement of people's democratic rights must be the basic function of any security system. Also it must embrace various aspects of human security such as the elimination of hunger, disease and illiteracy, and preservation of the environment. In addition, the secrecy which has characterized traditional security policy must be minimized so that people can participate in decision making. Obviously, there is very little that military forces can contribute to these elements of a people-centric security.

Second, as the people in Europe learned during the Cold War, weapons that were supposedly deployed to secure the safety of lives of one bloc caused a sense of insecurity in the other, resulting in an endless arms race in which the security of both blocs was endangered. This lesson illustrates that a security system must ensure the safety of both sides simultaneously. It is obvious that sucha system must be developed and operated in a cooperative process. Neither the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation nor the co-development of the TMD system contain such elements of a people-centric security system.

Approach A: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone

A nuclear weapon-free-zone (NWFZ) is a geographical area where the development, manufacture, possession, stockpiling, deployment, testing, use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons are legally prohibited by international treaty. When the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone was signed in 1996, almost the entire land area of the Southern Hemisphere was declared a zone free of nuclear weapons. This status is a result of four NWFZ treaties of Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, and Africa, and the Antarctic Treaty.

Although the establishment of such zones is generally considered to be an effective approach to a world free of nuclear weapons, it also illustrates a method for promoting a people-centric regional security system. I cite four reasons for this. First, the concept of freedom of nuclear weapons is widely supported by the public, even in most nuclear weapon states. The public believes that a world free of nuclear weapons is safer than one with nuclear weapons. Second, in many of the regions with international tension, such tension is related to the presence of nuclear weapons. This is the case in South Asia, the Middle East, and Central Europe, as well as in Northeast Asia. In Northeast Asia, for example, one of the fundamental causes of tension is a foreseeable competitive escalation of nuclear development among Japan, the ROK and the DPRK, or between Japan and a reunified Korea. Third, a NWFZ treaty establishes a mechanism to ensure compliance with the provisions of the treaty, including a mutual inspection system. This can be a sound initial basis for confidence building and preventive diplomacy among parties to the treaty. Fourth, a NWFZ treaty generally involves a provision for all nuclear weapon states to sign protocols which pledge no use, nor threat of use, of nuclear weapons within the zone. This means that a NWFZ leads to the establishment of channels for security dialogue between a party to the treaty and the nuclear weapon states.

To establish a brand-new NWFZ is of course an important approach to pursue; however, I want to suggest two significant ideas for expanding existing NWFZs. One is related to the idea of "stretching" and the other to the idea of "thinning-out." Both ideas are relevant to the Southeast Asian NWFZ Treaty (Bangkok Treaty). By adding protocols to the treaty, the SEANWFZ could be stretched westward to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, if these countries desire this. This might contribute to improving the security environment in this region. The idea of "thinning-out" was first introduced in the debate on a potential Nordic NWFZ. It is related to the withdrawal of nuclear weapons deployed outside but close to the boundary of a NWFZ to increase credibility of no-use or no-threat-of-use of tactical nuclear weapons by neighboring nuclear weapon states. This can be discussed in relation to the northern boundary of SEANWFZ if it might contribute to improving regional security. In any case, the role of civil society will be important in promoting such ideas.

Approach B: NGO Participation in Multilateral Fora

A cooperative security system will necessarily involve a multilateral forum to discuss issues. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established in 1994 with a goal to functioning as such a forum at the government-level in the Asia Pacific region. Presently it is still a single-day annual event, involving 21 nations and the EU. The upcoming Forum in July marks the ARF's seventh meeting. The ARF is unique in that it is centered in ASEAN developing countries and is under their formal leadership rather than under that of the economic and military super powers, including the US, Russia, China and Japan, which encircle ASEAN.

At least in its documents, the ARF claims to pursue a "comprehensive concept of security, including its economic and social aspects" (Chairman's Statement at the first meeting). According to its Concept Paper, the ARF is to evolve through three stages: promotion of confidence building measures; development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms; and development of conflict resolution mechanisms. However, with regard to the third developmental stage, the agreement over its meaning is ambiguous and there is no agreement to establish any compulsory mechanisms for conflict resolution. Given these circumstances, it is worthwhile for civil society to demand participation in the ARF and intervenes in its process in order to compel the ARF to move in the direction of people-centered security.

In its development to date, the ARF has revealed serious shortcomings which should be brought to the public's attention. One of the most serious is that the DPRK does not participate in the ARF. Although North Korea asked for formal participation in 1995, it was not invited in 1996 when the conditions for new membership were established. One of those conditions is that, "Newly participating countries should agree to accept past decisions and declarations of ARF prior to its admission." In the absence of North Korea, the ARF has continued to discuss issues related to the Korean Peninsula. Because of the ARF's conditions of entry, North Korea would not be allowed to participate if it were unable to agree to decisions taken by the ARF member countries in the years prior to its potential admission.

In this respect the present ARF is not a legitimate multilateral forum which ensures a genuine cooperative security process. To rectify this and to rectify other serious shortcomings including a lack of discussion on the reduction of military expenditures and the arms trade, the participation of civil society in the ARF process is highly recommended.

To summarize, traditional approaches to security in the Asia-Pacific have failed to ease tensions in the region and have been unable to ensure a genuine people-centric security. Civil society must explore initiatives to realize alternative security including the establishment and expansion of NWFZs as well as intervention into the regional security dialogue of the ARF.

<한글번역본>

대안안보에 관한 구상과 제안들

히로미치 우메바야시

평화자료협동조합(The Peace Depot)

군축과 안보에 대한 태평양 캠페인(Pacific Campaign for Disarmament and Security)

나의 발표에서, 나는 동북아시아 지역의 안보에 대한 전통적인 접근들의 실례를 언급하려고 한다. 그리고 인간 중심의 대안안보 개념의 요소들을 확인할 것이며 비정부기구들에 의해 대안안보를 실현시킬 수 있는 행동들을 제안할 것이다.

인간의 위험

얼마 지나지 않은 몇 주 전 1월 24일 월요일 8시 정각에 미 제트기의 굉음이 오끼나와의 카데나(상점들이 문을 연 주중에)를 강타했다. 70db 이상(일본 환경청의 기준에 의한)의 제트기의 소음은 그 날 245시간을 기록하였으며 그 비슷한 수준의 소음이 몇 일 동안 계속되었다. 비상 시의회가 소집되었고, 의회에서는 미군기지 사령부의 즉각적인 항공 연습의 중단을 촉구하는 결의안을 만장일치로 통과시켰다. 이 결의안의 채택 이후, 모든 시의회 의원은 시청사를 나서 카데나 비행장이 폐쇄된 작은 산허리(주민들에 의해 □일-미 안보 조약을 조망하기 위한 언덕□이라 불리워지는)로 올라갔다. 그리고 단호하게 그들의 주장을 소리 높여 외쳤으며 그들의 주먹은 하늘을 갈랐다. 카데나시 총 면적의 83%는 미군 기지에 의해 점령되어 있다.

기지 사령부는 25대의 많은 항공기가 미 키티 호크 수송기 7번째 해군 항공모함(일본 본토의 요코수카에 모함이 있는)로부터 오끼나와로 비행했다고 설명했다. 그것의 목적은 카데나에 영구히 배치될 다른 전투기들과 함께 전투준비를 위한 수송부대의 비상훈련을 수행하는 것이었다. 사실 다른 소식통들은 이러한 훈련이 아마도 북한이 한국에 대하여 스커드 미사일 공격을 감행할 것을 가정하고 한국에서의 실시되는 미 공군에 의한 모의 전쟁의 한 부분일 것이라고 밝히고 있다. 항공기는 모의 전쟁의 목적으로 오끼나와 훈련지역에서 동시훈련에 사용되었다.

일본 방위청의 관리들은 이것은 일-미 안보조약에 의해 합법적으로 인정되는 시행이고 미국에게 그것을 중단하라고 요청할 만한 권리가 없다고 말하며 카데나 시의회의 요청을 거부했다. 참을 수 없는 제트기의 소음은 안보조약에 의해 오끼나와 민중들에게 가해지는 수많은 위험 중 단지 하나의 예에 불과하다. 다른 것들을 보면 제트기 굉음과 오폭 ; 살인, 폭행, 강간, 뺑소니 사고까지 포함한 군인들에 의해 되풀이되는 범죄 ; 훈련과 건설작업에 의해 야기되는 환경파괴 ; 그리고 군사주의에 의한 문화적 잠식. 미군 기지에 대한 오끼나와의 경제적 의존은 위험의 원인이 되고 있다. 그것은 미래 오끼나와인들의 자생적인 경제발전을 준비하는 것이어야 한다. 더욱이 섬은 공격적인 군사기지의 존재로 인해 군사적 표적으로 변화되고 있고 (섬사람들이 군대와 함께 하는 것 이외에 다른 방법이 없다면) 미사일과 폭탄의 위협이 되기 쉽다.

명백히 일-미 안보조약(안보를 증진시키기 위한 조약)은 평화로운 하루하루의 삶에 해를 끼치고 있으며 오끼나와 민중들의 안보에 오히려 위협적이다. 더하여 이것은 분명히 오끼나와 미군 부대의 근본적인 역할이 일본의 보호에 있지 않다는 것이고 두말 할 필요 없이 오끼나와의 보호는 더더욱 아닌 것이다. 오히려 그것의 목적은 서태평양 지역, 인도양 그리고 페르시아 걸프 지역에 미국의 힘을 강화하기 위함이다. 미 일반회계청(GAO)의 1991년 보고서는 오끼나와 미 해군(오끼나와 주둔 미군의 대부분을 구성하는)의 역할을 설명하고 있다. 그것에 의하면 : □비록 일본에 위치해 있을 지라도 그것의(오끼나와 미군의) 구성은 태평양 전역 내부와 외부의 돌발사태를 책임지기 위해 배치되어야 한다.

일반적으로 행해지는 전통적 접근

명백히 동북아시아 지역에는 일본에 의한 침략과 식민지화 그리고 한반도의 남북분단으로 인해 야기되는 어떤 긴장이 존재한다. 이 긴장들은 북한의 강한 반발을 자극하는 미국의 전쟁놀음과 같은 행동에 의해 증가되고 있다. 그것은 되풀이하여 일본, 미국, 북한의 3국간 군사동맹의 □전쟁을 숙고할 것□을 요구받고 있다. 1999년 10월 한미간 합동 군사훈련(Foal Eagle) 전에 발간된 노동신문의 기사(Foal Eagle-한미간 합동 군사훈련)를 보면 : □전쟁놀음은 북한을 공격하기 위한 용납할 수 없는 범죄 시도의 징후다.... 우리는 죽음에 이르는 군사도발과 북한에 대한 공공연한 위협인 Foal Eagle을 강력히 규탄한다.□ 이러한 비난은 때때로 1999년 11월 발표된 북한 외무부 관리들의 성명서에서 보이는 것과 같은 보복적인 의견을 불러오기도 한다. : "한국 사람들과 군대는 미국과 남한 당국의 새로운 전쟁 준비를 넘어서는 최대의 경계태세와 함께 만반의 전쟁준비를 하고 있다. 만일 그것이 침략국의 해방전쟁이라면 우리는 한 번의 타격에서 적들을 모두 제거할 수 있는 좋은 기회를 얻게되는 것이다.□

미-일 간의 새로운 □안보□ 기준은 지역 안보의 전통적인 접근법의 전형적인 것이다. 1996년 그들은 두 나라간의 전쟁 교범인 미-일간의 방위협력을 위한 가이드라인을 갱신했다. 새 가이드라인은 그들의 영토를 넘어서 "일본을 둘러싼 지역적 정세□라 불리 우는 지역의 돌발적인 분쟁상황에서 미군의 작전을 지원하는 데 일본군대를 동원하는 방향으로 계획되었다. 미국의 관점으로는 갱신된 가이드라인은 이러한 정세에 대응하는 쌍무간 전쟁계획을 위한 정치적 권한을 준비하는 의미를 가지고 있다. 새로운 일본의 법률안은 1999년에 제정된 가이드라인에 그 기초를 두고 있다. 그것은 미국의 군사행동(실제 분쟁지역에 탄약의 수송을 금지하는 것, 전투 사상자들의 수색과 구조 그리고 후방지역의 복구작업, 항공기, 군함, 운송수단의 유지를 포함하는)을 지원하는 것을 고려하는 일본군에 의한 군사적인 효력을 명문화하고 있다. 이 모든 행동은 일본 헌법의 대다수를 위반하는 것이다.

전통적인 안보 사고로 특징지어지는 다른 □안보□의 기준은 근거 없는 북한과 중국의 탄도미사일 위협에 대처하는 미-일 전역미사일방위(TMD) 시스템의 개발이다. 이러한 시스템에 대한 요구는 (그들 다수의 배치와 기술적 발달에서 보면) 미 미사일의 경쟁상대가 없는 탁월한 연구에 있지 않다. 더하여 이러한 장거리 발사대-혹은 잠수함-는 전략 탄도 미사일을 발사했고, 미국은 함선과 잠수함을 향하여 배치된 전략탄도미사일과 첨단의 크루즈 미사일을 가지고 있다. 사실 일본 요쿠수카에 모선을 둔 수상 함정에 배치시킨 500개의 크루즈 미사일 연직 발사대는 정밀조준 정확성을 가지고 북한과 중국의 표적을 타격 할 수 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고 이러한 불가항력적인 우위를 가진 미사일 위협은 이 새로운 이른바 □안보□ 기준을 합리화하기 위한 자화자찬일 뿐이다.

이러한 두 가지 안보에 관한 전통적인 접근의 결과는 지역적 긴장을 높일 뿐만 아니라, 진정한 안보 문제들을 해결하는 방법을 말할 수 없다. 예를 들어 중국과 북한은 미-일 방위협력을 위한 새 가이드라인을 엄격히 규탄하고 있지만 이들 뿐만 아니라 남한도 역시 일본 군사 행동의 치외법권적인 확장 가능성에 깊은 우려를 나타내고 있다. 이 치외법권적인 문제에 관해서 중국은 가이드라인의 결과에 의한 대만의 이슈와 일본의 입법안에 대한 가능한 중재에 대해 경계태세를 늘려나가고 있다. TMD의 경우, 그것의 확장은 지역에서 총체적인 무기경쟁의 동기를 부여해주는 것과 같은 방법으로 약한 지역적 군사 균형을 더욱 더 약화시킬 것이다. 노동신문 기사(1999년 11월)를 보면 : □일본은 TMD의 건설을 통해 단지 장거리 탄두미사일의 소유뿐만 아니라 외국으로부터의 침략에 대비한 최신 전쟁의 장비를 스스로 갖출 수 있도록 다양한 미사일 기술의 확장을 모색하고 있다.

대안적 접근

안보에 대한 전통적인 접근은 군사적 긴장의 해소에 대한 해결책을 가지고 있지 않다. 또한 지역 민중들의 안전하고 평화적인 삶에도 어떠한 대안을 가지고 있지 않다. 전통적 안보 기준들은 권력엘리트들의 이해관계 혹은 그들이 영향을 끼치는 시스템을 방어하는 것을 계획해 왔다. ; 그러므로 이런 조치들은 모든 면에서 대부분의 사회에 오히려 악영향을 미칠 경향이 있는 군사적 힘에 매우 많은 부분 의존하고 있다. 안보, 그것의 기본적인 인식은 평화와 안전을 보장받으면서 인간들이 살아가고자 하는 소망에 그 바탕을 두고 있다. 그래서 우리는 인간이 중심이 된, 본질적인 안보에 대한 대안적 접근법을 반드시 찾아내야 한다.

여기 인간중심 안보에 대한 적어도 2가지 기본적인 바탕을 제시한다. : 이 시스템은 더 없이 민주적이어야 한다. 그리고 진행과정에서 협조적이어야 한다.

첫째, 안보에 관한 민중들의 인식은 안보의 기본적인 표준의 역할을 해야만 한다. : 그러므로 민중의 민주적 권리의 지속과 확대는 어떤 안보시스템에서도 기본적인 것임에 틀림없다. 또한 그것은 인간안보의 다양한 관점들(예컨데 기아, 질병과 문맹의 제거 그리고 환경의 보호)을 포용해야 한다. 이외에 전통적인 안보정책으로 특징지어지는 비밀주의는 정책결정에 민중이 참여할 수 있도록 축소되어야 한다. 분명히 인간 중심의 안보를 구성하는 요소에는 매우 작은 군사력이 공헌할 수 있을 것이다.

둘째 냉전 시기 유럽의 민중들이 배웠던 것처럼, 하나의 블록의 안전한 삶을 위해 배치된 무기들은 다른 곳의 안전을 해치고 위태롭기 그지없는 두 블록간의 안보를 위한 끝없는 무기경쟁이라는 결과를 가져왔다. 이 교훈은 두 진영 모두에게 안보시스템은 안전해야 한다는 것을 설명하고 있다. 명백한 것은, 어떤 시스템이라도 협조적인 방법으로 발전되고 작용되어야 한다는 것이다. 미-일 간의 신가이드라인이라는 방위협력도, TMD 시스템의 발전도 인간 중심의 안보시스템의 요소들을 포함하고 있지 못하다.

제언 A : 비핵지대 건설

비핵지대(nuclear weapon-free-zone, NWFZ)는 개발, 제조, 소유, 비축, 배치, 실험, 사용 또는 국제적 조약에서 명시된 핵무기사용 조약을 법률적으로 금지하는 지리적인 범위이다. 아프리카의 비핵지대 조약이 1996년에 서명되었을 때, 남반구의 거의 모든 대륙에서 비핵지대를 선언하였다. 이것은 라틴아메리카 그리고 카리브, 남태평양, 남아시아, 아프리카의 네 개의 NWFZ 조약 그리고 남극의 조약의 결과이다.

이러한 비핵 지대의 건설은 세계적인 비핵지대 건설의 효과를 고려하고 있지만 이것은 또한 지역적인 인간 중심의 안보시스템의 증진을 위한 방안이기도 하다. 나는 이것의 네 가지 이유를 언급하겠다. 첫째, □핵무기의 자유□라는 개념은 대부분의 핵무기 국가에서조차 대중적으로 넓은 지지를 받고 있다. 사람들은 핵무기의 세계적인 자유가 한 국가만 핵무기를 보유하고 있는 것보다는 안전하다고 믿고 있다. 두 번째, 국제적인 긴장상태의 많은 지역에서, 이러한 긴장은 핵무기의 존재와 관련이 있다. 이것은 남아시아, 중동, 중앙유럽, 물론 동북아시아의 케이스에서 알 수 있다. 예를 들어, 동북아시아에서는 긴장의 기본적인 이유가 미리 알 수 있는 일본, 한국, 북한 사이 혹은 일본과 통일된 한국 사이의 경쟁적인 핵개발의 확대에 있다. 세 번째, NWFZ 조약은 공통의 검열시스템을 포함한 조약의 준비와 함께 승낙을 얻어내는 메커니즘으로 제정되었다. 이것은 조약에 대한 여러 정당들 사이의 건설을 확신하고 외교를 준비하는 최초의 근거로 들릴 수 있다. 네 번째, NWFZ 조약은 일반적으로 모든 핵무기국가들이 그 지역 안에서는 핵무기를 사용하지 않거나 사용하는 징후조차 보이지 않을 것을 명시한 의정서에 사인하는 것을 포함한다. 이것의 의미는 NWFZ가 조약에 대한 정당사이의 그리고 핵국가들 사이의 안보대화 채널의 건설을 이끈다는 것이다.

새로운 NWFZ를 건설한다는 것은 물론 이야기를 속행하는데 중요한 제안이다. ; 나는 NWFZ의 확장을 위해서 중요한 두 가지 아이디어를 제시하고 싶다. 하나는 □긴장□관계에 관한 것이고 다른 하나는 □적음□에 관한 것이다. 이 두 가지 아이디어는 동북아시아의 NWFZ 조약(방콕 조약)과 관련이 있다. 조약의 초안을 작성함으로써 동북아시아 NWFZ는 만일 이 나라들이 원하기만 한다면 방글라데시와 스리랑카를 향해 서쪽으로 확장될 수 있다. 이것은 이 지역의 안보환경 증진에 기여할 것이다. □적음□에 관한 아이디어는 첫째로 가능한 북유럽의 NWFZ 논쟁을 소개할 것이다. 이것은 핵무기의 외부 배치의 철수와 관련이 있다. 그러나 인접 핵무기 국가들에 의한 전술 핵무기의 사용을 하지 않거나 사용가능성이 없게끔 하는 진실성의 증가를 위한 NWFZ 확장 가능성 경계를 차단하는 것은 아니다. 이것이 만일 지역 안보의 증진을 위해 도움이 될 수 있다면 동북아시아 NWFZ의 북부지방 경계에 대해 논의될 수 있다. 다른 예로, 시민사회의 역할은 이러한 아이디어들의 진척에 매우 중요한 것이 될 것이다.

제언 B : 다국간 포럼에 NGO의 참가

협력적인 안보 시스템은 이슈들을 토론하기 위한 다국간 포럼을 반드시 수반한다. 아세안 지역 포럼(ARF)은 아시아 태평양 지역의 국가간 포럼의 목적으로 1994년에 건설되었다. 최근엔 1년에 하루 열리고 21개국과 EU가 참가하고 있다. 다가오는 7월 포럼엔 7개의 ARF 미팅이 계획되어 있다. ARF는 아시아 계발도상국가들의 중심에 있는 유일무이한 것이다. 그리고 그들의 형식적인 지도력 아래 있다기보다는 아시아를 둘러싼 미국, 러시아, 중국 그리고 일본을 포함한 경제의, 거대한 군사력 아래 있는 것이다.

적어도 그것의 문서에는 ARF는 □경제적인 것과 사회적 상황을 포괄하는 안보에 대한 포괄적인 개념□을 명시하고 있다. 이 보고서에 의하면 ARF는 3가지 단계를 거쳐 발전한다. : 법안을 제정함에 있어 신뢰의 확장 ; 예방적 외교 메커니즘의 확장 ; 그리고 분쟁 해결 메커니즘의 확장. 그러나 이 세 가지 단계에 의한다 하더라도 그것의 의미를 넘어서는 이 협약은 모호하고 분쟁 해결을 위한 어떤 강제성도 협약 안에 담겨져 있지 않다. 이러한 주어진 상황에서 시민사회가 ARF에 참가할 수 있도록 요구하는 것과 인간 중심의 안보를 추구하는 방향으로 ARF가 움직일 수 있도록 하기 위해서 그것의 진행과정에 개입하는 것은 매우 의미 있는 일이다.

시간이 가면 갈수록 ARF는 대중적인 주의를 끄는 심각한 결점을 드러냈다. 가장 심각한 것 중의 하나는 한국이 ARF에 참가하지 않는다는 것이다. 1995년에 북한에게 형식적으로 참가를 요청하긴 했지만 새로운 멤버쉽이 건설된 1996년에 초대되지 않았다. 이러한 상태 중의 하나는 □새로운 참가국은 지난 결정과 그것의 가입보다 중요한 ARF의 선언에 동의해야한다.□ 북한의 불참 속에서 ARF는 한반도와 관계된 이슈들에 대한 토론을 계속했다. 가입 가능성에 앞서 ARF의 멤버인 나라들의 결정을 수용할 수 없다면 북한은 참가가 인정되지 않았다.

ARF의 존재에서 주목할 점은 진실로 협력적 안보 과정을 확보하는 합법적인 다국간 포럼이 아니다라는 것이다. 이것의 개정과 군비지출과 무기경쟁의 축소에 대한 결정, ARF 과정에 높은 수준의 시민사회의 참여 부족 등의 불충분한 것을 포함하는 다른 심각한 결점을 개정해야 한다.

요약하면, 아시아-태평양 안보에 대한 전통적 접근법은 지역의 긴장상태를 완화시킬 수 없다. 그리고 진정한 인간 중심의 안보를 보장할 수 없다. 시민사회는 ARF의 지역적 논의에 대한 개입과 함께 NWFZ의 건설과 확장을 포함한 실질적인 대안안보에 대해 연구해야 한다.

<key documents> 6

De-Nuclearization Challenges in Asia for the 21st Century

Roland Simbulan

Professor, University of the Philippines

National Chairperson, Nuclear-Free Philippines Coalition

General and Complete Disarmament

Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons As the new millennium unfolds, we realize that there are still urgent and serious unresolved issues for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Issues such as nuclear testing, regional tensions in the Korean peninsula and the threat of nuclear weapons use and deployments continue to persist. In the nuclear age, the use of force in international relations continuously spells the prospect of humanitys end. Even with the end of the Cold War, the existence and deployment of nuclear weapons continue to define a radically different context of the use of force in the relations of states.

This paper shall define the key nuclear issues in the Asia-Pacific today and present the outlook for the regions denuclearization for the 21st century. It shall make concrete proposals on how the region can stem the continuing nuclear threat in the Asia-Pacific.

Issues that Must be Addressed

The recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan have not only raised the level of regional tensions but have created a very dangerous situation which has only exacerbated the already existing weaknesses of the international proliferation regime.

The Asia Pacific regions remains a potentially dangerous region:

* The Pacific continues to be a highly nuclearized ocean. The US Navy continues to deploy nuclear capable ships with nuclear propulsion in its sea-going vessels in the Pacific. These are involved in routine deployment as well as for crisis and contingency missions. Others are involved in training and military exercises. The US Natural Resources Defense Council states that the US Pacific coast, Hawaii and Guam remain as nuclear weapons sites and remain as home to US nuclear-armed/ nuclear capable vessels which ply the Pacific waters.

If the US succeeds in amending the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia as part of its unrelenting push to install a National Missile Defense System (NMDS), then Pacific Ocean missile tests especially those at Kwajalein Missile Range in the Pacific may soon again resume. This will stimulate a new nuclear arms race in the Asia Pacific and elsewhere.

Also, concerns about the safety of nuclear-powered submarines and vessels of the US and Russia have been raised in the past. Governments of the South Pacific Forum have also expressed concern over the transhipment of radioactive materials especially the controversial shipments of highly radioactive mixed oxide (MOX) fuel thru Pacific waters en route from Europe to Japan. This is why many island-states are now beginning to formulate an integrated ocean policy for themselves in the 21st century.

These concerns about nuclear safety and nuclear accidents at sea are not unwarranted. For any mishap in the Pacific ocean would be devastating to the island nations (including Japan) especially those that rely heavily on fisheries and tourism for their livelihood. It would be a grave threat to their fragile economies.

Policy issues arising from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) have far- reaching implications to the security and safety of archipelagic or island countries. UNCLOS grants the right of innocent passage or archipelagic sea lane passage which many states now recognize as a dangerous environmental risk, if not an infringement on their security and integrity. For, UNCLOS does not require prior authorization with respect to passage thru archipelagic sea lanes or even just notification for the passage of submarines or other dangerous or noxious cargoes.

This is complicated by the fact that it is the interpretation of nuclear states that their warships and submarines have the right of "innocent passage" not only in the territorial sea but also thru archipelagic waters. The United Nations in a 1986 study The Naval Arms Race shows that, "The sea has now become the operational environment of ballistic missile submarines, each of which has been estimated to be carrying the equivalent of more explosive power than was used by the combatants in the Second World War. The combination of missile and warhead design, nuclear propulsion power, highly accurate navigation and guidance systems and sophisticated hull design and construction techniques has provided the opportunity for the development of an entirely new naval capability of awesome specific power".

* A Trend that must be averted is the militarization of outer space. Indeed, space, according to the latest issue of the Weekly Defense Monitor(Center for Defense Information, vol. 3, #46, Dec. 2, 1999) will be the frontier and future battleground of the 21st century. If in the past, great powers sought to dominate and control access to sea lanes, now the US military plans to dominate space. US Air Force analyst Richard Hallion observes, "We must dominate the military space dimension and integrate space forces into our overall warfighting capabilities across the spectrum".

* If the National Missile Defense System (NMDS) is any indication, space systems are today deemed vital, especially for precision-targeting such as the Global Positioning System (GPS) which is a critical space infrastructure for guiding bombs and missiles to their targets. The US is now embarking on a very dangerous space policy as defined in clear terms by the US Joint Chiefs of Staffs (National Military Strategy, 1997): "It is increasingly important to guarantee access to and use of space as part of joint operations and to protect US interests. Space control capabilities will ensure freedom of action in space and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries". Thus, the US military of the 21st century is projected to be a space force. This is alarming, for the militarization of space may also lead to its nuclearization, if we are to depend on the US track record of unilateralism when it comes to nuclear policy.

The global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has failed to contain nuclear proliferation in Asia. Of the six powers present in Northeast Asia, three are already heavily armed with nuclear weapons. A fourth is pursuing a nuclear option (North Korea), and the remaining two are keeping one hand in their pocket (South Korea and Japan) with respect to medium-to-long-term commitments to non-proliferation. In short, the problem is not just the "creeping nuclear proliferation" by the two Koreas and Japan. The nuclear weapons of the United States, Russia and China remain the major barrier to denuclearizing the Asia-Pacific region, including Northeast Asia.

Nuclear proliferation cannot be halted without a regional approach. A Nuclear Free Zone that effectively constrains North and South Koreas nuclear potential will automatically trespass on great power nuclear weapon privileges.

Recent declassified US government documents show that between 1971-1974, US government agencies like the Pentagon, State Department and the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency had begun to study the possibility of a regional nuclear free zone in Northeast Asia. This policy-study was shelved after the Nixon administration (J. Endicott, Japans Nuclear Option, Political, Technical and Strategic Options. Praeger, NY, 1975).

A US-led regional NFZ then would have imposed mutual constraint on nuclear arms racing by the local powers and reaffirmed US leadership. The credibility, integrity and leadership of nuclear armed states which have renounced nuclear weapons have the strongest and most effective moral authority for denuclearization.

An effective NFZ would necessarily also address non-weapon nuclear issues (such as radio active waste dumping and LWR spent fuel production); dual capable weapons activities (such as ballistic missile testing) and seek maximum constraints over remaining nuclear and related operations and preparations that affect the region.

Japan should have a regional non-nuclear strategy. Perhaps, phasing out Plutonium as the centerpiece of its national energy strategy would initiate an effective Japanese non-nuclear diplomacy in the region.

A recent ASEAN accomplishment is the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (SEA-NWFZT) which came into force on March 27, 1997. Signatory countries pledge not to develop, manufacture, acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons; station or transport nuclear weapons by any means; or test or use nuclear weapons. They will not allow their territories to be used by other countries for any of the acts specified above and does not allow the disposal of nuclear waste in the zone areas. The SEA-NWFZ Treaty and its attached protocol apply to the territories continental shelves and the Exclusive Economic Zones of the ASEAN countries (Burma, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam). ASEAN countries hope that all the five declared nuclear weapon states will accede to the treaty. It is hoped that bilaterally and regionally, the US will honor the legal and constitutional prohibitions on nuclear weapons.

There are also moves to amend and strengthen the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Raratonga Treaty, 1986) so it can effectively denuclearize the Pacific and stop nuclear transhipments thru the Pacific islands. The 1995 Waigani Convention needs also to be tightened in its ban on transboundary shipments of radioactive and hazardous wastes. The voices against nuclearization are rising everywhere to include the ban on nuclear waste dumpings, testings of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles and prohibition of nuclear power propulsion.

Role of International Agreements

Nation states should take measures to implement UN Resolution A/52/380 adopting "Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons", initiated by Malaysia and supported by 116 nations, including all ASEAN nations at the UN General Assembly on December, 1997. The Resolution "Calls once again upon all states to immediately fulfill that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stock piling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination".

Also, UN Resolution A/Res/53 77U "Nuclear Disarmament with a View to the Ultimate Elimination of Nuclear Weapons", passed in 1998 by the UN General Assembly after it was introduced by Japan and adopted with 160 in favor, none against and 11 abstentions should set the tone for the denuclearization of our region.

The five nuclear nations (US, Russia, China, Britain and France) must make concrete and demonstrated steps towards nuclear disarmament like their assent to Protocols of the SEANWFZ Treaty. The nuclear states compliance with Protocols would be a clear signal of their intent towards disarmament and a good example to follow for India and Pakistan, as well as other nuclear aspirants.

We must also promote Nuclear Non-Proliferation thru ARF (Asean Regional Forum) since promotion and implementation of nuclear non-proliferation is a prerequisite for regional security. With the coming into force of the SEANWFZ Treaty in March 1997, ARF can assert its collective authority on India and Pakistan since India is an ARF participant and Pakistan is seeking similar status and the five major nuclear powers are represented in ARF.

One major weakness of existing treaties and bilateral agreements is that they normally do not require a declaration by visiting US aircraft and vessels that they are free from nuclear weapons. Neither do these treaties require prior inspection by host country authorities of the nuclear capability and status of the visiting vessels and aircrafts.

Despite the nuclear-free status of many Asian countries, the existing treaties fail to ensure the nuclear-free policys implementation. On the contrary, they even facilitate and allow the circumvention of the nuclear free policy. Thus, local host authorities are rendered inutile to monitor, let alone demand compliance with prohibitions against the entry of nuclear weapons within their territories. It is important to strengthen the international pressure to urge nuclear powers to respect regional nuclear weapon-free zones and to sign their protocols. Local and nuclear free policies should likewise be respected. Both civil society and local governments play an important role in global nuclear disarmament. Since overseas military activities by the nuclear powers continue to be closely related to their nuclear strategy, denying these powers of a nuclear infrastructure or access will greatly enhance the disarmament environment.

In the Philippines, the removal of the US military bases and nuclear infrastructure in 1992 did not come overnight. In 1987, a nuclear-weapon-free constitution was drafted and ratified by the Filipino people whose provision reads: "The Philippine, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons on its territory. (Declaration and State Policies, Sec. 8 & Art. 2, 1987 Constitution) But this was not the sole measure that eliminated the nuclear infrastructure that eventually led to the inevitable removal of US military bases from the Philippines.

In 1988, the Philippine Senate passed legislation that formally outlawed nuclear weapons from Philippine as a national policy. The Philippine Senate approved S. No. 413, "An Act Enforcing the Policy of Freedom From Nuclear Weapons Provided in the Constitution, and Declaring Unlawful Certain Acts in Violation of the Said Policy". Through this law, the broader definition of a nuclear weapon was adopted where, "a nuclear weapon is any devise or weapon, or any of its nuclear parts or components, which uses the fission of fusion process, or a combination of both, to cause an explosion, including, but not limited to the carriers, thereof, the nuclear weapon delivery systems, platforms such as the nuclear launching system, and the nuclear infrastructure, which is an integral part of the command, control and communications system for nuclear powers". This interesting definition of a nuclear weapon which found itself in Philippine legal jurisprudence became an implementing vehicle for its Constitutional ban on nuclear weapons, and thus also in effect, illegitimatized US military facilities. The Philippine Senate legislation also prohibited, "the development, manufacture, acquisition, testing, use, introduction, installation or stockpiling of nuclear weapons, nuclear parts or components thereof, and nuclear weapons-related facilities under whatever form in, on ,under and over any part of Philippine territory including the existing military facilities of the United States of America in the Philippines, and the entry, transit, port calls, stationing and servicing in any part of Philippine territory of nuclear-armed overland transport as, ships or seaborne vessels or submarines or aircrafts or airborne vehicles." The same legislation also created a Nuclear Weapons Monitoring Commission (NWMC) to monitor and verify compliance with the prohibition on nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon-related facilities and activities. In Sec. 6, about Treaties, this legislation declared that,

"The Philippines shall not participate, engage, or be involved in, any program, project or activity that shall encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Any relevant treaty or international agreement entered into by the Philippines shall include a condition that no nuclear weapons or any nuclear parts or components thereof, shall be introduced, stored or installed in, or pass in transit through, any part of Philippine territory".

The Philippines also has related legislation Republic Act 6969 (1990) which prohibits the importation and dumping of nuclear waste in any part of Philippine territory. This law was extensively used by  anti-nuclear activists in their battle against the Philippine nuclear fuel cycle program. This is why up to now, there is not a single nuclear power plant in the Philippines because the Philippine anti-nuclear movement sees nuclear power breeder reactors and nuclear weapons as related issues.

The CTBT

It is clear that the US non-ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a setback to the non-testing programs. Nuclear states would now hesitate to state their commitment not to test with the non-ratification of the CTBT by the US. Definitely, this non-ratification of the CTBT by the US would send the wrong signal in this regard.

Russia, the US and France should be encouraged to announce, either unilaterally or together, a moratorium on subcritical tests and urge China, India and Pakistan to follow suit. A publicly-pledged moratorium on subcritical tests by nuclear powers would give the clear signal that the nuclear weapon states had put themselves against all forms of nuclear testing and would help prevent further damaging development of more sophisticated nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan should also be encouraged to join a moratorium on subcritical tests.

De-Alerting

De-alerting nuclear weapons or removing their hair-trigger alert are options which could be taken thru a series of reciprocal unilateral measure between nuclear states, including taking nuclear forces off alert, changing first-use and launch-on-warning doctrines, the further de-targeting of strategic and non-strategic forces, and the withdrawalof nuclear weapons within the withdrawal of nuclear weapons within the territories of Nuclear- Weapon States. All nuclear weapon countries should be urged to renounce any deployment of nuclear weapons overseas or in outer space.

The large majority of the international community has recognized that the most effective non-proliferation regime would be based on the elimination of nuclear weapons. This includes encouraging the US and Russia to reaffirm their commitment to begin deactivation of nuclear missiles as begun in Start II. This can only increase the international communitys confidence in the commitment of the NWS to meet their NPT Article VI obligations. Most nuclear weapon states are at least now rhetorically committed to a nuclear-free world.

While treaties, timetables, negotiations and verifications regimes may take many years to agree, political agreement by nuclear states on a common goal on nuclear weapons elimination by the early part of the 21st century would serve to delegitimize nuclear weapons and  move discussion away from the paradigm of "arms control" to "nuclear disarmament".

A statement by the nuclear weapons states on nuclear weapons elimination by, during the year 2000 Non- Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, would greatly boost the non-proliferation cause and  remove any of the "discriminatory" rational used by smaller nuclear states like India to justify nuclear weapons acquisition.

The framework of a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) as proposed by some sectors, would create a new but significant forum to leap-frog the inequitable and contradictory elements of the NPT. A Nuclear Weapons Convention similar to those for the elimination of chemical and biological weapons would have to set a definite date for the attainment of a nuclear free world.

The adoption of a Nuclear Weapons Convention would be a signal victory for the forces of denuclearization because State Parties will now undertake never to: use or threaten to use nuclear weapons; never to engage in any military or other preparations to use nuclear weapons; never to research, develop, test, produce, acquire, deploy, stockpile, maintain, retain or transfer nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons; and never to produce, stockpile, retain, transfer or use nuclear weapons- grade fissionable or fusionable materials.

Without improvements in political confidence and trust between states, technical non-proliferation measures are unlikely to succeed. Such confidence must be based on transparency with regard to nuclear weapons and fissile material. A nuclear arms register would go a long way for transparency measures to be implemented.

A significant discrimination in the NPT system has been the fact that Nuclear Weapon States have not had to accept full scope safeguards on all their civilian, yet alone military, nuclear facilities. Nuclear-weapon states must be made to fully agree that their own facilities be subject to full scope safeguards. Thus, an equitable safeguard system.

There should also be an end to the production or export of fissile material (Plutonium and highly enriched Uranium) and technologies for its production, both for military or commercial sources. Japan and European states are still continuously practicing this myth of the "peaceful atom".

The dual nature of nuclear reprocessing technology and materials has long been recognized. The success of smaller states such as India and Pakistan in building nuclear weapons which began with technology originally supplied for "peaceful" and "commercial" purposes only serves to underline the way in which Article V of the NPT has been used to undermine the treatys broader goal.

Commercial Plutonium production will over the next decade outpace the stockpiles of missile fissile material. Given the longevity of fossil material, this poses a significant proliferation threat and creates an enormous verification problem for any fool-proof non-proliferation system.

Commercial Plutonium production, its export and import should be banned. Large-scale existing commercial Plutonium facilities, such as Sellafield and La Hague should be closed down. Non-proliferation policies relating to commercial Plutonium should be equitable and consistent so that all countries get the same treatment. Industrial countries should agree to renounce the export of any materials or technologies which could contribute to nuclear-weapons programmes, including reactor technology to other countries. Likewise, a freeze on ballistic missiles as well as on long range missile technology development would be a strong measure toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. It could be a new initiative that could reduce the threat of increasingly sophisticated conventional as well as other weapons of mass destruction.

Other Asian Flashpoints

Resource wars should be averted if not nipped off the bud in the Asia-Pacific region. The link between natural resources and potential conflicts is clear. We can clearly see this in the Spratlys as well as in other areas. As a result, the military forces in many countries have emerged as distinct and important players in the competition over natural resource. Countries must adopt multilateral mechanisms for the settlement of disputes over access and control of natural resources from the local to the international. The critical role that competition for natural resources play in conflict should not underestimated. This becomes even more explosive when military exercises are conducted near or around the areas of resource conflicts, which can provoke wars or contribute to the threat of nuclear war. Finally, I must mention the alarming trend of the arms trade in the Asia-Pacific. Between 46% to 48% of total global military equipment is being purchased by  countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Despite the end of the Cold War, many Asian countries are still arming themselves thru "modernization" programs of their armed forces. The US, Russia, China and the European Union are aggressively peddling arms and missiles to Asian countries. The critical issue of conventional arms reduction and a general reduction of military expenditure is a prerequisite to ensure demilitarization, denuclearization, thus true regional security. Nevertheless, as some sectors have proposed, a multilateral regional security system such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is needed for managing post Cold-war tensions and potential conflicts.

Finally, we should expand and strengthen creation of nuclear weapons free zone treaties in all regions of the world. The existing NWF zones should be strengthened and extended such as the Treatyof Raratonga for the South Pacific and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty. A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone will greatly ease the remaining tensions in East Asia. These initiatives will widen the existing NWFZs such as the African NWFZ (1996), the Latin American NWFZT and the Antarctic Treaty, a situation where 2/3 of the vast ocean of the Southern Hemisphere is already a zone declared free of nuclear weapons.

It is our common desire and vision for the 21st century to see a swift and successful movement toward a nuclear free world. In the 21st century, let us create a new world free from nuclear threats, nuclear weapons and nuclear terror across national boundaries.

REFERENCES:

ASEAN Summit. Treaty on the South East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.

Bidwai, Praful. "The Myth of Deterrence". The Frontline. July 17, 1998.

Joint Proposal on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament by Research Institutes of Japan, Germany, and the United States. Website: http://www.iips.org/joint.html

Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), Feb, 1978, "History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons July 1945 through September 1977 Declassified Report", National Security Archives, George Washington University.

Philippine Supreme Court Petition. For: Certiorari and Prohibition with application for Temporary Restraining order and/ or Preliminary Injunction on Visiting Forces Agreement, VFA. Filed June 3, 1999, Prof. Roland Simbulan is one of 15 Co-Petitioners.

Senate, Philippine-Freedom from Nuclear Weapons Act (1998).

Simbulan, Roland. Post Cold War U.S. Foreign and Military Policy in the Philippines and Asia. Speech at the Rizal Center, Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. sponsored by Synapses and Resource and Information Center-RICE, May 15,1996.

Simbulan, Roland. The State of Affairs in Asia: The Continuing Threats to Human Security and a PAX ASEANA. Paper Read before the International Conference on Alternative Security. October 25, 1997.

Treaty of Raratonga, 1986.

Umebayashi, Hiro. Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone: Impact of the South Asian Nuclear Weapons Tests. Pacific Campaign for Disarmament and Security.

United Nations, General and Complete Disarmament: Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons. Report of the Secretary General. 1980. p.81.

Wade Huntley. The Proliferation Network. Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, 1997.

<key documents> 7

Diplomatic Judo: Using the NPT to Make the Nuclear-Weapons States Negotiate the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons

Zia Mian & M. V. Ramana

Introduction

Progress on nuclear arms control has become a case of one step forward, two steps back. Despite the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, after more than forty years of effort, and despite the judgement by the International Court of Justice, the Canberra Commission report, and the public calls by numerous retired military and political leaders to abolish nuclear weapons, the goal of a nuclear weapon free world seems more distant now than it did a decade ago when, at the Reykjavik Summit in 1986, Presidents Gorbachev and Reagan discussed the elimination of nuclear weapons. At the moment, the five nuclear weapon powers, especially the US and Russia, are unwilling to even consider disarmament. The US in particular seems to be investing in a modernized, lean-and-mean, nuclear armed future.

In this paper we explore a route by which the States possessing nuclear weapons can be brought lawfully to the negotiating table by those that don't.

Nuclear Disarmament Efforts at the UN General Assembly

The very first resolution passed by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1946 called for nuclear disarmament. It is a testament to the failure of the hopes represented by the UN that there have been hundreds of resolutions calling for the same goal since then, all to no avail. By and large, the nuclear-weapon States (NWS) have treated UNGA resolutions as little more than pious sentiment on the part of the larger international community.

The extent to which the NWS, especially the US, are prepared to go to frustrate the wishes of the international community is evident in the way the United States, almost in complete isolation, opposed a special session of all UN member States, which the vast majority of countries, including the European Union, wanted to be convened in 1999 to discuss a disarmament and security agenda for the 21st century. Such sessions have been convened in 1978, 1982 and 1988. (1)

Faced with such intransigence on the part of the powerful it is not surprising that, as with ordinary citizens in society who are denied justice, the non-nuclear States have turned to law. They have increasingly started to look at the issue of nuclear weapons in the context of international law, and to be more precise about exactly what the community of nations means by nuclear disarmament. In 1994, following the lead of the World Health Organization, the UNGA posed the question, "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances permitted under international law?", to the International Court of Justice (or World Court). Responding to this, the Court held that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law." Further, the Court went on to state, unanimously, that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control." (2)

Based on this ruling, on 6 November 1996, Malaysia introduced an important resolution, calling for compliance with the World Court opinion. (3) This was adopted on 10 December 1996 with the support of 115 States; there were 22 votes against and 32 abstentions. Significantly, the nuclear-weapon States, other than China, were opposed. Law, it seems, was not meant for them. In a separate vote, a paragraph underlining the World Court's statement on the obligation to negotiate nuclear disarmament was supported by 139 States. (4) In 1997 and 1998, follow-up resolutions to this were again introduced by Malaysia and were adopted with 116 and 123 votes in favour respectively. (5)

Although the starting point for these resolutions is the unanimous opinion of the World Court judges that there exists an obligation for States to "pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament," their major thrust is a call for negotiations leading to "an early conclusion of a nuclear weapon convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination." (6) What is significant is that these resolutions put the demand for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) - a treaty banning nuclear weapons similar to those already banning chemical and biological weapons - into the international arena for the first time. (7)

Besides merely calling for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, resolutions at the UN have gone as far as specifying where negotiations for this convention could be held. A resolution introduced by Myanmar called for, among other things, "the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations in early 1998 on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework through a Nuclear Weapons Convention." It urged "the Conference on Disarmament to take into account in this regard the proposal of the twenty-eight delegations for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons, as well as the mandate for the ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, proposed by the twenty-six delegations". (8) This was adopted with the support of 109 States in 1996, and has maintained a comparable level of support in subsequent years.

Despite this significant and growing majority for disarmament, and the isolation of the NWS that it reflects, the 1998 deadline set in the Myanmar resolution is long gone. The chief obstacle to disarmament through the UN system is the fact that while the UNGA has clear proposals for what to negotiate, and where, the UNGA is unable to organise collective action to pursue the goals of the international community if it faces resistance from the major powers.

Impasse at the CD

As the resolution proposed by Myanmar suggested, it is widely believed that the most appropriate forum to handle issues of disarmament is the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The CD has achieved some success with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). It has even made progress with measures to prevent horizontal proliferation, such as the partial test ban treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, on the question of controlling the arsenals of the NWS, the CD has failed to find any way of making progress.

There has been some hope for talks on the Fissban (or Fissile Material Cutoff), largely because the NWS place a high priority on trying to limit the size of the possible arsenals of the (as yet) non-deployed nuclear-weapon States (India, Pakistan, and Israel). Fully aware of the effects of such a cutoff on its nuclear ambitions, India, for a while, blocked progress on the fissban claiming that the treaty should be firmly linked to a time- bound program for nuclear disarmament. However, as part of its efforts to ease international pressure in the aftermath of its May 1998 nuclear tests, India relaxed its objections and has started participating in the negotiations at Geneva. However, as negotiations develop, hardliners in India may force renewed objections, as with the CTBT, because of the relatively small size of India's fissile material stocks compared to those held by the NWS.

The main dispute in the Fissban talks will be over the question of existing stockpiles of fissile material possessed by the nuclear-weapon States. In the words of the Indonesian CD ambassador, "brushing aside the issue of stockpiles, would, once again, render the cutoff treaty a mere non-proliferation measure...[with] no added value to date." (9) The US for its part has announced "we will not agree to any restrictions on existing stocks in a cut-off treaty." (10) India joins the weapon States in its opposition to such a provision, while Pakistan insists on talking about stockpiles and increasingly links its position to asymmetries in the fissile material stockpiles as well as conventional weapons levels within South Asia. (11)

These disputes have prevented actual negotiations on a Fissban from starting despite a negotiating mandate. There are instead demands that the CD must now discuss disarmament, which have now led to five separate proposals dealing with disarmament. (12) Among the countries pursuing this most vigorously are the non-aligned, but more modest proposals have, for the first time, emerged from members of NATO. But Western NWS and Russia oppose establishing even an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. Given the need for consensus at the CD, there seems no hope for any progress.

A Non-STARTer?

In response to calls for a multilateral treaty on nuclear disarmament, the NWS, especially the US and Russia, have stressed bilateral negotiations aimed at limiting and reducing strategic armaments

- the START treaties.

It is important to be clear what has and has not been achieved by the START process. The numbers usually quoted as the levels of warheads left after implementation of these START agreements are misleading; these numbers only refer to active operational weapons. In all, the US stockpile with the Department of Defense contains three categories of warheads: active operational warheads, along with spares kept at the bases where nuclear weapons are deployed; augmentation or "hedge" warheads not necessarily associated with active nuclear delivery systems; and reliability replacements kept in storage. Beyond these categories, the Energy Department has custody of retired warheads and the "strategic reserve." (13) Russia also keeps several thousand warheads in reserve.

If all these categories are included, it has been estimated that the US and Russia still have over 30,000 weapons. In all, the five nuclear-weapon States hold, between them, over 36,000 weapons. (14)

The START process is, moreover, not designed to lead to nuclear disarmament. This follows from the nature of the reductions - the START process only counts the numbers of delivery vehicles and not the fundamental core of the nuclear weapons the pits made of fissile material. Article II of START I reads: "Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty, do not exceed......." (15) There is no mention of pits being reduced. So far the pits recovered from dismantled warheads are stored and have not been disposed off in any fashion. This retention leads one to suspect that the US and Russia are not in a hurry to give up the potential to build up their arsenals, even if they are unlikely, at the present, to do so.

To make matters worse, the START process is now stalled. The Russian Duma is refusing to ratify START II. Since the US refuses to move forward unilaterally on START III, it seems highly unlikely that START will go much further in leading to lower numbers of nuclear weapons, let alone their complete elimination, at any time in the near future. The recent US decisions to expand NATO and to deploy anti-ballistic missile systems as soon as it is feasible are only likely to strengthen Russian resolve to maintain its nuclear arsenal.

In the case of the US, there are other indicators that the US intends to hold on to its nuclear weapons for the indefinite future: the Stockpile Stewardship and modernization programs, the plans to resume tritium production, and in particular, the recent Presidential Guidelines for retargeting nuclear weapons which affirms that the US will continue to rely on nuclear arms as a cornerstone of its national security for the "indefinite future". (16) Likewise, partly in response to NATO expansion, Russia is reportedly considering increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons. (17)

Since the START process is strictly bilateral, the non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) have little control over either the nature or pace of the reductions. As Miguel Marin-Bosch is said to have observed: the non-nuclear-weapon States had been forced to play in the arena of the cold war and now must learn to play in Yankee stadium.

The NPT - Disarmament in the Indefinite Future?

The lack of leverage that the NNWS have over the NWS is no secret. But for over two decades there was some kind of pressure that the NWS had to be sensitive to. It came from the NPT. The Treaty came with a built-in time bomb: after twenty-five years the Treaty had to be reviewed and decision made as to whether to extend it or not. It was for this reason that the START process was offered by NWS, and the US in particular, as evidence that they are meeting their commitment under Article VI of the NPT to work towards nuclear disarmament (see Appendix for the full text of Article VI).

When the time came, the options for extension at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) were, to put itsimply, two-fold. Either an extension, which allowed for more Review and Extension conferences in future, at each of which it would have to be decided whether the NPT would survive or not, perhaps based on progress made towards disarmament. Or an unconditional and indefinite extension, with a review process that had nothing hinging on the outcome of such a review. Realizing what would result from an indefinite extension, at the 1995 extension conference the NNWS seemed to have preferred some kind of a conditional rolling extension. This was not to be. The nuclear-weapons States, led by the US, forced through an indefinite extension.

The 1998 session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2000 NPT Review Conference exposed the supposedly "strengthened review process" put in place at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In the words of one observer, "the much vaunted strengthened review process sputtered to an end," because of "systematic backtracking from the commitments made at the 1995 NPTREC ... seemingly led by the United States with the other NWS expressing solidarity en bloc." (18) The nuclear-weapons States have clearly gotten their NPT cake and are now eating it.

The present impasse and bleak future for disarmament have led to calls for a "peasants' revolt" - a mass withdrawal by NNWS from the NPT "unless the NWS agree in some forum to start genuine negotiations designed to ultimately rid the world of nuclear weapons." (19) There is, however, no need, yet, for civil disobedience in the world of nuclear weapons; the law is still firmly on the side of the NNWS. As the World Court pointed out, it is the NWS who have to fulfill their Article VI obligations. The NNWS can still call the NWS to court to demand their lawful rights to a nuclear weapon free world.

A Way Out?

At the first PrepCom meeting for the 2000 NPT Review Conference, as part of the NGO presentations to the delegates, one of the authors (ZM) pointed out that the signatories of the NPT could use Article VIII (see Appendix for the full text) of the NPT to force negotiations towards nuclear disarmament. (20) This article concerns the process for amending the treaty. It stipulates that any party to the Treaty can submit an amendment to the Treaty. Then, if one third of the Parties to the Treaty (about 60 States) indicate their support, the Depository Governments for the treaty must convene a conference to consider the amendment.

Such an amendment can be written expressly as a fulfillment of the commitment to disarm (Article VI) and to transform the NPT itself into a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The precise form of the amendment is not important as long as it is acceptable to at least one-third of NPT parties. A simple amendment could, for example, be based on Article I of the Biological Weapons Convention (21), and would just add a new article to the NPT saying :

"Recognising their obligations under Article VI, each State party to the Treaty undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain:

ⅰ. Nuclear Weapons or fissile materials, whatever their origin or method of production, that can be used for producing nuclear weapons.

ii. Equipment or means of delivery designed to use such nuclear weapons or materials for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

iii. The verification procedures for realizing these are contained in the protocol to the Treaty."

The Conference that would be called to discuss such an amendment would become, in fact, a negotiating forum with a mandate to abolish nuclear weapons. Every signatory to the NPT would have to attend the conference as an obligation under the terms of the NPT. (22)

Calling such a conference to amend the NPT offers a way for the NNWS to exert leverage on the nuclear disarmament process. The enormous investment of political capital that the NWS have made in the NPT in an effort to preserve their nuclear weapons hegemony can be used against them. With the whole world watching, the NWS would have to decide just how much of a cornerstone the NPT is to maintaining the current order.

Judging from the case of the 1995 extension of the NPT, one can expect much opposition to any amendment of the NPT from the NWS. Thus, they are likely to prevent the amendment conference from happening in the first place. Instead the NWS may offer some measures leading to disarmament. These measures could be "qualitative" - such as adopting a no-first use clause, dealerting, sequestration, and so on. If the NWS were to rapidly adopt these measures, which require little time, then the NNWS could allow them more time before renewing their call for an amendment conference. Even if, as was the case with the 1995 extension conference, the NWS do succeed in blocking the amendment, the Amendment Conference can be reconvened.

This is in contrast to the idea of a once and for all mass withdrawal from the NPT.

If and when such an NPT amendment conference is held, the NWS would have to attend and, in the full view of international public opinion, demonstrate that they were fulfilling their commitments under Article VI of the NPT and delivering progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. If the NWS are seen to refuse, or even to be uncooperative, this could be taken as a straight forward violation of the NPT, with the NWS as the law-breakers. If even the depository governments of the treaty show that they are unwilling to live by its dictates, the NPT will cease to have any moral standing. Having destroyed the legitimacy of the NPT the NWS would have to accept responsibility if NNWS threaten to, or do, withdraw from the treaty. The choice to bring down the non-proliferation regime would have been made by the NWS.

Taking the First Step

The initial impetus and support needed for the proposed amendment process is unlikely to emerge spontaneously. Creating the conditions would require a major campaign by the international peace movement and States committed to the abolition of nuclear weapons. There are signs that the forces that could be part of such a campaign are stirring. For example, there is the New Agenda Coalition, comprising Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden, as well as the Middle Powers Initiative, created by a number of peace movement groups, including International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, International Peace Bureau, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, State of the World Forum, which seeks to "urge the leaders of several key middle-power States to press the nuclear-weapon States to negotiate the elimination of nuclear weapons." (23) The NPT amendment process outlined here could serve as a mechanism for these initiatives to help further the process of disarmament that they are committed to.

For instance, the New Agenda Coalition States could propose a resolution at the UN General assembly calling on all States party to the NPT to "consult among themselves as to the most appropriate method to take advantage of Article VIII of the NPT for the conversion of the NPT into a Nuclear Weapons Convention". This could be followed by one that calls on signatories to the NPT to "take practical steps leading to the convening of a conference at the earliest possible date to consider amendment of the NPT that would convert it into a nuclear weapons convention." (These are similar to resolutions at the UNGA which attempted to use the amendment clause of the Partial Test Ban Treaty to turn it into a comprehensive one. (24)) As pointed out earlier, such resolutions may be expected to garner substantial support. These resolutions could be followed up by the submission of an NPT amendment resolution at the next NPT Review Conference in 2000.

Conclusion

The argument outlined here offers a way out from the dynamic that has emerged only too clearly since the end of the cold war. Changing this dynamic will require changing the rules of the game of disarmament. The overwhelming majority of the international community can, if it chooses, exercise its right to dub those who insist on maintaining nuclear weapons at all costs, as being outside the pale.

Appendix

Attached below are the two articles of the NPT that are referred to in the paper. (25)

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith  on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date  and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament  under strict and effective international control.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any  proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depository Governments which  shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by  one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depository Governments shall  convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to  consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depository Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Notes and References

1. Rebecca Johnson, "The Arms Control Agenda at the UN: Breaking New Ground or Breaking Old Habits?", Arms Control Today, January/February 1997; http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/JAN_FEB/johnson.html

2. John Burroughs, The (Il)legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: A Guide to the Historic Opinion of the International Court of Justice, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, 1997.

3. UN General Assembly Resolution, A/Res/51/45M.

4. UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, Disarmament, New York, 1997, pp. 134-137.

5. The details of the vote in 1997, on UN General Assembly Resolution, A/Res/52/38 O are from Program for Promoting Non-Proliferation Newsbrief, Number 40, 4th Quarter, 1997, p.2 http://www.soton.ac.uk/~ppnn/nb40.pdf, and on the 1998 UN General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/53/77 W, from Program for Promoting Non-Proliferation Newsbrief, Number 44, p.2 http://www.soton.ac.uk/~ppnn/nb44.pdf.

6. Rebecca Johnson, "Multilateral Arms Control: Can the CD Break the Impasse?", Arms Control Today November/December 1997; http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/novdec97/johnson.htm#back4.

7. Rebecca Johnson, Arms Control Today, January/February 1997.

8.UN General Assembly Resolution, A/Res/52/38L.

9.Agus Tarmidzi, Indonesian ambassador to the CD, Geneva, February 20, 1997, CD/PV.756.

10. John Holum, US statement to the CD, 21 January 1999, http://www.gn.apc.org/acronym/cdholum.htm

11. Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram at the Special session of the Conference on Disarmament on 2 June 1998;http://www3.itu.int/pakistan/Pak-India%20Nuc%20CD%20Special.htm

12. Rebecca Johnson, "Frustration that the CD isn't working," Geneva Update No. 44, Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 34, February 1999.

13. Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, "US Nuclear Stockpile, July 1997", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1997, pp. 66-67.

14. Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, "Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-1997", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists November/December 1997, p.67.

15. The treaty text is from the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; http://www.acda.gov/treaties/start/treatyar.htm#II

16. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Clinton Directive Changes Strategy on Nuclear Weapons", Washington Post, 7 December 1997.

17. Walter Pincus, "Russia considering increased Nuclear Dependence", Washington Post, 7 December 1997.

18. Tariq Rauf, "PrepCom Opinion: Farewell to the NPT's Strengthened Review Process?", Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 26, May 1998; http://www.gn.apc.org/acronym/26tariq.htm

19. Frank Blackaby, "Time for a Peasants' Revolt", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1997, p.4.

20. Rebecca Johnson, "Reviewing the NPT: the 1997 PrepCom", Disarmament Diplomacy, April 1997, p. 18.

21. See, for example, "Text of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention", Appendix C, Preventing a Biological Arms Race, ed. Susan Wright, The MIT Press, 1990, pp. 370-376.

22. Zia Mian, "Disarmament's Auto Da Fe", SSRC Newsletter, Winter 1997. 23.Douglas Roche, "The Middle Powers Initiative," Peace magazine, July/August 1998, http://www.peacemagazine.org/9807.htm

24. UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/44/106; reported in Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Number 8, Winter 1989/90.

25. The text of the treaty is from the US Arms Control and Disarmament Web Page. http://www.acda.gov/treaties/npt2.htm

* Zia Mian and M. V. Ramana are Research Associates at the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University, USA http://www.princeton.edu/programs/cees.htm The authors welcome responses to the paper. They can be contacted by e-mail at zia@princeton.edu and ramana@princeton.edu

<key documents>8

Kwajalein Atoll and the new arms race Ballistic Missile Defence and the Asia-Pacific Region

Pacific Concerns Resource Center Inc.

(http://www.pcrc.org.fj/)

In the 1940s, Marshall Islanders were evacuated from their homes on Bikini and Enewetak Atolls to make way for a series of US nuclear tests. The islanders were asked to move "for the good of mankind and to end all world wars", as the United States tested its atomic and hydrogen bombs.

Today, Marshall Islanders are living with the radioactive legacies of the 67 US atmospheric tests between 1946 and 1958. And although nuclear testing in the Pacific finished with the last French tests at Moruroa Atoll in 1996, the Pacific islands are still being used as a testing ground for nuclear arsenals.

In October 1999, the United States tested a new missile defence system from Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. A mock nuclear warhead, launched from a missile fired from California, was knocked out of the sky by an interceptor missile launched from Kwajalein Atoll. A second test in January 2000 failed to hit the target. These tests are part of a series of American operations to develop a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system.

The United States is engaged in a new round of military build up (America’s share of world military spending today is larger than in 1985, at the height of Cold War confrontation with the former Soviet Union). To justify a new round of military spending and prop up major aerospace and military contractors, the new BMD system is supposed to deter a threat of missile attack from a "rogue nation" like Iraq or North Korea, or a deliberate or accidental missile launch by China or Russia.

This PCRC briefing paper sets out the background to the current BMD program, and how it affects the Marshall Islands. The paper also looks at the destabilising impact of this new arms race on countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

Ballistic Missile Defence

The US Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) program is a scaled-down version of the Reagan Administration’s 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars"), which aimed to establish a space-based system that would protect the United States from a massive Soviet missile attack. Star Wars never got off the ground, even after 15 years and more than $50 billion of research costs. Unlike President Reagan’s 1980s vision, however, the BMD is not capable of protecting the United States from an all-out nuclear attack ? it is supposedly directed against missiles fired by "rogue" states like North Korea.

Under President Reagan, the United States established the US Space Command in 1985 ? a joint Army, Navy and Air Force military command ? to co-ordinate Star Wars research and testing. With the revived NMD program, the Clinton Administration established a new military command on 1 October 1997 ? the US Army Space and Missile Defence Command. The Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation (BMDO) provides technical support to the US Army space program, to manage the billions of dollars allocated to this space age technology.

The BMD program is designed to include two elements:

a.) The National Missile Defence (NMD) system that, if deployed, aims to shield all 50 US states from a limited long-range missile strike.

b.) The Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system is designed to neutralise a strike on US forces or their allies by destroying incoming short-range enemy missiles. It is designed to operate in a particular theatre of military operations, such as East Asia or the Middle East.

The US decision on whether to deploy a national anti-ballistic missile system is scheduled to be made in June 2000 during a "Deployment Readiness Review". According to US President Bill Clinton, that decision will be based on four factors: the readiness of the technology, the impact on arms control and relations with Russia, the cost effectiveness, and the threat. If the decision is to go ahead, the system would be operational in 2005, instead of 2003 as originally envisaged by the Pentagon. The extra time is for testing, chiefly at leased facilities at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands.

But in the middle of the US Presidential campaign in 2000, the Democratic Party will not want to be seen as "soft on defence". Although officials say no formal decision on a US missile defense system will be made until June 2000, recent developments suggest that the administration will proceed with the development of a system.

According to United Press International: "In the wake of the October 1999 Senate defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), word leaked out that the administration was now focusing on ways to get Russia on board for changing parts of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which would prohibit the nationwide system that is under consideration." Any NMD will breach the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) between the United States and Russia. As discussed below, China is also opposed to US plans to share TMD systems with Japan and Taiwan.

Should NMD proceed, in its first phase to be complete by 2005, Alaska is the preferred site for the deployment of 100 anti-missile interceptors. The Pentagon claims that the Alaska site would provide adequate coverage for all US states. The site would also include construction of a powerful new battle-management radar. Politicians in North Dakota are arguing that some of the NMD forces be allocated to their state.

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has also completed a $18 billion upgrade to its missile-tracking and command-centre components. NORAD, a binational, US-Canadian military command, is located in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. According to a Reuters report: "Now the Pentagon is getting set to launch a giant systems-integration project, setting the stage for a proposed shield to protect the United States from limited missile attack by a 'rogue regime'. The work will tie about 40 air, space and missile systems into a single, integrated command and control system - the biggest modernisation since the complex became fully operational on 1 January 1966"

Cost overruns without results

The US government has allocated $10.5 billion over the next five years for research and tests into BMD. US President Bill Clinton, in his budget submitted to Congress on 1 February 1999, requested an extra $6.6 billion for work on the national missile defence system over the next six years, creating the $10.5 billion total budget between now and 2005. However, most estimates expect even the small initial system envisioned in that budget would cost far more. The US General Accounting Office has estimated that it would cost $18 to $28 billion to deploy a small system.

In March 1999, the US Congress approved legislation mandating the deployment of a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) "as soon as technically possible". The US House of Representatives approved the resolution 317-102; the US Senate vote was 90-3.

The main beneficiaries of this military spending are US aerospace and defence corporations. Boeing Corporation builds the launch vehicle for the NMD missile, while Raytheon Corporation (formerly Hughes Aerospace) manufactures the "Killer interceptor". Raytheon is the major contractor at the Kwajalein Missile Range.

The vast sums allocated for NMD and TMD merely adds to the $60 billion spent since President Reagan launched his Star Wars project in 1983. All this money has not lead to the deployment of a single effective system. It will take far more testing, and substantially increased budgets, to deploy a system that can be shown to be reliable and effective, but the threatened deployment of NMD and TMD is causing problems throughout the Pacific Islands and Asia. The money spent by the United States on missile defences is encouraging other nations to improve their missile capacity and countermeasures, deepening the arms race and insecurity at a time when many people are looking to the abolition of nuclear weapons as the best way of increasing international security.

Kwajalein Atoll Missile Testing Range

The major testing ground for both TMD and NMD missiles is the US Army Kwajalein Atoll / Kwajalein Missile Range (USAKA / KMR), located at Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI).

For decades, the lagoon in Kwajalein Atoll has been the splashdown point for missiles test-fired from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. The history of Kwajalein’s role in the development of Trident, MX, Minuteman and other US missiles is set out in Giff Johnson’s Collision Course at Kwajalein.

Kwajalein Atoll is made up of nearly 100 coral islands surrounding a 2,300-square-kilometre lagoon (the largest lagoon in the world). Under U.S. Army control since 1964, the USAKA / KMR lease covers eleven islands in the atoll. The Kwajalein bases are a $4 billion complex, including radar tracking, intelligence collection and missile launching facilities. US budget documents outline Kwajalein’s many roles:

Test and evaluation of Army and Department of Defence missile systems

US Army space surveillance

NASA scientific and space programs

Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation demonstration/validation tests

US Air Force Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile development and operational tests

US Space Surveillance Network.

In the 1970s and 1980s, Marshall Islanders staged "sail-ins" to occupy the islands in Kwajalein Atoll, in protest over US failure to compensate them for the loss of land and damage to the environment. "Operation Homecoming" in 1982 lasted four months, with Kwajalein landowners demanding the right to return to their home islands. Today, lease payments to the Kwajalein Atoll Development Authority (KADA) and landowners amount to $13 million a year. Under the KMR rental agreement, the United States pays landowners on 36 wetos (parcels of land) on Kwajalein Island. Former Marshall Islands President Imata Kabua is the Iroij (Chief) on 22 of those wetos and Anjua Loeak is Iroij on a further 12 wetos. Each of the remaining 2 wetos has a different Leroij.

Of the 1,277 Marshallese employed at Kwajalein, more than 1,060 work for Range Systems Engineering and Integrated Range Engineering, both run by Raytheon Corporation. Over 150 women work as domestic servants for US personnel on Kwajalein Island, travelling from Ebeye Island each day and returning home at night. Ebeye, once described as "the slum of the Pacific", today houses more than 12,000 people on less than 100 acres.

Even with the end of the Cold War, Kwajalein Atoll remains central to the testing and development of new missiles. As US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth told Congress in October 1998:

"According to a Department of Defence assessment, the USAKA / KMR is a ‘national asset’ ? currently the only facility in the world with an arena suitable for full scale testing of long-range missiles. The study also determined that Kwajalein is uniquely situated for intelligence gathering and provides important support for our space programs. We have, over time, invested upwards of US$4 billion in this facility, and relocating would be a costly and difficult proposal. Our lease of Kwajalein base expires in 2001 though if we choose to renew, our Compact with the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) provides automatic renewal rights for an extra 15 years."

The head of the US Army’s Space and Missile Defence Command, Lieutenant-General John Costello describes Kwajalein as the "gem in the crown". Costello sees Kwajalein as becoming more important in the future because of TMD and NMD: "Kwajalein is the singular place where all the capabilities exist to gauge the success or failure of missile defence systems. If we tell Americans that a national defence system works, it better work. The only place in the world to do precision testing is Kwajalein."

Kwajalein lagoon's shallow waters make for easy retrieval of test objects, and the very deep surrounding ocean provides secure disposal of missiles and warheads not to be recovered. The ALTAIR radar at Kwajalein is one of only three around the world that has deep space tracking capacity.

Kwajalein and Ballistic Missile Defence tests

On 1 October 1999, the United States conducted its first test of a prototype National Missile Defence (NMD) system. A modified Minuteman ballistic missile was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. As it flew over the Pacific, the missile released a mock nuclear warhead and a decoy. Another missile was then launched from Kwajalein Atoll, 4,300 miles away and the dummy target was intercepted and destroyed 140 miles above the Pacific Ocean by an "exoatmospheric kill vehicle" (EKV). According to the NMD Joint Program Office: "This 'hit to kill' intercept demonstrates that a warhead carrying a weapon of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical or biological - will be totally destroyed and neutralised."

As John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists notes: "What they've done is the equivalent of shooting a hole-in-one. What they have to be able to do is shoot a hole-in-one every time. Missile defense must work perfectly if it's going to work at all."

However, the second test in the series, on 18 January 2000, was not successful. The US Defence Department press release after the test notes simply that "an intercept was not achieved." The failure was a significant setback, meaning that the interceptor missile missed its target in spite of tens of millions of dollars of high-technology support systems.

The October 1999 test was an improvement over previous Star Wars tests ? of 16 previous trials, only two hit the mark, in 1984 and 1991. But the Kwajalein tests are highly controlled and critics remain doubtful about the system's reliability under stressful combat conditions. In October, the target was simplified to include fewer decoys than previous "fly-by" tests. This was only a test of the "kill vehicle," the last component that destroys the incoming warhead. The booster rocket, the radars, and the integrated management system were not tested. Other elements of the system, including space based sensors, ground based radars, and new rocket boosters and command centres have yet to be tested. Only one of the first three tests will involve the complete system, and all three will use surrogate parts, not the actual components.

The Kwajalein tests ? which cost more than $100 million - were the first of twenty planned intercept tests over the next six years to demonstrate the effectiveness and reliability of NMD system technology. However by the time of the deployment decision in June 2000, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization will have conducted only three intercept tests of the proposed NMD system.

US bases in the Pacific islands are also being used for Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) development as well as the National Missile Defence tests. Different branches of the US Armed Forces are in competition to develop TMD systems.

The naval TMD program is proposed as the US Navy’s defence system against missiles deployed during the Gulf War. The US Navy is conducting short-range missile tests at the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) at Barking Sands, on the western end of Kauai island in Hawai’i. The US Navy plans to fire interceptor missiles from ships at short-range missiles launched from Nihau island during tests in 2000. In December 1999, the destroyer USS Kane test-fired two missiles at PMRF as part of the TMD program ? the first at-sea firings of the new rockets.

The US is seeking environmental approval to develop launch and instrumentation sites in the islands to support their TMD program ? at Tern Island, Johnston Atoll, Nihau and existing PMRF sites on Kauai in Hawai’i.

As well as the NMD tests, Kwajalein Atoll is being used for the TMD program. Intermediate-range missiles from Barking Sands in Hawai’i and short-range tactical missiles from Wake Island will be lobbed into Kwajalein lagoon as part of TMD operations. Since the mid-1990s, the US has used Bikien island on Aur as a launch site for short-range missiles aimed at Kwajalein lagoon. (For example, Patriot missiles fired from Meck Island in Kwajalein Atoll shot down two SCUD missiles launched from Aur Atoll in February and March 1997).

Kwajalein is used for Radar System tests for the Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) tests, tracking missiles fired from Wake Island. (Of the first eight THAAD tests at the Army’s White Sands missile range in New Mexico, which started in 1995, only two hit the single target missile). Pentagon officials have called for further THAAD testing at Kwajalein before the THAAD system is put into the field.

Impact on the Republic of the Marshall Islands

The United States has guaranteed access to the Kwajalein Missile Range for another 15 years. However the relationship with the Republic of the Marshall Islands is clouded by current negotiations over the Compact which links the two countries.

The United Nations Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was formally ended by the UN Security Council in 1990, after the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) both ratified Compacts of Free Association with the United States in 1986. The 15-year Compacts for RMI and FSM run until 2001 (The Republic of Palau’s Compact runs until later in the decade, due to the long struggle over Palau’s nuclear free Constitution).

Under the Compacts, Washington takes responsibility for defence of RMI, FSM and Palau, in return for the right to deny access to third countries ? a policy of strategic denial originally directed against the Soviet Union. The Compacts were created at a time of Cold War paranoia about supposed Soviet advances in the Pacific.

In October 1999, the Marshall Islands and the United States began renegotiation of their Compact of Free Association. In 1999, the US government appointed a Special Negotiator for the Compact renegotiation. Allen P. Stayman previously served as Director of the Office of Insular Affairs (an office in the US Department of Interior that is responsible for relations with the "interior" islands of Micronesia!). Stayman heads an Interagency Group on the Freely Associated States, which includes representatives of the US Departments of State, Defence and Interior

A new Marshall Islands government was elected in November 1999, headed by United Democratic Party politician Kessai Note. President Note replaces former President Imata Kabua, one of the largest landowners in Kwajalein Atoll.

The Compact negotiations largely focus on financial management and economic aid, but security and defence issues are also central. According to October 1998 testimony to Congress by Stanley Roth (US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs), there were three key security reasons for the Compacts with the Marshall Islands, FSM and Palau:

"First, the principle of strategic denial elaborated in the agreements with each of the three Freely Associated States (FAS) guaranteed the United States exclusive military access to these countries and their surrounding waterways. Second, our agreement with the RMI ensured continued access to Kwajalein military facility. Third, our agreement with Palau included the right to develop a military base should the United States need an alternative to the Philippines."

Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for the Asia-Pacific region, reaffirmed this in testimony to Congress in October 1998: "The overriding defence interest in the negotiations will be the continued use of the Kwajalein missile range and the facilities on Kwajalein Atoll. The requirements of our missile defense and space surveillance programs, combined with the uniqueness of Kwajalein's location, infrastructure investment, and real world treaty restrictions, makes this an issue of the highest priority."

As the United States can unilaterally extend the Kwajalein leases for fifteen years after they expire in 2001, the Marshall Islands government is seeking increased rental payments to the government and Kwajalein landowners.

RMI-US negotiations over Kwajalein include the issue of mid-corridor people living on Ebeye Island (located next to Kwajalein Island that hosts the main KMR headquarters). In the early 1960s, some two hundred people were moved from islands in the mid-atoll corridor of the atoll and relocated to Ebeye, to make a corridor for the missile path on Kwajalein. Today, there are more than 20,000 mid-corridor people yet housing hasn’t expanded for them and there are demands for better education, job training and job preference for employment (which the USAKA refuses as an "equal opportunity" employer).

The US government has fiercely protected its control over defence and security issues under the Compact. In December 1997, the US government lodged complaints with the RMI government when the Marshall Islands failed to consult before signing the Ottawa Convention to ban landmines (a treaty the United States has refused to sign). "We don't want to make the United States mad, but we had to vote our conscience," explained the then RMI Foreign Minister Phillip Muller. "Usually, our side votes with the United States but we're not just a rubber stamp for the United States. We felt the Marshall Islands should stand up as a sovereign nation in this humanitarian effort. We wanted to associate the Marshall Islands with the rest of the world in an effort to rid the world of weapons that don't distinguish between civilians or military personnel."

The Marshall Islands and FSM are locked into US policy even on issues unrelated to Pacific security, such as resolutions on Israel in the United Nations. As FSM Compact negotiator Asterio Takesy told Congress during October 1998 testimony:

"We are keenly aware that strategic and security considerations are the cornerstone of our free association relationship with the United States. Thus, we have worked hard to give more than just lip service to the responsibilities we assumed in the Compact. The FSM has been strictly supportive of United States defense and security policy in the region, such as, for example, by refraining from joining its neighboring island countries in the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ), and by refraining from signing the Convention against Land Mines. Our consistent support for the State of Israel, while motivated in part by internal considerations, has also been with an eye toward supporting US policy in this important security area."

But the people of the Marshall Islands have concerns over security as well. The RMI government is seeking to renegotiate compensation allocated for the effects of the 67 US nuclear tests conducted at Enewetak and Bikini Atolls between 1946-58. Since 1995, the US Government has released previously classified documents, which show that 20 out of 22 populated atolls in the Marshall Islands were affected by radioactive fallout from these tests, rather than the four atolls previously recognised as affected by the US government.

Foreign Minister Muller also says that United States has failed to deliver on a promised $20 million development fund to compensate for provisions of the Compact unilaterally removed in 1983. RMI has only received $2 million of these funds. Originally under the Compact, RMI citizens were to get visa-free entry to United States to live and work. Now, after US officials changed the law, Marshallese must get work authorisation approvals, which is a lengthy and bureaucratic procedure.

The Marshall Islands government hopes that the United States will agree to extend the Compact for a period of more than 15 years, and provide incentives for US investment. While US officials have extensive criticisms of government corruption and mismanagement in the Marshall Islands, the US government rarely acknowledges the colonial history of the trusteeship relationship that distorts the economics of the country. From 1945 until 1968, outsiders could not visit the Marshall Islands without getting permission from the US Navy. No foreign investment was allowed in the islands until 1973.

As with other Pacific island countries, the RMI has been undergoing "structural adjustment" through a Public Sector Reform Program (PSRP). This involves the privatisation of government owned assets, through the Private Sector Unit (PSU) of the Office of the President. Under the PSRP there has been amalgamation of ministries, a 27% reduction in the number of government employees since January 1996, and a public sector wage freeze (Neighbouring FSM has also been under an IMF structural adjustment program since 1995).

Former Foreign Minister Muller says large Asian Development Bank (ADB) loans pushed by the United States have threatened the RMI economy: "The large scale of the loans, the enormous debt burden the Marshall Islands is accruing and the recommendations to rapidly reduce our public sector destabilises the Marshall Islands economic security." In early 1999, the ADB refused to release funds until the RMI government pushed through legislation to further cut back the number of government employees.

With a limited resource base, the RMI government has looked at other methods to raise finance, including several proposals over the last decade to store nuclear waste in the Marshall Islands. There have been persistent attempts by Taipower (the state-run nuclear agency in Taiwan) to establish a waste dump on islands contaminated by nuclear testing in the 1940s and 1950s. Former President Kabua declared a freeze on the nuclear waste plan in 1997, but a proposed "feasibility study" suggested that the plans were still on the table. In December 1998, the RMI government issued a statement stating that no nuclear waste could be imported into the Marshall Islands. The statement came in response to fears that the Taiwanese plan could be revived after the Marshall Islands established diplomatic relations with Taiwan in November 1998 (in response, the People’sRepublic of China broke diplomatic relations with the Marshall Islands and closed its embassy in Majuro).

Difficulties in US-Chinese relations have been compounded by the construction of a Chinese satellite-tracking base at Bonriki on the island of Tarawa in the neighbouring Micronesian nation of Kiribati. The Chinese Space Telemetry, Tracking and Command Station ? the first built outside China ? was constructed in 1997, after China and Kiribati signed an agreement for the tracking station in September 1996. In spite of claims that the station is used for monitoring Kwajalein Missile Range, both Governments have stated that the facility is used for monitoring China’s civilian satellite launch program, with China’s Ambassador to Kiribati denouncing the spying allegations as "fabricated lies".

Theatre Missile Defence and Asia

The US administration also announced steps to advance the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) program, which is designed to protect US troops and their allies in the field against medium- and short-range missiles. TMD programs are gaining momentum across the Asia-Pacific, provoking angry responses from China.

a) Japan

The United States and Japanese governments signed a memorandum of understanding on 16 August 1999 for joint research on a theatre missile defense system. The joint research project, looking at a sea-based anti-ballistic missile, is expected to cost between $435 million and $522 million over six years. The United States hopes to draw on Japanese funding and technology research to reduce the massive costs of BDM systems.

Among other concerns related to the US-Japan TMD should it be deployed is that it may require some sort of joint command. Japan's constitutional constraints banning military operations make the possibility of a joint command a highly sensitive issue in Japan.

b) Korea

After North Korea fired a Taepo Dong missile over Japan in August 1998, TMD programs were given a major boost. However, North Korea recently agreed to halt its missile flight test program while negotiating with the United States (the US and Japanese governments offered economic aid in exchange for North Korea imposing a moratorium on testing). However in spite of the US focus on North Korea as a "rogue" state and major missile threat, it has not tested a missile capable of hitting the United States with a nuclear warhead.

South Korea claims to have no interest in joining the US-Japan TMD system. President Kim Dae-jung has said that the development of a missile system should consider the regional interests of the whole Northeast Asia and should not cause misunderstandings among countries in the region.

Though declining to be part of the US-Japan TMD, South Korea appears to be developing an independent missile force to deter North Korea, believing a deterrent force might be more useful than TMD in preventing an attack from the North. On 10 April 1999, South Korea test-fired a surface-to-surface missile with a potential range of 300 kilometres. In November 1999, the Pentagon announced that South Korea had asked to buy 616 Patriot missiles and 14 Patriot firing units, 14 engagement radars and 76 launching stations for anti-missiles. According to the Pentagon: "The proposed sale will enhance the Republic of Korea's defensive capability against hostile neighbors, lessening the burden on the United States."

c) Taiwan

Within days after the announcement of the August 1999 agreement on TMD between the United States and Japan, Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui said he wanted to see the proposed TMD project cover Taiwan in order to "cope with the current situation."

The Taiwan Defense Ministry plans to spend about $9 billion in the next decade to develop a low-altitude defense system consisting of radar warning systems, command centres and missile launch bases. This "shield" would, in theory, provide missile protection for 70 percent of Taiwan against attacks from the People’s Republic of China.. The military-run Chungsan Institute of Science and Technology is scheduled to conduct tests in 2000 of "low-level anti-attack ballistic missile systems" that it has been developing for deployment in 2005.

In April 1999, under heavy congressional coercion, the Clinton administration agreed in principle to the sale of an early-warning radar system to Taiwan in accord with the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which stipulates that the United States may provide arms to Taiwan of a 'defensive nature'. Although the radar system does not constitute a full-blown operational TMD link, the sale represents a deliberate step towards bringing Taiwan under a regional TMD umbrella.

In October 1999, the Chairman of the US International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific disclosed the contents of this year's US arms sales package for Taiwan included early-warning radar to detect PRC missile launches, new and upgraded Patriot 3 anti-missile batteries, and new equipment intended to ensure the technological superiority of the Taiwanese airforce over its PRC counterpart. The United States is also considering the possible sales to Taiwan of P-3 Orion sub hunter aircraft and advanced Aegis battle-management radar for battleships.

The Far Eastern Economic Review notes: "US Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Jesse Helms has proposed a resolution to increase advanced military coordination with Taiwan. By connecting Taiwan with US reconnaissance satellites, it would put them in the feedback loop to US Aegis cruisers, and hence, into the greater TMD architecture ... China has deep fears about TMD for both Taiwan and Japan. The prospect directly undermines the credibility and effectiveness of China's strategic and political deterrent of its missile forces. In the case of Taiwan, Beijing fears inclusion in TMD could fan independence aspirations ... China has warned that TMD development and deployment would undermine its cooperation in efforts to control nuclear development and missile proliferation."

Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander in Chief of the United States Pacific Command has recommended the deployment of regional missile defenses to protect US troops and allies in the Pacific from missile attacks. He also stated that the US should help Taiwan build missile defenses. In November 1999, US State Department spokesperson James Rubin said that the United States maintains "an active dialogue" with the Taiwan government on TMD; however, specific sales of effective missile defense are "premature."

d) China

Throughout 1999, senior officials of the People’s Republic of China have spoken out against the proposed US deployment of NMD and TMD, especially if Taiwan is involved.

In March 1999 Foreign Minister Tang Juaxuan stated that if any country intends to include Taiwan in TMD, it would be tantamount to an encroachment on China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and would be an obstacle to reunification. The same month, Wang Daohan, the PRC's chief negotiator on Taiwan, strongly warned that inclusion of Taiwan in TMD would provoke an arms race, saying: "That will completely disrupt the current world situation and instead a new Cold War will appear." He said the PRC would consider such a move as the establishment of a military alliance between the United States and Taiwan.

The director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Department of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sha Zukang, reiterated the position that TMD will "only poison the atmosphere, undermine the conditions necessary for nuclear disarmament and breed a potential danger of an arms race." Sha Zukang also said: "The strategic balance will be broken and the international strategic situation might regress to its 1950s position if the United States successfully develops the NMD and TMD systems." Du Qenqi also argues that the American-Japanese co-operation in development of TMD will further enhance the military power of Japan and will stimulate the further expansion of the ambition of a few Japanese to take the road of militarism again."

China already perceives that US efforts to build a missile defense are intended to weaken the Chinese deterrent. China’s current nuclear arsenal is around 20 long-range, single warhead missiles. However, it is in a slow modernisation program to build longer-range missiles with multiple warheads. China would likely react to US deployment of a missile defense system by increasing the both the size of its arsenal and the pace of its improvements. Evidence of China’s response to US talk of abrogating the ABM Treaty is already developing, with Reuters reporting on 25 October 1999 that China recently added $9.7 billion to its defense budget to improve its nuclear arsenal.

China is opposed to NMD as well as TMD: "China's military has noticed that the first NMD antimissile base, proposed for Alaska to intercept a potential future threat from North Korea, is also positioned to shield against China's small intercontinental missile force", accounting for China's skepticism of US claims that the system is directed solely at "rogue" states.

Impact on nuclear disarmament

Arms control critics are opposed to the NMD program for a number of reasons:

1. The technology is unproven, and cannot be shown to be reliable or effective by the June 2000 deployment decision.

2. Unless Russia agrees to modify it, deployment would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, a move that could unravel the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime and substantially increase the nuclear threat to the United States.

3.The cost of the system is unclear and likely to spiral upwards far beyond the $10.5 billion the Clinton Administration has budgeted over the next five years. The system cannot be shown to be effective and reliable under the current budget and deployment schedule.

4. The low-risk threat cited as justification for deployment, particularly North Korea’s small and untested long-range missile arsenal, does not warrant the damage US missile defence deployment would wreak on relations with Russia and China.

The US Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on 10 October 1999 was a serious rejection of the multilateral security philosophy of the past 40 years. It was a clear statement that US politicians see rearmament as a priority. They seek more nuclear weapons in US hands, not fewer, with an end to the international framework embodied in the CTBT.

The New York Times states: "The greatest dangers lie in South Asia, especially after this week's military coup in Pakistan. It will be much harder now for the United States to persuade both India and Pakistan to sign a test ban treaty that the Senate has refused to ratify ... The Senate vote will also complicate America's nuclear diplomacy with China, which has signed the treaty and is observing a voluntary moratorium on testing ... China may be tempted to test new [bomb] designs if it begins to seem as if the treaty will never be ratified. There is also a greater risk that a future Russian government might feel tempted to conduct secret underground nuclear tests now that plans for establishing the treaty's worldwide network of monitoring stations and its provisions for on-site inspections have been indefinitely postponed."

The next agreement under assault is the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Republican Presidential front-runner George W. Bush has made a missile defense system the centerpiece of a plan to "redefine war on our terms" and claims he would be willing to tear up the ABM Treaty in order to deploy such a system.

The US government is urging Russia to amend the ABM Treaty, which bars a missile defence system covering the entire country (under the treaty, only one site is allowed for limited defensive systems). The Clinton Administration is currently discussing modifications to the ABM Treaty with Russia, which would allow the United States to deploy a "limited" national missile defense. Both Clinton Administration and Russian officials have repeatedly stated that the ABM Treaty remains the "cornerstone of strategic stability." To date, Russia has opposed all changes to the ABM Treaty and declared that US withdrawal from it or insistence on changes would end the START process that is reducing strategic nuclear arsenals. This would leave Russia with 6,000 warheads that could hit the United States, many ready for launch within 15 minutes of a decision to attack.

'To ensure that an American missile defense could be overwhelmed, Russia would keep as many nuclear warheads on hair-trigger, launch-on-warning as possible. This would increase the risk of an accidental or unauthorised Russian launch, arguably already the greatest threat to US national survival. ... the most effective protection against nuclear weapons is to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime in cooperation with other like-minded nations"

The risk of nonproliferation regimes being undermined is far greater than a missile attack from a so-called rogue state. Roelf Ekeus, Sweden's ambassador to the United States and former head of the UN Special Commission for arms inspections in Iraq has warned: "As missile defence gathers speed, what is the political impact? It gives the impression that the United States is settling down to live with nuclear weapons. The risk is that more and more [countries] just give up the hope [of nonproliferation], which I think is the greater threat."

In November 1999, Russia and China introduced a United Nations resolution demanding strict compliance with the ABM treaty. Signalling strong opposition to US efforts to change the treaty, the resolution recognises the historic role of the ABM Treaty "as the cornerstone for maintaining international peace and security and strategic stability," and reaffirms "its continued validity and relevance, especially in the current international situation." The resolution was adopted on 5 November 1999 in the UN General Assembly with a vote of 54 to 4 with 73 abstentions. The four "no" votes were from the United States, Latvia, Israel and the Federated States of Micronesia.

China congratulated the UN for endorsing the resolution saying: "In recent years, some countries have made great efforts to develop national missile defense plans to strive for their own absolute security and short-term strategic advantages. These countries have proposed changing the ABM Treaty and even threatened to withdraw from it. These actions would damage strategic balance and stability, damage the progress of nuclear disarmament, shake the foundation of nuclear non-proliferation and even cause a new nuclear arms race, including in outer space"

In November, 138 nations also voted in the United Nations General Assembly to reaffirm the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, especially the provision that space "be for peaceful purposes" (The United States and Israel abstained during the vote).

* This briefing paper is compiled from information published by the Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation (BMDO), the Pacific Campaign for Disarmament and Security (PCDS), the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), the Marshall Islands Journal and the Disarmament Clearinghouse. Thanks for their permission to reprint material. First edition ? February 2000.

Further information on the militarisation of space can be found at the website of the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space ( http://www.globenet.free-online.co.uk/).

<한글번역본>

콰자레인 산호섬과 새로운 무기경쟁: 탄도미사일요격(BMD)과 아시아-태평양 조약

940년대, 마샬 군도인들은 미국 핵 실험 시리즈를 위한 길을 만들기 위해  비키니와 에네워택 산호섬들에 있는 그들의 집을 뛰쳐나왔다. 섬주민들은 미국이 원자폭탄과 수소폭탄을 실험하고 있을 때, 이주에 대한 조건으로 인류에 도움이 될 것, 그리고 세계전쟁을 종식시키기 위한 실험일 것을 요구했다.

오늘날, 마샬 군도인들은 1946년에서 1858년에 걸친 67 US기상실험의 방사능 유산과 함께 살고있다. 그리고 비록 태평양에서의 핵실험이 지난 1996년 모루로아 섬에서 있은 프랑스 실험으로 끝났더라도, 태평양의 섬들은 여전히 핵병기고를 위한 실험지로 남아있다.

1999년 10월, 미국은 먀샬군도 공화국의 콰잘레인 섬에서 새로운 미사일 방어 시스템을 실험했다. 캘리포니아의 발사대에서 발사된 모조 핵 탄두는 콰잘레인 섬에서 발사된 요격미사일에 의해 공중에서 격추되었다.  2000년 1월에 있은 실험은 목표물을 적중시키는데 실패하였다. 이러한 실험들은 탄도미사일요격(BMD) 시스템의 발전을 위한 미국작전 시리즈의 일부이다.

미국은 군사구조에 관한 뉴라운드에 속해있다. (오늘날 전세계 군사비중 미군이 차지하는 비중은 구 소련과 대립해있던 냉전시기의 절정이었던 1985년보다 크다. )

군비에 관한 뉴 라운드를 정당화하기 위해, 주요대기권과 군사계양자를 받치기 위해, 새로운 탄도미사일 요격 시스템은 이라크나 북한과 같은 악동국가의 미사일 공격을 겁을 주어 그만두게 하거나, 혹은 신중을 기하기 위해, 혹은 중국이나 러시아에서 잘못 발사된 미사일을 위한 것처럼 보인다.

이 PCRC 보고서는 현 BMD 프로그램의 뒷배경과 그것이 마샬 군도에 미치는 영향에 대해서 이야기 한다. 그리고 또한 이 보고서는 아시아-태평양 지역의 나라들 간의 새로운 무기경쟁의 약화시키는 것에 대한 중요성을 이야기하고 있다.

탄도미사일요격

미 탄도미사일요격(BMD) 프로그램은 레이건 행정부의 1983년 전략방어구상(Star Wars)의 축소판이다. 그것은 우주기지 시스템의 건설을 목표로 하고 있는데 크고 육중해 보이는 소련 미사일의 공격으로부터 미국을 지키기 위해서이다. 15년 동안, 500억 달러 이상의 연구비용을 쏟아부었음에도 불구하고 Star Wars는 한번도 근거지를 이탈해 본 적이 없다. 레이건을 닮지 않은 1980년대 전망은, 그럼에도 불구하고, BMD는 전면적인 핵공격으로부터 미국을 방위할 능력이 없었다. 이것은 아마도 북한과 같은 □건달□ 국가로부터 발사되는 미사일에 대항하도록 통제되었기 때문이다.

레이건 대통령 하에서, 미국은 1985년에 육군, 해군, 공군 사령부와 공동으로 미우주사령부를 건설했다. : Star Wars 연구와 실험을 조정하기 위하여. 되살아난 NMD 프로그램과 함께, 1997년 10월 1일 클린턴 행정부는 새로운 군사령부를 건설했다. : 미군 우주&미사일 방위사령부. 탄도미사일요격위원회(BMDO)는 미군 우주 프로그램에 대한 기술적인 지원과 이 우주 과학기술 연령에 대한 몇십억 달러의 경영을 준비한다.

BMD프로그램은 두가지의 요소를 포함하고 있다.

a) NMD 시스템이 전개된다면, 얼마 안 되는 장거리미사일의 공격으로부터 미국의 50개 주를 보호하는 장치가 된다.

b)TMD시스템(시트레미사일 요격)은 미국의 권력 혹은  단거리의 적국미사일의 파괴를 위한  그들의 동맹을 유지하는 것을 목적에 두고 있다. 이것은 동아시아나 중앙Ea 처럼  군사작전에서 특히 시트레미사일로 군사행동을 하는 것을 목적에 두고 있다.

국가의 대탄도미사일시스템을 전개할지 어떨지에 대한 미국의 결정은 2000년 6월 □Deployment Readiness Review□ 과정에 따라 움직여질 것이다. 미국 대통령 빌 클린턴에 의해, 이 결정은 4개의 요소에 기반할 것이다: 기술의 준비성, 군대통제에 대한 영향력과 러시아와의 관계, 유효비용, 그리고 위협. 만일 이 결정이 진행된다면, 이 시스템은 미 국방성의 원래구상인 2003년이 아닌 2005년 안에 사용될 것이다.  그때까지의 여유시간은 주로 마샬제도의 콰잘레인 산호섬의 계약된 기지에서의 테스트를 실시하게 된다.

그러나 미국대통령의 2000년 선거전의 중반에서 민주당은 □방어에 있어서 연약한□ 모습을 보이길 원치 않는다. 공무원들이 2000년 6월까지 미국 미사일시스템이 만들어진다는 것에 대해 형식적 결정은 없다고 말할지라도, 근래의 국면은 당국은 시스템의 개발에 착수할 것이라는 암시를 풍기고 있다.

국제신문연합에 의하면, □1999년 10월 CTBT(포괄적 핵실험금지조약)의 상원의 패배에 따라서, 당국은 이제 1972년의 대탄도미사일조약에 러시아를 끌어들이는 것에 주목한다라는 말이 누설되었다.□ 몇몇 NMD가 미국과 소련사이에서 대탄도미사일조약(ABM)을 위반할 것이다. 논의아래서, 중국은 역시 일본과 대만과 TMD시스템을 공유하기 위한 미국의 계획에 저항했다.

만일 NMD가 진행되면, 2005년에 완성되는 첫 번째 국면에서 보면,  알래스카는 대미사일요격기 100대가 배치를 위한 우선적인 지역이 된다. 미 국방성은 알래스카 지역이 전미지역을 위해 적절한 대비를 해낼것이라 주장한다. 이 지역은 또한 새롭고 강력한 군수레이더(battle- management radar)시설을 포함하고 있다. 북다코타의 정치인들은 NMD 일부의 위력이 그들의 주에 배치되는 것에 대해 논의하고 있다.

북아메리카 항공방위병력(NORAD)는 미사일추적과 명령센터구성에 180억불을 증액해냈다.

NORAD, 즉 미국과 캐나다의 군병력은 콜로라도의 샤이엔산에 위치하고 있다.

로이터의 보도에 의하면, □이제 미 국방성은 거대한 시스템 통합계획에 착수하고 있으며, □건달정권□에 의한 한정된 미사일공격으로부터 미국을 보호하기 위한 방어물 건설 제안단계를 마무리하고 있다.□ 이 일은  단일하게 묶인 40개의 항공과 우주와 미사일시스템, 통합된 병력과 제어시스템-1966년 1월1일에 작전상 충분하게 된 복합체 이래로 가장 거대한-과 결합될 것이다

결정 없이 희생이 퍼지다

미국 정부는 다음 다섯해 동안 105억 달러가 넘는 돈을 연구와 BMD 실험을 위해서 할당했다. 미국 대통령 빌 클린턴은 1999년 2월 1일 국회에 제출된 그의 예산안에서 다음 6년 동안 국가간미사일방위시스템을 위해서 특별히 66억 달러 요구했다. 지금부터 2005년까지 총 예산은 105억 달러가 소요된다. 그럼에도 불구하고 대부분의 세출 세입 예산은 하찮은 최초의 시스템에서조차도 그들의 예산에 좀 더 많은 예산이 포함되길 기대했다. 미 일반회계청은 작은 시스템 하나를 배치하는 데 18억에서 28억 달러가 소요될 것으로 추측했다.

1999년 3월, 미 의회는 탄도미사일요격(BMD)의 전개에 대한 법률제정을 위임하는 것을 □기술적으로 가능하자마자□ 승인했다. 미 하원은 법원판결 317-102를 승인했다: 미 상원은 90-3에 투표했다.

이 군비 지출에 주요 수취인은 미 항공우주 분야와 방위 회사들이다. 보잉사는 레이던 사(이전 휴즈 항공사)가 □살인 요격기□를 제조하는 동안 NMD 미사일을 위한 발사대를 세웠다. 레이던은 콰잘레인 미사일 범위에서 주요한 도급자이다.

이 거대한 총액은 1993년에 레이건 대통령의 스타워즈(Star Wars) 프로젝트를 착수한 이래로 단지 600억 달러를 쓴 NMD와 TMD를 위해서 배분되었다. 이 모든 돈은 단 하나의 효과적인 시스템의 배분을 이끌지 못했다. 이것은 좀 더 많은 실험을 요구할 것이고 대체로 예산의 증액도 마찬가지일 것이다. 시스템의 배치는 신뢰할 수 있고 또 효과적이라는 것을 보여줄 것이다. 그러나 우려스러운 NMD와 TMD의 배치는 태평양의 섬들과 아시아의 도처에 문제의 원인이 된다. 미사일 방위에 대한 미국의 지출은 다른 나라에 그들의 미사일 역량과 대응책, 심각한 무기 경쟁 그리고 불안정한 시기(국제적인 안보 증가의 가장 좋은 길인 핵무기 철폐를 많은 사람들이 원할 때)에 용기를 주고 있다.

콰잘레인 산호섬

미사일 실험 구역

TMD와 NMD에 근거한 중요한 미사일 실험이 콰잘레인 산호섬에 위치한 미군기지에서 실시되었다. / 마샬 아일랜드 공화국의 콰잘레인 산호섬에 위치한 콰잘레인 미사일 구역(USAKA/KMR)

수십년 동안 콰잘레인 산호섬 내의 석호는 캘리포니아의 반덴버스 항공기지로부터 폭발된 미사일 실험의 착수지점이 되어오고 있다.

제해권, 대형 핵 미사일, 대륙간 탄도탄 그리고 다른 미국 미사일의 개발에 대한 콰잘레인 법의 역사는 콰잘레인에 대한 기프 존슨(Giff Johnson)의 충돌방향으로 기울고 있다.

콰잘레인 산호섬은 2300평방 킬로미터의 석호로 둘러싸인(세계에서 가장 큰 석호인) 거의 100개의 산호섬으로 이루어져 있다. 1964년 이래 미군의 통제하에서 산호섬 내 11개 섬들은 USAKA/KMR 임대지역으로 되었다. 콰잘레인 기지들은 레이다 통로, 정보수집체, 미사일 발사의 용이성등을 포함하는 40억 달러나 되는 복합체들이다. 미 예산안 문서들은 콰잘레인의 많은 역할들에 대해 약술한다.

·군과 방어성 미사일 체계들의 테스트와 평가

·미군 구역 감독

·나사(NASA) 체계적 구역 계획

·탄도미사일요격(BMD) 조직 실험

·대륙간 미공군 탄도미사일 개발과 작동실험

·미구역 감독망

1970년대와 80년대 마샬섬 거주자들은 콰잘레인 산호섬들을 점유하기 위해 입항을 꾀했다. 그리고 그들은 미국의 실패에 대해-섬의 손실과 환경위험에- 그들에게 보상할 것을 주장했다. 1982년 □귀국작전□은 콰잘레인 섬 소유자들이 그들 자신의 섬으로 되돌아 갈 귄리를 요구하면서 넉달동안 지속되었다. 오늘날은 콰잘레인 산호섬 개발 기관(KADA)과 땅 소유자들에게 1년에 1천3백만 달러의 요금을 지불하며 임대 받고 있다. KMR 임대 동의하에 미국은 땅 소유자들에게 콰잘레인 섬 36위토스(한 필지)에 대해 돈을 지불한다. 이전의 마샬섬 대통령인 이마타 쿠브나(Imata Kubna)가 그 땅들 중 22위토스의 주인이고 아뉴아 로액(Anjua Loeak)가 12위토스의 주인이다. 나머지 2위토스는 각각 다른 주인들이 있다.

콰잘레인에 고용된 1277명의 마샬 주민들 중 1060명이 넘는 사람들이 구역 시스템 기술과 통합 구역기술에 종사하는데 이 둘은 모두 레이던 사에 의해 운영된다. 150명이 넘는 여성들이 콰잘레인 섬의 미국 직원들의 가정부로 일한다. 이들은 매일 낮에 에베예 섬으로 출근해서 밤에야 집으로 되돌아가는 출퇴근을 한다. 한때 □태평양 빈민지대□로써 묘사되었던 에베예는 오늘날 100 에이커도 안되는 땅에 12000명이 넘는 사람들이 거주한다.

냉전 종식이 끝난 후조차도 콰잘레인 산호섬은 새로운 미사일의 개발과 실험의 중심지로 남아있다. 미국의 동아시아와 태평양 담당 서기관보 스탠리 로스는 1998년 10월 국회에서 말했다.

□방어성 평가에 따르면 USAKA/KMR은 국가적인 보배이다. 최고 장거리 미사일의 완전한 규모의 테스트에 적합한 면적을 가진 세계에서 유일한 용이성을 지닌 지역이다. 또한 학계는 콰잘레인이 정보수집에 유일무이하게 적합하고, 우리의 스페이스 프로그램(space programs)에 중요한 지지기반을 공급한다고 결정했다. 우리는 이러한 용이성에 40억 달러를 투자해 오고 있다. 새로운 장소에 재배치 한다는 것은 값이 매우 비쌀 것이고 어려운 일일 것이다. 콰잘레인 기지에 대한 우리의 임대계약은 2001년에 만기가 된다. 만약 우리가 토지 임대계약 갱신을 선택한다면, 우리는 마샬 공화국(RMI)과의 접촉을 추가로 15년 동안 할 수 있는 자동적인 재계약 권리를 얻게 될 것이다.□

미군 지역과 미사일 방어 지휘부의 지휘자인 육군중장 존 코스텔로(John Costello)는 콰잘레인을 □왕관속의 보석□으로 묘사한다. 그는 콰잘레인이 TMD와 NMD 때문에 미래에 더욱 중요하게 될 것이라고 본다. : □콰잘레인은 미사일 방어체제의 성공과 실패를 측정할 수 있는 모든 가능성이 존재하는 유일한 장소이다. 만약 우리가 미국인에게 국가방위체제가 행하는 것을 말한다면 그것은 더 잘 진행될 것이다. 세계에서 정확한 테스트를 할 유일한 장소는 콰잘레인이다.□

콰잘레인 초호의 얕은 물들은 테스트 목표물들이 복구되는 것을 쉽게 한다. 그리고 깊은 수심으로 둘러싸인 해양은 미사일이 안전하게 처리되도록 하며 탄두가 재발견되지 않게 한다.

콰잘레인에 ALTAIR 레이다는 고도의 공간추적의 가능성을 가진 전 세계에 있는 단 세 개의 레이다 중 하나이다.

콰잘레인과

탄도미사일요격(BMD) 실험

1999년 10월 1일, 미국은 국가미사일방어망(NMD) 시스템의 첫 번째 실험을 실시했다. 수정된 밀레니엄 탄도요격미사일은 캘리포니아에 있는 반덴버그 항공기지에서 발사되었다. 태평양을 향해 폭격 비행될 때, 미사일은 가짜 핵탄두와 레이더 탐지 방해용 물체를 투하하였다. 다른 미사일은 4,300마일 떨어진 콰잘레인 산호섬에서 발사되었고, 이 연습용 표적은 태평양 140마일 상공에서 외기권 살인 물체(EKV)에 의해 요격되어 파괴되었다. NMD 연합 프로그램부(NMD Joint Program Office)에 따르면: □이 □살인타격□ 요격은 대중적인 파괴용 무기를 나르는 핵탄두-핵, 화학제품 또는 생물제제-가 총체적으로 파괴하며 불편 부당하다는 것을 증명한다.□

미 과학연구자 연합(Federation of American Scientists)의 존 파이크(John Pike)는 다음과 같이 적고 있다: □그들이 한 일은 홀인원(hole-in-one) 사격과 맞먹는다. 그들이 할 수 있는 일은 매시간 홀인원 사격과 같은 것이다. 만약 그것을 계속한다면 미사일 방어는 완벽해야 한다.□

그러나 2000년 1월 18일에 있을 시리즈의 두 번째 실험은 성공적이지 못했다. 미 방위부(The US Defence Department) 보도는 투하실험 이후에 다음과 같이 간단히 적고 있다. □요격은 성공하지 못했다.□ 실패는 소중한 패배였다. 그 의미는 수백만 달러의 최첨단 테크콜로지 시스템이 지원했음에도 불구하고 요격 미사일이 표적을 놓쳤다는 것이다.

1999년 10월의 실험은 단지 2번의 표적을 맞추는데 그쳤던 지난 1984∼1991년 16번의 별들의 전쟁(Star Wars) 실험보다 진보된 것이다. 그러나 콰잘레인 실험은 고도로 통제되었고 긴장상태의 전투에서 시스템의 신뢰도에 대한 의심이 남아있는 것이었다. 10월에 표적은 지난 □저공비행□ 실험에 비해 보다 소수의 레이저 탐지 방해용 물체를 포함할 수 있도록 보다 간소해졌다. 이것은 단지 □살인물체□ 실험이었고, 마지막 요소는 날아오는 핵탄두를 파괴하는 것이었다. 보조 로켓, 레이더, 그리고 통합된 경영 시스템은 실험되지 않았다. 센서에 기반한 우주공간과 레이더에 기반한 땅과 새로운 로켓 보조장치들 그리고 지휘 센터를 포함하는 시스템의 다른 요소들도 아직 실험되지 않았다. 최초의 세 번의 실험 중 단지 하나만 완벽한 시스템을 포함할 것이다. 그리고 3가지 모두는 실제 요소가 아니라 대용물로 사용될 것이다.

1억 달러 이상의 비용이 드는 콰잘레인 실험은 이후 6년간 NMD 시스템 테크놀로지의 효과와 신뢰도를 증명하는 요격 실험이 계획된 20개 중의 첫 번째 이다. 그러나 2000년 6월의 전개 결정에도 불구하고 BMD 협회는 NMD 시스템에 의해 제안된 3번의 요격실험을 할 것이다.

태평양 섬들의 미군기지는 NMD 실험과 마찬가지로 또한 전역미사일방어체제(TMD)성장에 사용될 것이다. 미군부대의 다른 부문은 TMD 시스템의 성장을 위해 경쟁할 것이다.

해군 TMD 프로그램은 걸프 전쟁 기간에 미사일 배치에 대항하여 미 해군의 방위 시스템의 일환으로 제안되었다. 미 해군은 하와이 군도의 아홉번째 섬인 카와이 섬의 서쪽 끝에 위치한 바킹사막의 태평양 미사일 사정 기지(PMRF)에서 단거리 미사일 실험을 지휘했다. 미 해군은 2000년 실험 동안 니하우 섬으로부터 발사되는 단거리 미사일을 목표로 한 요격기 미사일 폭격을 계획했다. 1999년 12월, 파괴자 미군함 케인(Kane)은 새로운 로켓의 첫 번째 수중발사인 TMD 프로그램의 일환으로 PMRF로부터 두 개의 미사일을 시험 발사했다.

미국은 TMD 프로그램을 지원하기 위해 섬들에서의 발사를 증강시키는 것과 도움이 될 만한 장소를 찾고 있다.: 턴 섬, 존스톤 산호섬, 니하우 그리고 하와이 군도의 아홉번째 섬인 카와이 섬에 있는 PMRF 현장.

NMD 실험과 마찬가지로, 콰잘레인 산호섬은 TMD 프로그램에서도 마찬가지로 사용되고 있다. 하와이 군도의 아홉번째 섬에 있는 바킹 사막으로부터의 중거리 미사일과 웨이크 섬으로부터의 단거리 전술 미사일은 TMD 작전연구의 일환으로 콰잘레인 석호를 통과할 것이다. 1990년대 중반 이래로 미국은 아우르 산호섬들 중 비키엔 섬을 콰잘레인 석호를 향한 단거리 미사일 발사장소로 사용하였다. (예를 들어 패트리어트 미사일은 콰잘레인 산호섬들 중 맥 섬에서 발사되었는데 그것은 1997년 2월과 3월에 아우르 산호섬에서 발사된 2기의 스커드미사일을 명중시켰다)

콰잘레인은 고지대 방위(THAAD)와 웨이크 섬에서 발사된 추적미사일을 위한 레이더 시스템 실험에 사용되었다. (뉴멕시코에 있는 군대의 백사 미사일 범위에 대한 첫번째 8번의 THAAD 실험-1995년에 시작된- 은 단지 두 번 단일목표 미사일을 맞췄을 뿐이다) 펜타곤 관리들은 그 이상의 THAAD 실험(콰잘레인에서의)을 요구했다.

마샬군도 공화국에 격돌

미국은 앞으로 15년 동안 콰잘레인 미사일에 실험장에 관여하겠다고 확언했으나, 두 나라간의 조약 전면에 대한 교섭이 현재 진행 중 이어서, 마샬군도와 미국의 관계는 흐릿하다.

태평양군도에 대한 UN의 신탁통치령은 1990년 UN안전보장이사회에 의해 공식적으로 종식되었고, 그후 마샬군도 공화국(RMI)과 미크로네시아 연방(FSM)은 1986년에 미국과 자유연합 조약을 비준했다. RMI와 FSM에 대한 그 조약은 15년간으로, 2001년까지 효력을 지닌다. (팔라우 공화국의 조약은 10년간 더 효력이 연장되는데, 그것은 팔라우의 핵금지법에 대한 오랜 투쟁 때문이다.)

그 조약에 따라, 워싱턴은 제3세계 나라들에 대한 간섭을 거부할 수 있는 권리를 갖는 대신에, 그에 대한 대가로 RMI, FSM과 팔라우의 안보에 대한 책임을 지닌다. 전략적인 거부정책은 원래 소련 연방에에 대항한 지침이었다. 그 조약은 태평양에서의 소련의 행보가 예상된다는 냉전의 망상에 젖어있던 시기에 만들어졌다.

1999년 10월에, 마샬군도와 미국은 자유연합조약에 대해 재협상을 시작했다. 1999년에 미국 정부는 그 조약의 재협상을 위한 특별 교섭자로 알렌 스테이먼(Allen p. Stayman)을 임명했는데, 그는 과거에 군도업무부(미크로네시아 군도의 내정에 관련된 일들에 책임이 있는 내무성의 한 부)의 장관으로 일했었다. 스테이먼은 자유연합국가들에 관한 관계부처합동기관을 지휘했는데, 그 기관엔 미국 국무성, 국방성, 내무성의 대표들이 포함되었다.

1999년에 새롭게 선출된 마샬군도 정부는, 통일 민주당의 정치인 케사이 노트(Kessai Note)에 의해 이끌어졌다. 노트대통령은 전 대통령인 이마타 카부아(Imata Kabua)의 후임자가 되었는데, 카부아는 콰잘레인 섬에서 가장 많은 영토를 소유하고 있는 사람중의 하나였다.

그 조약의 협상은 재정운영과 경제적 원조에 크게 역점을 두었지만, 안보와 방위 문제 또한 중시했다. 스텐리 로스(동아시아와 태평양 업무를 위한 미국의 차관)의 1998년 10월 의회 증언에 따르면, 마샬군도, FSM, 팔라우와 맺은 조약에는 다음과 같이 3가지의 주요한 안보상의 이유가 있다.

□첫째, 세 자유연합국가와 각각 맺은 협정에서 구체화 된 전략적인 거부의 기본방침은, 이들 나라와 그 주변 항로에 미국의 독점적인 군사적 접근을 보장했다. 둘째, RMI와 우리의 협정은 콰잘레인 군사시설에 계속적인 접근을 확보했다. 셋째, 팔라우와의 협정은 만약 미국이 필리핀에 대한 대안으로 요구한다면, 군사기지를 확장할 수 있는 권리를 포함했다.□

아시아 태평양지역 안보차관인 커트 켐벨(Kurt Campbell)은 1998년 10월 국회증언에서 다음을 시인했다. □협상에 있어서 가장 중요한 군사적 이익은 콰잘레인 미사일 기지와 콰잘레인 섬에 있는 시설을 계속적으로 이용하는 것인데, 이것은 우리의 미사일 안보에 대한 요구와, 콰잘레인의 독특한 지리적 위치가 겸비된 지역 감시 프로그램의 요구, 기본 군사시설에 대한 투자 요구, 그리고 현실세계 조약을 제한할 필요 등에서 가장 중요하고 우선적인 이슈가 된다.

미국은 콰잘레인 임차권을, 2001년 자격이 소멸한 뒤에도, 15년동안 일방적으로 연장할 수 있기 때문에, 마샬군도 정부는 증가된 임대료 상환을 정부와 콰잘레인 지주들에게 요구하고 있다.

콰잘레인에 관한 RMI와 미국의 협상은 에베예섬(콰잘레인 미사일 지역 주요본부의 주인 노릇을 하는 콰잘레인 섬 옆에 위치한)에 살고 있는 회랑지대 중앙부 사람들의 문제를 포함하고 있다. 1960년대 초기에 콰잘레인에 길게 뻗은 미사일 통로를 만들기 위해, 약 200명의 사람들이 그 섬의 회랑지대 중앙부에 있는 섬들로부터 강제 이주되었고, 에베예에 재배치되었다. 오늘날엔 20,000명 이상의 중간회랑지대 사람들이 있지만, 아직까지 주택공급이 충분이 이루어지지 못했고, 더 나은 교육과 직업훈련, 고용(USAKA가 □채용에 있어서 균등한 기회를 주는□ 고용주로서 거절하고있는)에 있어서 직업에 대한 특혜에 대한 요구가 여전히 존재하고 있다.

미국정부는 그 조약에 따라 방위와 안보에 대한 통제를 엄격히 지켜왔다. 1997년 12월, 마샬군도가 대인지뢰를 금지하는 오타와 협약(미국은 그 조약에 서명하기를 거절했다)에 서명하기 전에 미국과 의논하지 않았다고 , 미국정부는 RMI 정부에 불만을 제기했다. 그때, RMI외무장관인 필립 뮬러(Phillip Muller)는 다음과 같이 설명했다. □미국을 거슬리게 만들고 싶지 않지만, 우리는 우리 양심에 투표해야 했었다. 우리측은 통상적으로 미국에게 표를 던져왔지만, 우리가 미국이라면 그저 무턱대고 도장을 찍어주는 건 아니다. 우리는 마샬군도가 이러한 인도주의적 노력에 있어서 자주적인 독립국으로 우뚝 서야한다고 생각했다. 우리는 민간인이든 군인이든 구별하지 않는 세계의 무기를 없애려고 노력하는 나머지 세계들에게 마샬군도가 찬성하기를 원했다.

마샬군도와 미크로네시아 연방은, UN의 이스라엘에 대한 해결책과 같은, 심지어 태평양 안보와는 관련없는 이슈들에 조차 미국의 정책에 가두어졌다. 미크로네시아 연방의 조약 협상자인 아스테리오 타케시(Asterio Takesy)는 1998년 10월 의회 증언에서 다음과 같이 말했다.

□우리는 전략과 안보에 대한 고찰이 미국과 우리의 자유연합관계에 있어 초석이란 것을 잘 알고 있다. 그러므로, 우리는 그 조약에서 우리에게 주어진 책임에 대해, 단지 입에 발린 책임이 아니라 그 이상의 것들을 다하기 위해 열심히 노력해 왔다. 미크로네시아 연방은 예를 들어, 남태평양 핵무장 금지 지대 조약에 미크로네시아 연방에 이웃한 섬나라들이 참여하는 것을 저지함으로써, 그리고 대인지뢰에 반대하는 협약에 서명하는 것을 저지함으로써, 지역방위와 안보정책에 대해 미국을 전적으로 지지해왔다. 이스라엘에 대한 우리의 끊임 없는 지지는, 일정정도 내재적인 숙고에서 비롯되는 한편, 또한 주요안보지역에 대한 미국정책을 지지할 목적으로 이루어지고 있는 것이다.□

그러나 마샬군도 사람들은 더욱이 안보에 대해서 걱정하고 있다. RMI정부는 1946에서 1958년 사이에 에네웨타크와 비키니섬에서 행해진 67번의 미국의 핵실험에 대한 결과로 할당된 보상금을 재조정하려고 노력하고 있다. 1995년 이후로, 미국정부는 이전 기밀문서들을 공개해왔는데, 그 문서들은 마샬군도에 있는 22개중 20개의 유인도가 이 실험으로 생긴 방사성 강하물(죽음의 재)에 의해 해를 입었다는 것은 알려준다. 그 이전에는 4개의 섬이 미국 정부에 의해 해를 입었다고 알려졌었다.

외무장관 뮬러는 또한 미국이 1983년 일방적으로 파기한 협약의 규정에 대한 보상으로 약속된 2천만 달러의 개발자금을 주지 않고 있다고 말했다. RMI는 이 자금 중 겨우 2백만 달러를 받았을 뿐이다. 원래 그 조약에 따르면, RMI 시민은 일하거나 살기 위해서 미국에 비자없이 입국할수 있도록 되어 있었다. 미국 관리들이 그 법을 바꾼 후, 이제 마샬군도 사람들은 관계당국의 승인을 받아 일자리를 얻어야 하는데, 관계당국의 승인을 받기까지는 시간이 오래 걸리고 번잡한 절차를 거쳐야 한다.

마샬군도 정부는 미국이 15년 이상의 기간동안 그 조약을 연장하는데 동의하고, 미국의 투자를 이끌어낼 동기를 제공해 주길 바란다. 미국 관리들은 마샬군도 정부의 부패와 그릇된 운영을 폭넓게 비판하는 반면에, 미국정부는 한 나라의 경제를 왜곡시키는 신탁통치 관계에 있던 식민지의 역사를 거의 인정하지 않는다. 1945년부터 1968년까지, 외국인들은 미국 해군의 입장허가를 해주지 않으면, 마샬군도를 방문할 수 없었다. 1973년이 되서야 그 섬에 외국인의 투자가 허용되었다.

태평양 지역의 다른 섬나라들과 마찬가지로, RMI는 공공부문 개혁프로그램을 통한 □구조조정□을 겪고 있다. 이것은 민간부문 단위를 통한 정부자산의 박탈을 수반한다. 공공부문 개혁프로그램에 따라, 내각통합, 1996년 1월 이후로 정부인력의 27% 감소, 공공부문 임금동결(이웃한 FSM 또한 1995년 이후로 IMF 구조조정중에 있다)이 이루어지고 있다.

전 외무장관인 뮬러는 미국에 의해 강요된 아시아 개발 은행으로부터의 대규모 차관이 RMI 경제를 위협해오고 있다고 말한다. □대규모의 차관, 이자가 계속 늘어나고 있는 거대한 채무부담, 공공부문을 급속히 축소하라는 권고는, 마샬군도의 경제적인 안정을 동요시킨다.□ 1999년 초에, 아시아 개발 은행은 RMI가 정부인력을 더 삭감하는 법안을 통과시키기 전까지는 자금양도를 거절했다.

한정된 자원 기반 때문에, RMI 정부는 마샬군도에 있는 핵폐기물을 저장하기 위한 최근 10년간의 몇가지 제안을 포함해, 재정을 늘릴 다른 여러 방법들을 고찰하고 있다. 1940년대와 1950년대에 있었던 핵실험에 의해 오염된 섬에 폐기물 집적소를 세우려는 타이파워(타이완정부가 운영하는 원자력 에이전시)에 의한 끊임 없는 시도가 있었다. 전 대통령인 카부아는 1997년에 핵폐기물을 동결시키자는 플랜을 발표했지만, 제출된 □타당성 조사□라는 것은 그 계획이 아직도 검토중이란 것을 암시했다. 1998년 12월에, RMI 정부는 마샬군도내로 어떠한 핵폐기물도 들여올 수 없다는 성명을 공고했다. 그 성명은 1998년 11월에 마샬군도가 타이완과 외교관계를 맺은 후에, 타이완의 계획이 되살아 날수 있다는 우려에 대한 응답이 되었다. (그 성명에 대한 응답으로, 중국은 마샬군도와의 외교관계를 단절했고 마쥬로에 있는 대사관을 폐쇄했다.)

미국과 중국의 관계에 있어 난관은, 미크로네시아 국의 키리바티에 근접해 있는 타이완 섬의 본리키에 중국이 위성추적기지를 건설함으로써 더욱 복잡해지고 있다. 중국과 키리바티가 1996년 9월 추적기지를 위한 협정에 서명한 후, 중국의 우주 원격 측정, 추적, 명령기지가 1997년에 건설했는데, 그것은 중국 외부에는 처음으로 세워진 것이다. 그 추적기지가 콰잘레인 미사일 실험장을 감시하는데 사용되어진다는 주장에도 불구하고, 키리바티 중국대사는 그 몰래 감시(정찰)한다는 주장을 □조작된 거짓말□이라고 비난하면서, 중국와 키리바티 양 정부는 그 기지가 중국의 민간위성발사계획을 제어하는데 사용되는 시설이라고 진술했다.

전역 미사일 방어와 아시아

미 행정부는 미군과 동맹국의 영토를 중·단거리 미사일로부터 방어하기 위하여 전역미사일 방어(TMD) 프로그램을 강화하기 위한 방법을 발표했다. TMD 프로그램은 중국으로부터의 성난 반응들을 자극하며, 아·태 지역에 걸쳐서 힘을 얻고있다.

a) 일본

미 합중국과 일본정부는 1999년 9월 16일 전역미사일방어시스템의 공동연구를 위한 이해 각서에 서명했다. 해상에 기지를 둔 대(對)탄도 미사일에 주목하는 이 공동 연구 프로젝트는 6년 동안 432달러에서 522달러 이상의 비용이 소요될 것으로 예상되고 있다. 미합중국은 BMD 시스템의 이 막대한 예산을 줄이기 위해 일본의 기금과 기술연구를 끌어들일 수 있기를 희망하고 있다.

TMD를 배치시키기 위한 미-일 사이의 다른 이해관계 중 하나는 그것이 어떤 합동명령을 요구한다는 것이다. 일본의 우수한 군사작전연구에 대한 헌법상의 속박은 합동명령의 가능성을 일본에서 매우 민감한 이슈로 만든다.

b) 한국

북한이 1998년 9월 대포동 미사일을 일본 쪽으로 쏘아 올린 후, TMD 프로그램은 주요 후원자를 얻었다. 그러나 최근 북한은 미국과의 협상이 진행되는 동안 (미국과 일본정부는 실험 중 북한의 심각한 모라토리엄과 맞바꾸기 위한 경제원조를 제안했다) 미사일 발사 실험을 중지하는 데 동의했다. 비록 미국이 북한을 □깡패□ 국가 그리고 주요한 미사일 위협국으로 취급하는 데 초점을 맞추고 있음에도 불구하고, 핵탄두를 장착한 미사일이 미국을 폭격할 가능성은 실험되지 않았다.

남한은 미-일 TMD 시스템에 참가하는 데 아무런 관심이 없다고 주장하였다. 김대중 대통령은 미사일 시스템의 개발은 전 북동아시아의 지역적 이해관계를 고려해야 하며 인접 국가들 간의 오해를 불러일으켜서는 안된다고 말했다.

비록 미-일 TMD의 일부분이 되기에는 쇠퇴했지만, 남한은 북한을 막을 수 있는 독립적인 미사일 군을 개발하고 있는 것처럼 보인다. 북으로부터의 공격을 막는 데에는 전쟁을 억지할 수 있는 군대에 대한 신뢰가 TMD보다 더 유용할 지 모른다. 1999년 4월 10일, 남한은 가능한 사정거리 300□의 지대지 미사일을 시험 발사했다. 1999년 11월, 미 국방성은 남한이 □616 패트리어트 미사일□과 □14 패트리어트 발포장치□, □14 교전 레이더□ 그리고 □76 방어용 미사일 발사대□를 구입하겠다는 의사를 밝혔다고 발표했다. 미 국방성에 의하면 : □적국에 대항한 한국의 자위 능력을 높이고, 미국의 짐을 덜어주기 위한 제시된 판매성적은 올라갈 것이다.□

c) 대만

1999년 8월 미국과 일본 사이의 TMD 협정 발표가 난 얼마 후, 대만의 대통령 리 탱후이(Lee Teng-hui)는 □현 상황에 대처□하기 위한 목적으로 대만을 엄호하는 TMD 프로젝트를 지지한다고 말했다.

대만 국방부는 지휘부와 미사일 발사기지들, 레이더 경고 시스템으로 이루어져 있는 낮은 수준의 방어 시스템을 발전시키기 위해 향후 10년간 약 90억 달러를 사용할 계획을 세우고 있다. 이 □보호막□은, 이론적으로, 중국의 공격으로부터 대만의 70%를 방위할 수 있게 준비해 줄 수 있을 것이다. 중산 군경영 과학 기술연구소는 2005년까지 배치되어 발전하게 될 □낮은 수준의 방어용 탄도 미사일 시스템□의 2000년 실험을 지휘할 예정이다.

1999년 4월, 국회의 강제 하에서 클린턴 행정부는 미국이 대만에 □본원적인 자위력□을 위해 무기들을 공급할 것을 명시한 1979년 대만관계법에 의거하여 조기 경보 레이더 시스템의 판매원칙에 동의했다. 비록 레이더 시스템이 방대한 작전상의 TMD 연계망을 구성할 수 없다 할지라도, 판매성적은 지역적인 TMD 우산 아래로 대만을 이끌기 위한 신중한 걸음을 보여주고 있다.

1999년 10월, 미국 아·태 국제 교섭 분과위원회의 의장은 PRC 미사일 발사를 탐지하는 조기 경보 레이더 그리고 새롭고 한층 발전된 패트리어트3 방어용 미사일 포열, 그리고 PRC 하위 파트너를 넘어서는 대만 공군의 기술적 우위를 보증하는 새로운 기술이 포함된 올해 대만에 대한 미국의 무기 판매 종합정책을 발표했다. 미국은 대만에 P-3 오리온 서브 헌터 항공기와 전함에 장작되는 진보한 아지스 전투관리 레이더의 가능한 판매를 또한 고려하고 있다.

『극동경제리뷰』는 이렇게 전한다 : □미 상원 외교관계 의장 제시 햄스(Jesse Halms)는 대만과의 진보한 군사적 조정을 증진하는 결의문을 제안했다. 미국과 대만의 인접한 국가들의 정찰대와 함께 대만을 이음으로써, 그것은 그들을 지금부터 보다 큰 TMD 건축술 안에서 미국 아지스 순양함까지 피드백 고리로 두게 될 것이다... 중국은 대만과 일본 두 나라의 TMD에 대해 깊은 공포를 가진다. 이런 예상은 곧장 중국의 전략과 그것의 미사일 무력을 억제하는데 믿을 수 있으며 효과적이다. 대만의 경우에서, TMD가 포함된 베이징의 공포는 독립의 열망을 부추길 수 있었다..

중국은 TMD 개발과 전개가 핵 개발과 미사일 확산을 억제하는 노력과 협력을 훼손할 것이라고 경고했다.□

태평양 연방 지휘부의 대장인 데니스 블레어(Dennis Blair) 제독은 미사일 공격으로부터 태평양 동맹국과 미 군대를 보호하는 지역 미사일 방어의 전개를 추천했다.

그는 또한 미국이 대만을 미사일 방어지로 건설하여 도울 수 있다고 진술했다. 1999년 11월에 미 국무부 대변인 제임스 루빈(James Rubin)은 미국이 TMD에 대해 대만정부와 □활발한 대화□를 계속해야 한다고 말했다. ; 그러나, 분명한 것은 효과적인 미사일 방어의 판매가 □시기상조□라는 것이다.

d) 중국

1999년 내내, 중국의 수석 공무원들은 만약 특별히 미국의 NMD와 TMD 배치에 대만이 관련된다면 그 제안을 반해한다고 말했다.

1999년 3월, 외무장관 탕 쥬쓔안(Tang Juaxuan)은 만일 어떤 나라도 대만이 TMD에 포함되어야 한다고 생각한다면 그것은 중국 통치권 그리고 영토 보전에 대한 침략과 같은 것이며 중국의 재통일을 방해하는 것과 같다고 말했다. 같은 달, 왕 다오한(Wang Daohan) 중국 수석 교섭자(대만에 대한)는 대만이 TMD에 포함되는 것은 무기 경쟁을 자극할 수 있다고 매우 우려했다. □그것은 철저히 전세계의 정세를 혼란시킬 것이다. 그리고 대신에 새로운 냉전이 도래할 것이다.□ 그는 중국은 미국과 대만간의 군사동맹의 설립과 같은 초처들을 고려하고 있다고 말했다.

군사 통제 지도자이자 중국 외교부 군축위원회 샤 쥬강(Sha Zukang)은 □주위의 상황에 해로운 영향을 주고, 핵군축에 필요한 조건을 손상시키고 그리고 무기 경쟁의 잠재적 위험을 조성하는□ TMD의 배치에 대해 반복하여 경고했다. 그는 또한 이렇게 말했다: □전략 균형은 깨질 것이다. 그리고 만일 미국이 성공적으로 NMD와 TMD 시스템을 전개한다면 국제적인 전략 정세는 1950년대와 같은 상태로 되돌아갈 것이다.□ 듀 퀜퀴(Du Qenqi) 또한 TMD의 개발에 대한 미국과 일본의 협력은 일본의 군사력을 더 강화시킬 것이고 몇몇 일본인들의 군사화에 대한 야망을 확장하도록 자극할 것이라 주장했다.

중국은 이미 미사일 방위를 건설하려는 미국의 노력이 중국의 전쟁 억지력을 약화시킨다는 것을 감지했다. 그러나 그것은 복합 탄투의 장거리 미사일을 증강하려는 완만한 근대화 프로그램이다. 중국은 군수공장과 그것의 이용 증가로 미국의 미사일 방위 시스템의 배치에 역습을 가하려고 한다. 1999년 10월 25일 로이터통신에 따르면 미국의 ABM 조약의 폐기에 대한 중국의 반응의 증거는 중국이 핵공장을 개선시키는 방위 예산에 최근 97억 달러 증가했다는 것이다.

중국은 TMD와 마찬가지로 NMD도 반대한다: □중국 군은 첫 번째 알라스카로 제안된 북한으로부터의 가능한 위협을 막고 또한 중국의 작은 대륙간 미사일 부대에 대항한 NMD 방어용 미사일 기지를 경고했다.□ 미국 주장에 대한 중국 회의에 따르면 이 시스템은 □깡패□국가 단독으로 지시한 것이다.

핵군축에 있어서의 충돌

군비제한 평론가들은 많은 이유로 국가미사일방어망(NMD) 계획에 반대한다.

1. NMD에 관한 과학기술이 검증7되지 않았고, 2000년 6월까지 배치하기로 한 결정이 효율적이라거나 신뢰성 있다고 볼 수 없다.

2. 만약 러시아가 ABM조약을 완화하는 것에 동의하지 않는다면, 미사일배치는, 전체 핵무기의 확산방지체제로 해결지을 수 있었던 움직임인, 1972년 탄도탄요격미사일제한조약(ABM)과 1967년 우주천체조약(Outer Space Treaty)을 위반하게 될 것이고, 미국에 대한 핵위협은 사실상 증가하게 될 것이다.

3. NMD 시스템에 소요되는 경비는 불분명하고, 클린턴 정부가 향후 5년간 예산한 105억 달러를 크게 웃돌아 계속적으로 늘어날 것 같다. 현재의 예산과 배치계획 아래에서, NMD 시스템은 효율적이거나 신뢰성 있다고 볼 수 없다.

4. 미사일배치를 정당화하는데 인용되는 것으로서 어떠한 위협(특히, 북한의 시험되지 않은 소형 장거리 미사일기지와 같은)에 대한 위험을 줄여준다는 말은, 미국의 미사일 방어 배치가 러시아, 중국과의 관계에 있어 해를 끼친다는 사실을 정당화하지 못한다.

1999년 10월 10일 포괄적 핵실험금지조약(CTBT)에 대한 미(美)상원의 부결은, 지난 40년간의 다국간 안전원리를 철저히 거부하는 것이었다. 미국 정치가들은 재무장(再武裝)을 가장 우선 순위로 생각한다고 명백히 진술했다. 핵무기는 세계체제를 지키는 최후수단으로서 더욱 축소되어야 한다고 CTBT에 나타낸 것과 달리, 그들은 미국의 수중에 더욱 더 많은 핵무기를 보유하려 한다.

뉴욕타임즈는 다음과 같이 진술했다. □특히 이번 주에 일어난 파키스탄의 군사적 쿠데타 이후로, 남아시아에 가장 커다란 장애물이 놓여있다. 이제 미국은 미(美)상원이 비준하기를 거부한 핵실험금지조약에 서명하도록 인도와 파키스탄을 설득하는 것이 훨씬 더 어려워질 것이다...... 미(美)상원의 거부표결은 또한, 그 조약에 이미 서명했고 스스로 핵실험 유예를 지키고 있는, 중국에 대한 미국의 핵외교를 복잡하게 할 것이다...... 그 조약이 절대로 비준될 수 없을 것처럼 보여지기 시작하면 중국은 새로운 무기 구상을 실험하도록 유혹 받을 수도 있다. 그리고 또한 그 조약의 전세계적인 감시본부 네트워크를 세우려는 계획과 현지시찰(핵사찰)에 관한 규정이 무기한으로 연기된다면, 앞으로 러시아정부는 비밀지하핵실험을 하려는 유혹을 느낄 수도 있다.□

다음으로 갑작스런 돌격이 예상되는 것은, 탄도탄요격미사일제한(ABM)조약이다. 공화당의 전 대통령인 조지 부시는 □우리의 용어로 전쟁을 다시 정의한다□는 계획의 센터피이스(centerpiece)로 미사일 방어 시스템을 구축해왔고, 그는 그와 같은 시스템을 배치하기 위해서라면 ABM조약을 기꺼이 파기할 수도 있다고 공언했다.

미국 정부는 전세계 국가를 망라하여 미사일 방어 시스템을 금지하는 ABM조약(이 조약에 따르면 오직 한 곳만이 제한된 방어 시스템이 허용된다.)을 수정하기 위해 러시아에 압력을 가하고 있다. 클린턴 정부는 미국이 □제한된□ 국가 미사일 방어망을 배치하는 것이 허용될 수 있도록, ABM조약을 일부 변경하는 것에 대해 현재 러시아와 협의 중이다. 클린턴 정부와 러시아 관리들은 양측 다 ABM조약이 □전략적 안정의 초석□으로 유지되어야 한다고 거듭 말해 왔다. 최근까지 러시아는 ABM조약을 변경하려 것에 대해 모두 반대해 왔고, 그것에 대한 미국의 후퇴나 변경에 대한 강요는, 전략적인 핵비축을 경감시키고 있는 START과정을 종식시킬 것이라고 선언해 왔다. 이것은  미국을 칠 수도 있는 6,000개의 핵탄두(그중 많은 수의 핵탄두가 공격결정 15분 이내로 발사할 준비가 되어있다)를 가진 러시아를 방치하게 될 것이다.

□미국의 미사일 방어를 압도할 수 있다는 것을 확신하기 위하여, 러시아는 발사 경보 발효시 즉각적으로 발사할 수 있는 핵탄두를 가능한 한 많이 보유하려 할 것이다. 이것은 러시아의 우발적이거나 독단적인 발사위험을 증가시킬 것이고, 아마 틀림없이 미국의 국가적인 생존에 대한 가장 큰 위협일 것이다. 핵무기에 대한 가장 효과적인 방어는 같은 의견을 가진 다른 국가들과 협력하여 핵확산 방지와 군비축소체제를 강화하는 것이다.□

핵확산 방지체제가 흔들리는 것은 소위 □악당□국가로부터의 미사일 공격보다 훨씬 더 위험하다. 이라크 무기시찰을 위한 UN특별위원회의 전(前)회장이자 주미 스웨덴 대사인 Roelf Ekeus는 다음과 같이 경고했다. □미사일 방어시설이 점점 더 가속화되어 늘어났을 때의 정치적인 충격은 무엇일가? 그것은 미국이 핵무기를 존속시키도록 결정하는데 영향을 줄 것이다. 그러면 더욱더 많은 나라들이 핵확산방지의 바램을 포기할 것이고 내 생각에 이것은 더 큰 위협이다.□

1999년 11월, 러시아와 중국은 ABM조약을 엄격하게 지킬 것을 요구하는 UN의 결의문을 제출했다. 그 조약을 변경하려는 미국의 노력에 강한 반대를 나타내면서, 그 결의문은 □국제적인 평화와 안전, 전략적인 안정을 유지하기 위한 초석으로서의□ ABM조약의 역사적인 역할을 인정하고, □특히 최근의 국제상황에서 그 조약의 계속적인 효력과 타당성□을 재확인한다. 그 결의문은 1999년 11월 5일 UN총회에서 73기권에 54: 4로 채택되었다. 4개의 반대표는 미국, 라트비아, 이스라엘, 미크로네시아 연방에서 나왔다.

중국은 UN이 결의문을 뒷받침한 것에 대해 다음과 같이 축사를 했다. □최근 몇 년간, 몇몇 국가들은 그들의 절대적인 안전과 단기적인 전략적 이익을 위해 국가미사일 방어 플랜을 개발하기 위해 커다란 노력을 해왔다. 이 나라들은 ABM조약을 변경하자고 제안해왔고, 심지어 그것을 철회하도록 위협해왔다. 이러한 조처들은 전략적인 균형과 안정에 해가 되고, 핵무장해제를 진척시키는데도 해가되고, 핵확산 방지의 기초를 뒤흔들 고 심지어 우주를 포함해 새로운 핵무기경쟁을 야기한다.□

11월에, 138개국은 또한 1967년의 우주조약(Outer Space Treaty), 특히 우주는 □평화로운 목적이 되어야한다□는 조항을 재확인하기 위해서 UN 총회에서 투표했다. (미국과 이스라엘은 이 투표동안 기권했다.

<key documents> 9

Law and Civil Society: Resources for Nuclear Disarmament

John Burroughs

(Hague Appeal for Peace, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, Lawyers□ Committee on Nuclear Policy)

As Admiral Ramdas mentioned, I bring greetings to you from the Hague Appeal for Peace. I also bring greetings from the Abolition 2000 Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons, which now comprises almost 1500 groups worldwide. If you have not already done so, please join the Network (www.abolition2000.org, or contact me at the address provided below). And I bring you greetings from the US abolition movement yes there are the beginnings of such a movement!

THE ARMS CONTROL TEMPTATION

As you work to build a campaign to halt and reverse nuclearization of South Asia, I suggest you consider the lessons of 50 years of activism in the United States. During the Cold War years, the focus was on partial measures, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the agreements to cap and then to reduce the US and Soviet/Russian arsenals. The conceptual framework was one of ensuring 뱒tability□ and of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons: arms control and non-proliferation were the great catch phrases of those years. A whole industry grew up around this framework, not only in the government, but in think tanks, universities, non-governmental organizations. The thinking of the peace movement was deeply influenced by this environment.

Thus when the Berlin Wall came down, US groups were not prepared effectively to demand and advocate nuclear disarmament, ie the abolition of nuclear weapons. The old thinking still held sway. To be sure, some of the smaller groups, of which I have been a member, have called for abolition, and as I mentioned an embryonic abolition movement has been formed, but then several of the key small groups (like the Lawyers□ Committee on Nuclear Policy and Western States Legal Foundation) had been advocating nuclear disarmament during the Cold War years!

Clearly, as Adm. Ramdas indicated, one of your tasks will be to work for nuclear restraint, responsibility, safety, and stability in South Asia. How can you do otherwise, given the imminent dangers? But I can see from this conference that you will also keep the complete denuclearization of South Asia foremost among your aims. If you do so, you can avoid the nearly exclusive focus on arms control and stability that has hampered the peace movement in the US.

LAW AS RESOURCE

As a representative of the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, and its US affiliate, the Lawyers□ Committee on Nuclear Policy, it is natural for me to emphasize the contribution that law can make to nuclear disarmament. Given widespread violation, particularly by the United States, of the UN Charter, the disarmament obligation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, human rights instruments, it is tempting to be cynical about international law, to dismiss its importance. I believe this is a mistake. While we must keep our eyes wide open to hypocrisy, we must see law as a resource, just as we see other products of the human spirit as resources.

In 1983 there was a mass demonstration the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, one of the two principal nuclear weapons design and development laboratories in the United States (the other one is at Los Alamos in New Mexico). 2000 people were arrested, and held in jail for two weeks. In a local traffic court, my organization at the time, Western States Legal Foundation, argued on behalf of the protesters that they were acting reasonably and lawfully to prevent planning and preparation (Nuremberg Charter) for the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The protesters were nonetheless convicted, and arguments from international law have remained marginal in US political discourse.

More than a decade later, however, the same arguments were being made by governments before the International Court of Justice (World Court), the judicial branch of the United Nations, at the hearings in the nuclear weapons advisory opinion case in The Hague.

One of the points of argument was the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. India rightly has denounced the treaty as discriminatory, as the codification of a nuclear apartheid. And yet, as the arguments showed, the NPT does contain the seeds of universality.

On the first day of the hearings, October 30, 1995, Gareth Evans, Foreign Minister of Australia, argued to the Court that the norm of non-possession of nuclear weapons under the NPT 뱈ust now be regarded as reflective of customary international law? He stated that 밿f humanity and the dictates of the public conscience demand the prohibition of such weapons for some states, it must demand the same prohibition for all States. And following the end of the Cold War, there can no longer be, if there ever was, any practical imperative for treating nuclear- weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States differently.□

The Court essentially accepted that argument, unanimously concluding that: "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control". Although not stated explicitly, the Court뭩 reasoning made it quite clear that this obligation applies to all states, including those outside the NPT. The Court stated that 뱕irtually the whole of [the international] community□has been involved in the adoption of unanimous General Assembly resolutions regarding nuclear disarmament, and that fulfilling the Article VI nuclear disarmament obligation is 밶n objective of vital importance to the whole of the international community today?

While the Court declined to confront deterrence head on, it did hold that a threat of use of illegal force is itself illegal. The illegal threat of use of nuclear weapons is inherent in the postures of deterrence (hair trigger deployment, declared policies of massive retaliation, first use, defence of 뱕ital interests? etc.) now continuously maintained by the nuclear weapon states. So there is a legal dimension to the argument that Pakistan and India must not emulate the Permanent Five by deploying their weapons pursuant to doctrines of deterrence, because to do so is to increase the degree of illegality. Judge Weeramantry of Sri Lanka, recently retired from the Court, explained his rejection of deterrence in this way:

A global regime which makes safety the result of terror and can speak of survival and annihilation as twin alternatives makes peace and human future dependent upon terror. This is not a basis for world order which this Court can endorse.

One thing abolitionist civil society groups have become more clear about in the last five years, drawing on the World Court opinion, and stimulated in part by the insights of General Lee Butler, former commander of US strategic forces, is that nuclear disarmament requires an unequivocal rejection of the theology of nuclear deterrence and of the claim that international peace and security and global stability can and should be based on nuclear deterrence. Deterrence instead must be squarely recognized as illegal, immoral, and irresponsible. Despite its ambiguities, the World Court opinion at bottom strongly supports the delegitimization of deterrence. And this view is becoming more and more widespread. As Arundhati Roy percipiently observed, that is why India뭩 adoption of the soulless, deadening rhetoric of deterrence has sounded so hollow and anachronistic.

So what, the cynic may say □ the nuclear weapon states have ignored the World Court opinion, as they have ignored Article VI of the NPT. The cynic can make a good case here. Five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, in 1994, the Pentagon completed its Nuclear Posture Review, which made unmistakably clear that the US remains committed to a large arsenal and to doctrines of massive retaliation and first use. By 1995, it was also well established that the US intended, through the Stockpile Stewardship program of computer simulations, subcritical tests, laser fusion generated explosions, etc., to maintain nuclear superiority indefinitely, with or without underground testing. The 1996 ICJ opinion has produced no change in official discourse in Washington, as dramatically illustrated by the Senate non-debate on the CTBT. The defeat of the CTBT in the Senate reflected in large part the doubts of Republican senators that Stockpile Stewardship is adequate to achieve the objective of nuclear superiority, but the objective itself was not questioned by any party to the debate, including the Clinton Administration. Other aspects of the Washington political climate in this decade: The US could not even have a truthful, searching discussion of its atomic bombings of cities in Japan, and members of Congress continue to assert triumphantly that the nuclear threat won the Cold War. I do not believe that historical research will bear out this assertion, but even if it was true, it is hardly a matter for jubilation.

Despite all this, the law as stated by World Court is penetrating discussion of these issues, slowly to be sure, not only in the United Nations General Assembly or among small abolitionist groups, but also in mainstream 밶rms control□ NGOs in Washington and in Congressional caucuses. Stated another way, in the US, law is beginning to move from traffic courts to the halls of Washington.

STRENGTH AND POWER OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Another resource, sometimes not fully appreciated, is found among ourselves, in civil society. Let me give some examples.

In the United States, demonstrations at the Nevada Test Site involved thousands of people at a time, with as many as 2000 people arrested at a time. These demonstrations were little noticed by the media and apparently by the US government, but they probably did make some difference in US policy calculations remember US testing was stopped in 1992. And the Nevada Test Site demonstrations were definitely noticed in Kazakhstan, where a powerful anti-nuclear movement succeeded in shutting down the principal Soviet test site in Semipalatinsk. That campaign was named the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement, in recognition of the link with demonstrations in the United States!

In 1991, the Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference took place at the United Nations in New York. While this treaty banning tests everywhere except underground was not amended at the conference, the conference did isolate the United States. Soon thereafter, the US Congress enacted a moratorium on testing, and negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty began in Geneva at the Conference on Disarmament. The Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference was initiated by Parliamentarians for Global Action, a non- governmental organization, though its members are parliamentarians, in a several year campaign in the late 1980s. Despite the refusal of the US Senate to approve the CTBT in 1999, I believe that full-scale underground nuclear testing is on its way out, that a global non-testing norm is emerging. We must ensure that this norm becomes firmly entrenched, and also challenge forms of laboratory testing and development that nuclear weapon establishments are using to replace underground testing.

In the World Court Project, supported by over 700 groups worldwide, civil society succeeded in inspiring and supporting Non-Alignment Movement countries which obtained the advisory opinion on nuclear weapons from the International Court of Justice.

In the Middle Powers Initiative, international disarmament NGOs have launched a campaign to support and embolden non-nuclear weapons countries, like the New Agenda Coalition, in their efforts to inject some life into the nuclear disarmament process.

Scientists, lawyers, and former diplomats, coordinated by the Lawyers□ Committee on Nuclear Policy, drafted a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, which subsequently was circulated in the United Nations by Costa Rica. The model convention sets out the institutional framework for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear forces.

In 1995, the Abolition 2000 Global Network was formed at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension and Review Conference, immediately attracting the adherence of 200 groups around the world. The Network today comprises almost 1500 groups worldwide. Its program remains the same, including:

commence multilateral negotiations leading towards the early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention; de-alert, de-mate, and disable nuclear forces globally; cease the design and development of nuclear weapons; commit to non-use of nuclear weapons and reject deterrence; move away from reliance on nuclear power providing the infrastructure and materials for weapons programs, including through the establishment of an International Sustainable Energy Agency.

In January 1997, Abolition 2000 held its annual meeting on the island of Moorea, in Polynesia (Tahiti), a year after the end of French testing there. The meeting was hosted by Hiti Tau, a local network of NGOs dedicated to supporting indigenous culture, anti-nuclear activism and support for test site workers and other victims of testing, independence, and economic self-sufficiency, including through enterprises like vanilla and manoi (coconut) oil cooperatives. Women are well represented among the Hiti Tau leadership.

A PERSONAL NOTE

In her essay 밫he End of Imagination,□ Arundhati Roy refers to the need to pursue beauty to its lair. When I was at Nevada Test Site for demonstrations, in the wild desert, at times I was overwhelmed by the beauty. In Tahiti, the constant presence of the ocean was a powerful, disturbing and beautiful reminder that humanity is only a part of the world. Here among you, I experience also the beauty of being among fellow creatures. So I wish us all a good conference.

John Burroughs, Executive Director Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy

211 E. 43d St., Suite 1204, New York, NY 10017 USA

tel: +1 212 818 1861; fax: 818 1857

e-mail: johnburroughs@earthlink.net;

website: www.lcnp.org

Part of the Abolition 2000

Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

<key documents>10

Living with South Asian Nuclear Reality

Iftekharuzzaman

The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in April 1998 and their self-acclaimed status of nuclear weapon states have caused irreversible strategic transformation in South Asia. These have also posed formidable new challenges to the global non-proliferation regime. The regime has agreeably been in a state of crisis for long, though it has now become quite convenient to link the crisis to the Indo-Pak nuclear tests. Given that there are now for the first time two states with declared weapons capability, which are also actively hostile traditional rivals, the commonplace wisdom is that the South Asian region may any time become a flash point for a nuclear catastrophe □ by choice or by accident.

International concern has also grown that Indian and Pakistani tests may soon lead other potential nuclear weapons capable states, including those who had only recently renounced their nuclear arsenal, to follow the suit. There was also a fear that a possible nuclear race in South Asia would have obvious adverse fallout in the adjoining regions, specially Middle East, where the temptation to acquire similar status would now be much greater.

While there is no definite evidence that such predictions would indeed translate into reality, following the tests both India and Pakistan engaged themselves in a dangerous brinkmanship. Both followed up their nuclear jingoism with tit for tat missile testing. The Kargil conflict proved to be one of the most intensely fought recent conflicts between the two. Although no full-scale war broke out, nor has either India or Pakistan made and definite progress towards actual weaponization or deployment of warheads and delivery systems, the global concerns over South Asia as a potential nuclear flashpoint have escalated for genuine reasons. Apart from the fear of a nuclear confrontation between the two, the dilemma for the international community is that the Parties to the NPT cannot ignore emergence of new nuclear weapons states, while it is also impossible to open the treaty for re-negotiation, and increase the number of the nuclear weapon states from five to seven or more.

The Desirable versus the Possible

The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests were received in both the countries by unprecedented national euphoria and pride on both sides of the borders. Caught up in a "patriotic" fervour that equated the bomb with national prestige, the common Indians and Pakistanis ignored common sense and joined politicians, elite, political parties, strategic planners, scientists, sections of intellectuals and professional cheerleaders in celebrations. India apparently chose to give up all its credit for non-violence and panch shila. The tests even led to a shameless reinterpretation of Gandhian non-violence as something for the brave and not cowards, claiming that India should now be able to take a strong stand before the world community. Immediate popular reaction in Pakistan was equally jingoistic, if not more. However, the initial enthusiasm gradually dissipated and gave way to more sombre reflections including expressions of grave concern about the security and stability of both the countries as well as the rest of South Asia.

India has subsequently announced its nuclear doctrine, under which a triad of land, sea and air-based "minimum credible deterrence" is to be ensured by deploying 350-400 nuclear weapons over the next three decades. It is only obvious to expect Pakistan to also come up with its own response. Pakistan뭩 nuclear force will obviously be much smaller than India뭩. Whatever it is, given the short flying time between the two countries, Islamabad could opt for a trigger-happy posture. The more India emphasizes a high-handed retaliatory position, the more will Pakistan have an incentive to adopt a quick-to-anger posture essentially because it would be difficult to distinguish between a rapid retaliatory capability and a surprise or first-strike capability. Notably, on the one hand India has been pledging that there will be no first use, while on the other it also continues to maintain an aggressive nuclear strategy. Reaffirming "India뭩 resolve to retrieve the part of Kashmir that Pakistan forcibly captured immediately after independence", Prime Minister

Vajpayee has only recently sent a clear message that "India is prepared for a nuclear war".

In any case, South Asian nuclear question is no longer a problem of preventing India and Pakistan from assuming nuclear weapons power status "recognized" or not. It is more a problem of meaningfully engaging India and Pakistan in a process that could lead to their association with the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, and more importantly to a degree of mutual trust and confidence between the two, which is the sine qua non for stability and peace in the region of South Asia.

Most of the international reactions and responses to the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan have been based on a commonplace wisdom of linking the South Asian nuclear problem with the conflict between the two traditional rivals. In some cases it is also viewed as a fall-out of the Sino-Indian rivalry. However, in reality the Indian move was only partially a response from New Delhi to its perceived nuclear threats from immediate neighbourhood - China and Pakistan. Pokhran II was an expression of India뭩 challenge to the discriminatory international nuclear regime. More important, the act showed New Delhi뭩 determination to force itself into the "exclusive club" of nuclear weapon states (NWS). India played according to the membership rule of the club - might is right. Pakistan replied in kind as a show of its own ambition to achieve parity with its arch-rival.

It is not known if the Indian shift, followed by Pakistan뭩, from a long-standing position of nuclear ambiguity to the present status of self-proclaimed NWS followed careful consideration of the strategic, political and economic costs compared with advantages of ambiguity. Be that as it may, the reality today is that India and Pakistan have achieved the status of nuclear weapons power □ recognized or not. What needs to be realized is the gap between the desirable and the possible. It is obviously most desirable to rollback to pre-May 11, 1998 situation □ which is rather unlikely, whereas what is possible is to explore ways to prevent further worsening of the situation. The reason a rollback scenario is unlikely is simple. Pakistan would "eat grass" rather than renounce its nuclear option until and unless India does so, whereas India would not do the same before China and other NWS make definite progress towards complete elimination of their nuclear weapons. While Pakistan뭩 nuclear weapons program is a direct response to India뭩, the latter뭩 nuclear ambition is only partially addressed to security threats from any particular country including Pakistan and China. It is to a greater extent linked with global nuclear weapons problem. India has made it abundantly clear that the existing adverse nuclear asymmetry was not acceptable to it. The underlying rationale of the asymmetry argument is New Delhi뭩 long-nourished major power ambition.

Nuclear Weapons: Status Symbol

Indian elite뭩 perceived destiny and international role as a major power of regional and international influence has always shaped New Delhi's foreign and security policies and actions. Conscious of India뭩 power potential - physical size, population, economy and resource base, industrial and technological strength, strategic location, democratic institutions, historical past - India aspires to play the role of a power that matter in the international arena. India뭩 leading initiatives in the non-aligned movement was to a great extent guided by its aspiration to play a role of global importance. While Nehru was a great exponent of non-alignment, he also gave expression to this perceived great power role of India, though it was often masked in moral language. In the words of Nehru:

India will always make a difference to the world; fate has marked us for big things. ... Leaving the three big countries, the United States, the Soviet Union and China aside for the moment, look at the world. 꿬f you peep into the future □ the obvious fourth country in the world is India.

The reference point for India is not only its neighborhood but also great powers. Nehru was a genuine supporter of nuclear disarmament. But from him also came the inspiration in the successive generations of Indian political leaders to be too proud to accept any status lower than those with whom India considers itself at par. Notably, Nehru was also conscious of the potential security benefits of India뭩 nuclear program. Referring to nuclear capability Nehru said:

I think we must develop it for peaceful purposes □ of course, if we are compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that way.

The potential of military use of India뭩 nuclear capability underlying this statement was very clear. It was Nehru who approved the Indian plutonium reprocessing capacity from where came the plutonium used for the 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE). It was also under Nehru and Lal Bahadur Shastri that India insisted on creating an independent nuclear industry base. Indira Gandhi ordered the PNE. Under Rajiv Gandhi, the research reactor Dhruba was commissioned which provided the source of weapons grade plutonium. Under Narasimha Rao a nuclear test was reportedly about to take place in December 1995. I.K. Gujral, notwithstanding his gestures for peaceful relations with neighbors was not known for any particular opposition to India뭩 nuclear weapons program. Hence what the present Hindu fundamentalist BJP-led Government has done is a culmination of a process of continued activity by all previous Indian governments, as confirmed also by statements made by leaders of the BJP as well as other political parties including former Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda, who claimed that it was a result of cumulative efforts of last 45 years and a matter of timing.

Quite clearly, India's nuclear aspiration as an instrument to ensure its long-standing desire to emerge as a power of global importance is nothing new. There is also apparently a large-scale popular support to India뭩 nuclear program. Prime Minister Vajpayee indeed echoed Nehruvian determination to achieve a major power status when he said in his suo Moto statement to the Parliament:

India is now a nuclear weapon state. This is a reality that cannot be denied. It is not a conferment that we seek; nor is it a status for others to grant. It is an endowment to the nation by our scientists and engineers. It is India뭩 due, the right of one-sixth of human-kind. (emphasis added).

Pakistan is clearly an important security concern for India, while its more important concern is to establish itself as a power of global as well as regional influence. New Delhi cannot be expected to be content with a position of a nuclear outcast as long as others have the weapon in possession.

Notably, the newly declared Indian nuclear doctrine is silent on identifying specific sources of its nuclear threat. The strategy is targeted at all the nuclear powers, not just Paksitan and China. It clearly states that India뭩 weapons will be deployed against "any state or entity" that may threaten India, and hence the ambit of "minimum" and "credible" deterrence it talks about is inclusive of all states that are in possession of nuclear weapons. Hardly anyone in responsible position in India would perhaps stipulate actual use of the weapons against any of these powers, but it is basically the urge to achieve the status of being equal to them that motivates the Indian policy. Although the big five never admit openly, the status symbol attached with the possession of nuclear weapons cannot be underestimated. Robert O묿eill argues,

There can be no denying that nuclear weapons states have more clout in the international system just because they have nuclear weapons. They attract more attention, they take each other more seriously, their defence establishements think about each other in a more significant way, and they form an identifiable club, whose members include those states that other nations wish most to have close relations with or gain the attention of. And it is club whose membership is not controlled by

those who already wear the tie. New members simply have to be willing to make their own tie and wear it. The other members then have no choice but to recognise them.

A Comprehensive Approach

The above discussion clearly shows that the possibility of renunciation of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan is remote, if not nil, as long as the recognized nuclear powers do not make any progress towards elimination of their own nuclear arsenal. The focus of international initiatives should, therefore, be on a comprehensive approach that could include the following components.

a. Global Nuclear Disarmament

If nuclear tests by India and Pakistan are any indicator for the future, it must be that the global nuclear non-proliferation movement in the true sense cannot be sustained without progress on nuclear disarmament. A basic question underlying the international non-proliferation regime, particularly NPT and a number of other allied processes including CTBT, FMCT, START and NWFZs is whether the ultimate goal of all these is the total elimination of nuclear weapons as provided under article VI of the NPT, or management of the problem created by possession of nuclear weapons. The simple and indisputable answer is: to explore a practicable road map leading to elimination rather than management.

The international community requires firm and unequivocal commitment and concrete steps on the part of NWS to eliminate nuclear weapons leading to global nuclear disarmament. The Canberra Commission reported:

Nuclear weapons are held by a handful of states, which insist that these weapons provide unique security benefits, and yet reserve uniquely to themselves, the right to own them. This situation is highly discriminatory and thus unstable; it cannot be sustained. The possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them. (emphasis added).

The Indian and Pakistani tests provide a clear evidence of the validity of this statement. The same message came from the summit meeting of the South Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) held in Colombo which for the first time after the Indian and Pakistani tests brought the Prime Ministers of the two countries together. It is well known that the SAARC has no potential to function as a security forum. However, it did consider the new international security situation created by the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan. The declaration of the summit proclaimed:

The Heads of State or Government (of South Asia) were of the view that stability; peace and security in South Asia could not be considered in isolation of the global security environment. Although great power rivalry, which the NAM had consistently opposed, no longer posed a serious threat and the danger of a global nuclear conflagration had abated yet some States had sought to maintain huge arsenals of nuclear weapons. The NPT and CTBT, to which some SAARC members were signatories, had not led to any progress towards nuclear disarmament nor prevented proliferation. They underscored their commitment to complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the need for promoting nuclear disarmament on a universal basis, under effective international control. They recognized that global non-proliferation goals cannot be achieved in the absence of progress towards nuclear disarmament and in this context called upon all nuclear weapon states, whether party or non-party to the NPT to engage constructively through a transparent and credible process of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament.

The Heads of State or Government therefore urged the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a comprehensive, universal and non-discriminatory international instrument prohibiting the use or threat of nuclear weapons as well as eliminating such weapons in existing arsenals. (emphasis added)

The Advisory Opinion of July 8, 1996 issued by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated with reference to Article VI of the NPT: "There exists obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control". No significant movement has taken place in this direction proving the fundamentally flawed nature and limited utility of the non-proliferation regime. The declared recognized nuclear powers have actually moved in opposite direction from disarmament enhancing actual capacity through further sophistication of their arsenal. The United States and Russia have taken some steps to cut their nuclear arsenals, but even if they go ahead with ratification of the START II, the two will be left with enormous advantage over other nuclear weapons states. These latter are unlikely to participate in any nuclear weapons reduction negotiations until US and Russian stockpiles are reduced to a level comparable to theirs, which remains a remote possibility. Hence the vicious circle. No goals of genuine non-proliferation can be achieved as long as the P5 nuclear weapons powers continue to pay lip service to their commitment under Article VI of the NPT.

Freeze, Reduce, Eliminate

The Canberra Commission identified several practical and achievable steps, which have not been taken. One possible way forward in the present context is that India and Pakistan freeze their nuclear programs at current levels without weaponizing or deploying for an agreed period, while during this agreed period the five NWS could undertake a specific commitment and action plan on a phased timetable for universal nuclear disarmament. As a first step in a process of FRE (freeze, reduce, eliminate) that could follow, all nuclear weapons states could agree on an upper limit of the number of nuclear explosive devices to be achieved within a specific date say 1000 devices by the year 2015. Under the terms of this agreement to be signed by all recognized and other nuclear weapons powers the next steps could be to reduce their respective arsenals by an agreed factor in each successive periods leading to the achievement of zero level say by the year 2020. This multi-step elimination process takes into consideration concerns of all parties involved including deterrence for all recognized weapons powers and countries enjoying their nuclear umbrella for as long as all weapons are not totally eliminated. It also addresses India뭩 insistence on non-discriminatory global nuclear disarmament, which by implication also covers Pakistan뭩 concerns.

In the interim period leading to achieving the zero level, while India and Pakistan cannot be clearly recognized as a nuclear weapon state under the existing framework of NPT, they could be persuaded to sign a protocol under which they would commit to the obligations of the NPT, including safeguards and export controls. After the tests, India and Pakistan sent signals that they may be willing to negotiate signing of the CTBT, though India was initially talking of certain unspecified conditions, and now stressing the need to achieve national consensus, which can be a convenient ploy to delay the process. Both New Delhi and Islamabad have pledged voluntary moratorium on further tests. They have also indicated their willingness to join the Conference on Disarmament for Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations. It can also be expected that they would be willing to conform to other related instruments including the Missile Technology Control Regime. By joining these international regimes, which do not require giving up nuclear weapons capability, India and Pakistan could avert further international condemnation. Although the failure of US to ratify the CTBT has provided India, and hence Pakistan, the scope to be reticent, these are options, especially for India, to be in a morally stronger position to work towards its long-professed goal of nuclear disarmament.

The proposed FRE scheme to achieve total elimination of nuclear weapons in 20 years, which also for the first time links Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs with that of the P5, may appear ambitious, but if the Indian and Pakistani tests have led to an extraordinary situation, and if the international community is really keen to see India and Pakistan renounce their nuclear capability, it also deserves extraordinary response. The alternative is a scenario where India will have deployed its 350-400 warheads in next 30 years, with Pakistan ensuring its own numbers.

Ironically, the fait accompli provided by Indian and Pakistani tests may be viewed to have extended renewed imperatives and opportunities for global nuclear disarmament. The tests persuaded the international community of the need to wake up and move with greater degree of seriousness than ever before in dialogue with them, especially India. The level and intensity with which the US, for instance, has engaged in dialogue with India has hardly any parallel in the history of US-India relations. Although the series of dialogues that took place have not produced much in concrete terms, these demonstrate the willingness on both sides not to allow differences dictate the terms of negotiations. The Kargil conflict of June-July this year brought forth a coincidence of Indo-US perspectives in ensuring regional stability, especially against a backdrop of widespread doubts about credible command and control as well as safeguards in South Asian nuclear capability. While Washington was found to be sympathetic to India in the conflict, unusually for India it had no hesitation in accepting a US role in ending the conflict. The point here is, in the period since the nuclear tests in the region the atmosphere in dialogue with South Asia has changed where the international community is more interested to co-opt India and Pakistan in the non-proliferation regime rather than treat them as pariah. This is not an unmixed blessing, as it can lead to a situation where the world becomes used to South Asian nuclear status, further restraining the possibility of global nuclear disarmament. The US having failed to ratify the CTBT and taking refuge to voluntary adherence to the treaty, has for instance, lost a main source of disagreement with India, which in turn having achieved the status of a nuclear weapons power for all practical purposes, and having imposed voluntary moratorium on testing, would have developed an interest in maintaining the status quo and ensuring further horizontal proliferation □ an objective that brings India closer to the US perspectives.

The United States is indeed clearly proceeding towards accepting the reality of India possessing nuclear weapons in exchange of New Delhi signing the CTBT. The US was reported to have eased come of the last remaining sanctions including the ones against 51 Indian companies allowing them to source goods and technologies from Washington. A senior US official was also quoted to have said that New Delhi could have a minimum nuclear deterrent "at the level it chooses" even if it signed the CTBT. Not surprisingly, this would be viewed in India as a step towards Washington뭩 de facto acceptance of India뭩 status as a nuclear weapons power. The Indian External Affairs Ministry termed the development as "self-evident truths", and said "it has always been clear that India will determine and define its security requirements and nuclear deterrent". In the meantime, while the new military rulers of Pakistan were reported to be willing to sign the CTBT by mid-January 2000 following extensive behind the scenes informal diplomacy with the US, Islamabad has made it clear that it reserved the right to carry out more tests if India rejected the treaty.

The real challenge, therefore, is to make progress on complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons and deterrence are a historical dead-end. Nuclearism is also a "psychopathological syndrome", a "drive for potency and genocidal mentality" that motivates even people ideologically committed to highest forms of democratic institutions and governance to participate in a worst form of authoritarianism. All nuclear weapon states - collectively and severally - must be able to demonstrate that they are committed to global peace and stability, and not disaster. They have to "recognize that their long-term security interests would be better served by ridding the world of nuclear weapons, and hence, acting on that basis. In other words nuclear weapons should be treated similarly to the other two categories of weapons of mass destruction, biological and chemical weapons, and eliminated. This, of course, is a huge step for the five to take but if we are to avoid the growth of enormous dangers, it will be inevitable. □ Once the big five had agreed that their long term goal was to eliminate nuclear weapons, the problems posed by India and Pakistan would be less complex, India and Pakistan will lose their moral arguments for retaining nuclear weapons and India would lose its rationale that China will always pose a nuclear threat".

a) International Legal Instrument for Security of NNWS

South Asia today is clearly under a nuclear shadow with no active and reliable instruments available for mutual confidence, communication and transparency of information between the two actively hostile neighbors sharing disputable borders. The smaller countries of the region have been thrown into a state of helplessness and despair. Prospect of improving trade and economic relations between India and Pakistan within or outside the framework of SAARC, about which expectations grew high recently has suffered a serious setback. The idea of economic ties working as a confidence building measure has ben rendered irrelevant in the South Asian context.

Irrespective of whether or not the region will face a direct nuclear catastrophe, there is certainly going to be a balance of terror. An indication of this came from the way the smaller States of the region responded to the tests. Countries like Bangladesh and Maldives reiterated their commitment to a nuclear weapon-free world but refrained from making any direct critical comment on the Indian and Pakistani tests. The visit of the Prime Minister of Bangladesh to New Delhi and Islamabad in the wake of the tests was clearly an evidence of her concern for the impact that nuclearlization would have on the stability of the region. But in consultation that she held with her Indian counterpart she refrained from raising the issue clearly because it was not to be well received by the hosts. Sri Lanka, which has always been at the forefront of non-proliferation movement, took a position that was tantamount to endorsing India뭩 "right" to conduct the tests. They did so largely because they have no capacity or will to antagonize India, especially when they are always concerned of being penalized in their bilateral relations if any move they take is not liked in New Delhi.

But they did so also because of the absence of any legally binding international instrument providing security assurance against use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS). The absence of such an instrument is particularly unjustified in the face of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of July 8, 1986, that use or threat of use of nuclear weapons are contrary to the international law. The Indian and Pakistani tests have once again underscored the need to redouble international efforts towards a universally binding international legal instrument to provide specific and complete security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states. The South Asian NNWS need the support of the international community, especially the powerful G-8, as well as the United Nations and other international forums in persuading India and Pakistan to sign a binding legal instrument to guarantee their security against any possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This provision could be built into an agreement that may be reached between India and Pakistan to promote nuclear stability in the region.

a. Positive Incentives

As widely expected, international sanctions on India and Pakistan did not cause any major collapse of the economies of the two, especially the former. The tests resulted in widespread international condemnation. But beyond that there was no concerted international action of specific nature. Economic sanctions were imposed by the United States because it had to do so mainly thanks to domestic legal obligations. Japan followed the suit primarily also to meet its own constitutional obligations. But other leading members of the United Nations Security Council or G-8 showed no interest in taking any concrete action. The UN Security Council Resolution of June 5, 1998 declared the tests as a threat to international peace and security. It refused to confer nuclear weapons status to India and Pakistan and called upon them to sign the CTBT, and refrain from weaponization and deployment. Apart from this there was no indication of how India and Pakistan could be persuaded to oblige to such appeals. The Security Council did not consider, for instance, any collective action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The tests did shock other international forums like Non-aligned Movement, which, however, failed to come up with any clear position on the question. It is indeed difficult to imagine how the international community can make sanctions work against countries that possess nuclear capability, especially India.

Economic sanctions were certainly expensive, but from the very beginning it was doubtful if the kind of sanctions that were being imposed were going to help rolling back to the pre-May 1998 situation. Notably, the economic sanctions focused almost exclusively on financial assistance, both bilateral and multilateral, whereas there was hardly any initiative that could affect trade and investment relations. In case of Pakistan sanctions had indeed provided its fragile and externally dependent economy a severe blow. But the Pakistani economy had already been surviving on borrowed money and borrowed time for long, with or without its nuclear program. Sanctions have certainly caused a temporary setback, and functioned as an instrument of pressure, but the linkage of nuclear capacity with national pride not only accounted for the emotions attached at the respective national levels but also rendered the financial and other costs bearable.

In case of India, which is a huge economy but has relatively smaller, though not negligible, external economic dependence, sanctions and the associated international pressures perhaps provided New Delhi a moral and political humiliation rather than any substantive economic setback that prompted India to launch its own diplomatic counter-offensive. But it was always unthinkable that the cost of economic sanctions that were imposed would be unbearable for India in practical terms.

On the other hand, one inevitable outcome of such sanctions is the loss of space for negotiations for objectives that sanctions are supposed to achieve. Not too long after the sanctions became effective, the US Senate authorized the President to waive some of these to give it room to maneuver in nuclear bargaining with Indian and Pakistani Governments. Japan also gradually moved away from its initial position of punitive sanctions to constructive dialogues. Indeed, for the NWS as well as other leading members of the international community maintaining a stable relationship with India and Pakistan with proven nuclear weapons capability is clearly more desirable rather than isolating them, especially because of their active mutual hostility.

Given the history of confrontational relationship between the two, now with the nuclear dimension added, it is more important than ever before to facilitate effective war-avoidance measures. This demands possession of advanced technologies and devices that can prevent miscalculated, misinformed or even accidental use of nuclear weapons. Many experts see the possibility of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan not by a conscious and a well-thought-out design but as a result of misperception and miscalculation of each other뭩 moves or even unintended use of the weapons. If indeed this happens it will have as much to do with the lack of communication and transparency as the lack of relevant expertise and technology. There is little information on whether the weapons capabilities in possession of Pakistan and India are equipped with fully dependable safety devices. In this connection it will be imperative upon the recognised nuclear weapons states to facilitate limited access to technologies that would ensure safety of whatever nuclear weapons capabilities India and Pakistan are in possession of. In the absence of proper safeguards the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons may indeed provide the ultimate and most expensive evidence of the failure of the deterrence value of such weapons.

In addition, the process of engaging India and Pakistan in the non-proliferation process cannot be successful without sufficiently attractive incentives. Particularly in case of India, the possibility of its accession to CTBT would be enhanced if it is provided access to dual-use technology, especially trade in nuclear power and peaceful use of nuclear technology.

b. Confidence Building - Rethinking Security

Indian and Pakistan must be able to work out specific and achievable confidence building measures that could lead to a stable relationship. A good number of mutually agreed CBM instruments are already in place between India and Pakistan. The problem lies in their practical implication and use. The Lahore Declaration and Memorandum of Understanding of February 1999 included a series of arms control and confidence building measures - both conventional and nuclear. If duly implemented, in addition to security and confidence building in the region, these could contribute to global non-proliferation objectives. Not surprisingly in Indo-Pak relations, the spirit of the Declaration and prospect of any tangible outcomes of it met with serious setbacks by the Kargil conflict that followed within five months.

Then came the recently announced Indian nuclear doctrine creating incentives for an arsenal far larger than necessary for mere deterrence. First, it proposes the creation of a triad of forces on land, sea, and in the air, mimicking the superpowers. But the triad - and the multitude of delivery systems associated with it □ is proposed not so much because it was carefully determined that such a structure would ensure India뭩 security and stability, but perhaps more as a consequence of inter-service rivalry for allocation of military budget.

Second, by not specifying what a "minimum deterrent" is, and by calling for robust and survivable second-strike forces, the doctrine endorses an open-ended arsenal. Someone will always be able to argue that x number of weapons is not sufficient because, of course, India's forces will not be developed in isolation. Pakistan and possibly China will respond, leading to a counter-response by India and so on. The result will be an arms race, with each side's actions - taken in the name of increasing security - leading to more insecurity for the other.

The document is uni-dimensional, and not in conformity with contemporary knowledge about national security problematic. Ignoring the whole gamut of other factors, it is preoccupied with only one dimension of national security -- the quantitative and the qualitative aspect of the nuclear deterrence. What India and Pakistan need, is not a nuclear doctrine, but a national security strategy that would include multi-dimensional aspects of security concerns □ political, social, economic as well as defence. Imperatives for realistic, non-polemic and non-confrontational assessment of defence requirements cannot be more urgent anywhere in the world than in India and Pakistan.

Security discourse in India and Pakistan, and hence, in the rest of South Asia, has always been distorted because defence or military build up and strength have been perceived as the instrument of self-assertion and as the currency of status and power. This is wrong and outdated. India and Pakistan need to adopt non-offensive defence strategy that would abandon the policy and practice of using defence preparedness as an instrument of power projection and confrontational foreign and security relation, and would instead adopt a policy of developing military strength for purely self-defense purposes. Accordingly, build-up and modernization of military strength conventional as well as nuclear where applicable □ must be based on objective and multi-disciplinary assessment of external threats, relative national priorities, as well as financial and economic capabilities and constraints.

Equally important are imperatives of activism of the civil society groups and institutions in transforming the security and strategic discourse in the region. The growing frequency of "track two" initiatives in the region is encouraging, and must be sustained. The institutions and groups engaged in research and education should particularly focus on sensitizing younger generation of South Asians as agents of change. The role of media and education are vital; it is particularly important to review and rethink knowledge and information systems that could help a transformation process.

The common South Asian citizens have no idea on what India and Pakistan plan to do with their nuclear weapons capabilities. There is hardly any doubt that nuclearization has made India and Pakistan and thereby the rest of South Asia - more insecure than ever before. Whatever these weapons are supposed to do, these cannot certainly address the security concern of the common South Asian, nor can they help the cause of regional stability, development and cooperation in the region. The peoples of the region in their search to know where do they stand in the nuclear space must work towards strengthening the regional civil society movements. Although such movements may not go too far in making the region free of nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future, they can at least help rethink security and promote a human-centred security discourse.

<key documents>11

Living with South Asian Nuclear Reality

Speech of Dr. Joseph Gerson

American Friends Service Committee

I want to thank Praful Bidwai, Professor Imtiaz Ahmed and Focus on Global South for the work they have done in organizing this conference and for their invitation to join this truly important gathering. Years ago as the West was turning from its struggle with Nazism and fascism to the totalitarianism of the nuclear age, the French Philosopher Albert Camus asked a simple and most profound question in his essay Neither Victims Nor Executioners. "All I ask," he wrote "is that, in the midst of a murderous world, we agree to reflect on murder and to make a choice." Elsewhere, he stressed the futility of half-hearted efforts if truly meaningful barriers are to be erected against the plagues of our time.

I am honored by the opportunity to join with many here who have looked deeply into the murderous structures and dynamics of our world "murderous world" and are making authentic efforts to secure the human future against the increasing dangers of nuclear war.

Framing Remarks

Before moving to frame my analysis of U.S. nuclear war policy and practice and giving you an update on the U.S. disarmament movement, I thought it might be helpful to say a few things about how the 1998 Indian and Pakistani demonstration nuclear weapons explosions were understood at the popular level experienced in the world뭩 most powerful and dangerous nuclear weapons nation. Although the Bush and Clinton administrations had prepared and threatened nuclear attacks against Iraq, Libya, Korea and China, the South Asian explosions came as a shock and reminded those U.S. people who were paying attention that the dangers of nuclear war had not evaporated with the end of the Cold War. One of the more remarkable responses - on several levels - appeared as a New York Times headline: "Pakistan Test Leaves U.S. Out of Ideas, And Angered."

I traveled to China shortly after these proclamations of nuclear intentions and was initially surprised by what I heard in Beijing and Shanghai think tanks. Their assumption, which was reinforced by the discriminatory impacts of U.S. economic sanctions against India and Pakistan, was that Washington had encouraged India to come out as a nuclear power to reinforce the encirclement and "containment" of China.

The U.S. discourse had not prepared me for this cynical an interpretation, but it led me to recall an interview I did with Daniel Ellsberg several years ago. Dan described how, in 1964 following China뭩 first successful nuclear weapons test, the Indian government asked Washington for an atomic bomb that could be detonated in India and advertised as an Indian bomb. Contrary to U.S. nonproliferation commitments, Secretary of State Dean Rusk initially agreed to provide India with the bomb. It was, as Dan told it, only after he and his Pentagon colleagues fought an intense political battle at the highest levels of the U.S. government that Rusk뭩 decision was overturned.

Whether or not Washington covertly encouraged India뭩 demonstration nuclear detonations, it is clear that following an indecent interval, the Clinton administration appears willing to accommodate itself to a nuclear India with regional and global influence rivaling that of China. This is a "bi-partisan" policy with conservatives from George Bush the younger, Condoleezza Rice, and the New York Times□ Abe Rosenthal, all having stressed India뭩 potential role in contributing to "containing" China."

As a way of framing my analysis of the continuities of U.S. use of nuclear weapons, I will confess to being a C.O.B. - a classmate of Bill뭩 (Clinton) - from our days at Georgetown University뭩 School of Foreign Service in the 1960s. I was never a F.O.B. (Friend of Bill뭩.) I tell you this because, as students, we were exposed to the same efforts to educate and socialize our generation of the U.S. "national security elite," even if my values and commitments were already leading me into the Civil Rights and Vietnam era peace movements.

The shock of Professor Ello뭩 first words, as he began his introductory course on international relations, ensured that they would be remembered. "The study of international relations" he said "is

analogous to studying the rules of the game among Mafia families." Thus thirty-five years later I have a framework for understanding John Deutch뭩 (formerly Clinton Assistant Secretary of Defense and Director of the C.I.A.) seemingly off hand remark that "We live in a Trident world." Similarly, it provides a context for understanding New York Times columnist Tom Friedman뭩 appeal for corporate and public appreciation for the post-modern role of the United States□incomparable military power:

"sustainable globalization still requires a stable geopolitical power structure, which simply cannot be maintained without the active involvement of the United States. All the technologies that Silicon Valley is designing꿢ll the trade and financial integration it is promoting꿢nd all the wealth this is generating, are happening in a world stabilized by a benign superpower, with its capital in Washington, D.C. The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist - McDonald뭩 cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the builder of the F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley뭩 technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps."

From Professor O묪rien, an esteemed authority on international law, we learned that "International Law is what those who have the power to impose it say it is." Thus a recent lead commentary in the elite Council of Foreign Relations journal, Foreign Affairs, celebrated "The United States and NATO - with little discussion and less fanfare꿦ffectively abandoned the old U.N. Charter rules that strictly limit international intervention in local conflicts꿬n favor of a vague new system that is much more tolerant of military intervention but has few hard and fast rules꿐osovo illustrates꾿merica뭩 new willingness to do what it thinks right - international law notwithstanding."

So it is that, with reckless disregard for international law -- not to mention human lives and the survival of the species -- since the criminal atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, every U.S. president, with the possible exception of Jerry Ford, has in times of international crisis prepared for and/or threatened to initiate nuclear war:

1946 Truman threatens the Soviets over northern Iran

1946 the Yugoslav crisis

1948 the Berlin Blockade

1950 Truman뭩 preparations and threats during the Korean War

1953 Eisenhower뭩 Korean War preparations and threats

1954 the U.S. offer of nuclear weapons to France to break the siege at Dienbienphu

1954 to support the CIA-sponsored coup in Guatemala

1956 the Suez War

1958 to contain the Iraqi revolution

1958 the Quemoy-Matsu crisis in the Taiwan Strait

1961 the second Berlin crisis

1962 the Cuban Missile Crisis

1967 the Middle East Six Day War

1967 Johnson threatens the Vietnamese during the siege of Khe Sanh

1969 Nixon뭩 "madman threats and "November ultimatum" against

North Vietnam, including the 29-day Defcom 1 nuclear alert

1970 the Black September War in Jordan

1972-73 Nixon again threatens Vietnam

1980 the Carter Doctrine to ensure the Persian Gulf remains an American lake

1981 the Reagan corollary to the Carter Doctrine

1990-91 the Desert Storm War against Iraq

1993-94 Clinton뭩 threats to annihilate North Korea

1996 the U.S.-Chinese exchange of nuclear threats during the Taiwan crisis

1996 the threat against Libya

1998 renewed nuclear threats against Iraq.

Of course, as we moved from the Post Cold War era into the Age of U.S. Hegemony -- a period in which, according to France뭩 Foreign Minister, the U.S. "is not comparable, in terms of power and influence, to anything known in modern history -- the United States is not the world뭩 lone nuclear gangster. The world is graced with seven others - including India, whose new elite felt it necessary "to prove" that they "are not eunuchs" and Pakistan. Russia, reeling from the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the eastward advance of NATO and its aggression in the former Yugoslavia, the transformation to gangster capitalism, and the severe entropy of its military establishment is re-staking its claim to superpower status with its nuclear arsenal. According to the new Yeltsin-Putin "Concept on National Security" greater reliance will be placed on Russia뭩 first strike doctrine in order "to repel armed aggression."

Additionally, as the provisions of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty testify, there are a host of threshold nuclear states, including North Korea which may have several nuclear weapons, and Japan (whose military budget is now the world뭩 fourth largest) which is but several turns of a screwdriver and the threatened revision of its Peace Constitution away from becoming a nuclear superpower.

Allow me one last framing reference to a physicist who has been an inspiration to many of us here. In 1991, in Hiroshima, Joseph Rotblatt articulated our existential condition with crystal clarity: Because no nation will long tolerate discriminatory structures of power, humanity faces a stark choice: abolition of nuclear weapons or their global proliferation and catastrophic use.

Nuclear Terrorism

As those of you here who have studied or taught in the United States know, most people in the U.S. believe what the foreign and military policy establishments, its unquestioning university mandarins, and the press tell us: "American values are universal." The U.S. is the "world뭩 first benign superpower." We are the "indispensable nation" guaranteeing the peace of the world order. "Our" nuclear arsenal is essential to deter other nuclear powers and to "preserve the peace" against the threats of "rogue" nations. Few, even in the U.S. peace movement, have intimations of the U.S. history of nuclear threats or the profound evil implicit in a state which makes preparations for nuclear genocide or omnicide "a cornerstone" of its military policy.

Why the U.S. persists in pursuing nuclear superiority, from Truman뭩 savaging the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to gain "a hammer over" the Soviet Union to the current debates over Theater and National Missile Defenses is a question that is not posed. It was, however, answered in 1948 by George Kennan the architect of U.S. cold war foreign policy and more recently by Bill Clinton and his Republican Secretary of Defense (War) William Cohen..

As Director of the State Department뭩 Policy Planning staff, Kennan bluntly advised that:

"We have about 50 percent of the world뭩 wealth, but only 6.3% of its population. In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity꿞e need not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the luxury of altruism and world benefaction꿞e should cease to talk about vague and unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and de-mocratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic concepts, the better."

Fifty years later, after European and Japanese reconstruction were long completed, and during a period when the U.S. presides over and benefits from a complex global system, Bill Clinton updated Kennan saying, "We have four percent of the world뭩 population, and we want to keep 22% of the world뭩 wealth. [Who is "we" in a country where the richest one percent hold 38.9% of national wealth, roughly equal to that shared by the poorest 95% - proportions which may be mirrored here in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan.] More recently, Secretary Cohen explained "the prosperity derived from our vibrant world economy [I wonder when he last traveled to South and Southeast Asia] would be simply impossible without the persuasiveness of our꿥iplomacy, and the power and actions and the sacrifices of our U.S. military."

Years ago Dan Ellsberg described the U.S. nuclear modus operandi used to ensure our "position of disparity." He explained that whether U.S. doctrine was Massive Retaliation or Flexible Response, U.S. presidents have used nuclear weapons "in the way that you use a gun when you point it at someone뭩 head in a confrontation꿾hether or not you pull the trigger." Paraphrasing Secretary of War Stimson, who guided President Truman from his first knowledge of the Manhattan Project to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Dan explained that "You뭨e using it when you have it on your hip ostentatiously."

Secretary of "Defense" Harold Brown, in his valedictory address to Congress confirmed Dan뭩 analysis by testifying that U.S. nuclear forces permit its conventional forces to become "meaningful instruments of military and political power." Noam Chomsky has, in turn, translated Brown뭩 subtle phraseology this way: "Our strategic nuclear weapons system provides us with a kind of umbrella within which we can carry out conventional actions, meaning aggression and subversion, without any concern that it will be impeded in any fashion."

Shortly after leaving the CIA two years ago John Deutch, who is now at the center of yet another "national security" scandal, was refreshingly honest in a speech ostensibly designed to complement Graham Allison뭩 calls to mobilize against "Loose" Russian Nukes. Deutch made four remarkable points: 1) "We live in a Trident world." 2) U.S. nuclear war doctrine remains essentially that outlined by Henry Kissinger forty years ago. 3) U.S. nuclear superiority remains essential to its global power, and 4) the United States "never intended nor does it intend now to implement" its Article VI Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty commitments. Support for Article VI, he said, was just one of those things you have to say in order to get what you want from a conference.

Deutch뭩 reference to "a Trident world" was a euphemism for a world (dis)order whose foundation is U.S. nuclear terrorism. Tridents, as I suspect most of you know, are U.S. and British nuclear-powered submarines armed with 24 intercontinental ballistic missiles. The U.S. has 18 Tridents, whose missiles are designed to carry eight 100 kiloton nuclear warheads □ 192 hydrogen bombs. When we recall that a single hydrogen bomb can incinerate and otherwise kill far more people than were murdered at Auschwitz, the scale and evil of the United States□ -- and other nuclear weapons states?- genocidal and omnicidal nuclear terrorism becomes all too apparent. Of course, the U.S. nuclear arsenal is hardly limited to D-5 missiles aboard Tridents. At any given moment, the U.S. has more than 2,300 nuclear warheads, with the explosive power of 44,000 Hiroshimas on alert.

The U.S. Strategic Command뭩 partially declassified 1995 "Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence" is among the more interesting recent codifications of the U.S. policy of nuclear terrorism against both nuclear and non-nuclear states. It states, for example, that:

"For non-Russian states, the penalty for using Weapons of Mass Destruction [chemical and biological, as well as nuclear, weapons] should not just be military defeat, but the threat of even worse consequences. Should we ever fail to deter such an aggressor, we must make good on our deterrence statement in such a convincing way that the message to others will be so immediately discernible as to bolster deterrence thereafter?

"[T]he United States should have available the full range of responses, conventional weapons, special operations, and nuclear weapons. Unlike chemical or biological weapons, the extreme destruction from a nuclear explosion is immediate, with few if any palliatives to reduce its effect. Although we are not likely to use nuclear weapons in less than matters of the greatest national importance□ nuclear weapons always cast a shadow over any crisis or conflict in which the U.S is engaged. Thus deterrence through the threat of use of nuclear weapons will continue to be our top military strategy? [NB: "not likely" implies the possibility of initiating nuclear war in crises that are "less than matters of the greatest national importance."]

The policy continues, "That the US may become irrational and vindictive if its vital interests are attacked should be a part of the national persona we project to all adversaries?

These weapons and policies are commonly understood to be targeted against Russia, China and any "rogue state" (an interesting concept given U.S. disrespect for treaties and other international law) that challenges U.S. regional or global hegemony. It also plays an unremarked upon role in reinforcing the hierarchy of nuclear powers, and it ensures that U.S. allies such as Japan, Germany, France, Britain and Israel -- all of which are potential regional rivals □ stay in "their place." I agree with Noam Chomsky who wrote that the first axiom of U.S. foreign and military policy is that "the United States will take any possible steps to ensure that its allies do not gain independent access to [Middle East petroleum reserves] to any significant degree, and that surely the Soviet Union [read now China and Russia] do not."

This is what the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff have in mind in their doctrine of "Shape, Respond and Prepare Now." With no "peer competitor" or regional powers or coalitions in positions to substantially challenge the U.S., Washington seeks to "Shape the international environment" to "create conditions favorable to US interests" and the globalized system it both benefits from and dominates. U.S. military doctrine requires the weapons and global infrastructure to "Respond" with "Decisive Force" to the full spectrum of crises" affecting U.S interests and hegemony and to "Prepare Now for an uncertain future" - which is to say any challenges to U.S. global interests and hegemony.

Toward these ends, the Clinton Administration has been proactive in its nuclear weapons diplomacy, the research, development and deployment of still more advanced technology for fighting nuclear war, and post-modernization of its nuclear warfighting doctrine. It has also "redefined" and greatly expanded the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and NATO, which are nuclear as well as conventional military alliances.

First came the Nuclear Posture Review rationalizing the status quo, reaffirmed Washington뭩 first strike policy, and euphemistically insisting that the U.S. maintain a nuclear "hedge" against a possibly resurgent Russia. Added to U.S. non-proliferation policy (including the Nunn-Lugar program and the recent $100 million program to plutonium production) - which simultaneously seeks to limit the dangers of nuclear war and to reinforce the global nuclear hierarchy of power - was a "counter-proliferation policy. Its "preventive" dimensions include old standards: diplomatic dissuasion, denial of access to technology, arms control, international pressure, and (as in the case of Iraq) agreements to inspect, monitor, convert or destroy nuclear capabilities.

Counterproliferation also has offensive dimensions that have been implemented at a cost of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives and through the disproportionate sanctions against Pakistan. These measures include the use of "military, political, economic, and commercial tools꿻o persuade even the most ardent proliferator that the risks or the threat of use of [weapons of mass destruction] are not acceptable."

John Deutch뭩 remarks, quoted earlier, describe the cynicism of the Clinton administration approach to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty뭩 extension in 1995 and the upcoming NPT review conference. While extreme right-wing unilateralists in the U.S. military and Senate have blocked ratification of the CTBT, the Clinton administration has backed it to bolster its nonproliferation efforts and because "it locks in place the tremendous technological advantage the US. now possesses in [its] nuclear arsenal." Recall that when President Clinton submitted the CTBT to the U.S. Senate, he simultaneously demanded a $40 billion commitment for the misnamed "Stockpile Stewardship Program" which is designed not only to ensure the reliability of the U.S. omnicidal nuclear arsenal, but to fund research and development of new weaponry. With the CTBT functionally, if not permanently, in place, the U.S. is surging ahead with so-called "sub-critical" and computer simulated explosions and with the construction of the National Ignition Facility to develop and deploy new nuclear weapons like the B61-11 nuclear penetration bomb and to explore the possibility of a "pure" hydrogen bomb.

In response to the World Court decision on the threat and use of nuclear weapons, calls by General Lee Butler and other generals and admirals, and the Canberra Commission Report, the Clinton administration has reaffirmed that preparations for nuclear war remain "a cornerstone" of U.S. policy, and it has gone on to revise U.S. guidelines for initiating nuclear war in ways that increase the chances of nuclear war.

Which brings me to National and Theater Missile Defenses. Like Kissinger with MIRVs, the U.S. "national security" elite are focusing on the short-term advantages of technological fixes (which also provide powerful subsidies to U.S. high-tech and weapons manufacturers) not on the longer-term dynamics and dangers of ratcheting up arms races.

In the U.S., greater attention has been given to National Missile Defenses (NMD) than to TMD. Our morally and politically weak President and his Vice President have acceded to demands for increased funding for research and development of a full-scale and updated version of Ronald Reagan뭩 notorious Star Wars. In order to placate the military-industrial-academic complex, they have also signed on to NMD deployments (a system on which the U.S. has already wasted $50 billion) "as soon as the system is technologically feasible." To compensate for NMD뭩 obvious vulnerabilities, it is being sold as insurance against attacks by North Korea, Iraq and other so-called "rogue" states said to be preparing to attack the U.S. with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

Placing its electoral ambitions ahead of national and global security, Clinton and Gore have all but adopted the Republicans□ Star Wars agenda. Despite repeated NMD test failures and warnings that NMD deployment will trigger a new arms race, they are pressing Russia to revise the ABM treaty - the foundation of what little "arms control" we now have □ and they are warning that "if necessary" the U.S. will abandon the treaty. If NMD are eventually deployed, the Russian military , of necessity, plan on the basis of a worst case scenario, assuming that NMD will actually work. As the new Yeltsin-Putin "Concept on National Security" indicates, this will lead Moscow to rely on building still more missiles to overwhelm the system.

TMD poses a more immediate danger. It is being sold to the U.S. people as a high-tech means of protecting forward deployed U.S. troops and weapons in their hundreds of bases and installations across East Asia and the Pacific and the Seventh Fleet from possible Chinese and North Korean missile attacks. As Ezra Vogel, who plays a critical role in the U.S.-Chinese elite dialog explained it a year and a half ago, by threatening to make all Chinese missile forces vulnerable to TMD deployments in Japan and Taiwan, he and others are seeking to extort a "grand bargain" from China. He has signaled that the U.S. would agree to forego its TMD deployments in exchange for Beijing agreeing not to adopt any more aggressive military doctrine or related weapons than are already in place. Of course, this leaves U.S. forward deployments across East Asia, the Seventh Fleet, nuclear and space weaponry as they are with the U.S. free to "modernize" . Such a (dis)order would parallel the power relations that prevailed following China뭩 defeat in the Opium War.

While Washington publicly emphasizes TMD뭩 defensive roles, Beijing correctly sees TMD as a U.S. shield to reinforce the many swords Washington can target against the Middle Kingdom. The Chinese government has repeatedly and angrily declared that if US TMD deployments go forward, Beijing will produce and deploy as many missiles as are needed to overwhelm it. This means a dangerous new arms race beginning in, but not limited to, Northeast Asia. To put this in its proper perspective, Joe Nye - among the most influential architects of U.S. foreign and military policy - concedes that if China뭩 military modernization continues at its current pace, in forty years Beijing will have the power of a mid-level U.S. NATO ally of twenty years ago. Yet, Nye insists that it is not a question of whether TMD will be deployed, but of what their precise characteristics will be.

Clinton뭩 Successor

Last fall Bishop Bello of East Timor ironically referred to President Clinton as the "ruler of the world" who had more influence over Indonesian military intervention in East Timor than did the cleric. We are now in the season of primary elections to determine whether John McCain or the junior Bush (sometimes referred to as shrub) will face Al Gore or Bill Bradley in the election for "ruler of the world." Whatever the outcome, the continuity of U.S. policy will be greater than the changes.

Typically, McCain, son and grandson of admirals, who is best known in the U.S. as a former POW than as a mass murderer of Vietnamese, was long on military symbolism when he ascended the (retired) aircraft carrier Intrepid to deliver his major military and foreign policy speech. Anxious to compensate for his National Guard service during the Vietnam War, Bush - who speaks of "compassionate conservatism," journeyed to The Citadel - a military academy known for its steadfast virile militarist traditions - to deliver his initial foreign and military policy address. With Bush, like his father, we are promised a "kinder gentler machine gun hand."

Each of these men call for, in McCain뭩 words, extending this "unique 몍nipolar moment□ in world affairs꿢s long as we possibly can." Both describe national and theater missile defenses as "indispensable," (McCain), call for their deployment "at the earliest possible date," (Bush) and threaten abrogation of the ABM treaty should Moscow continue to reject treaty revisions that would legalize NMD and TMD deployments.

Both fear China뭩 "growing military and economic might," and call for limited engagement with this "potential threat" (McCain,) but Bush has gone further stating that "China is a competitor, not a strategic partner" with "the means to incinerate Los Angeles." Both call for containing China and Russia. McCain defines his candidacy by stressing pay raises for U.S. troops and calling for "rogue state rollback." Bush - in the tradition of Ronald Reagan뭩 "Discriminate Deterrence" doctrine - urges "selective concentration of U.S. military power" with a "Eurasian" focus and that 20 per cent of the entire U.S. weapons procurement budget be devoted to research and development for high-tech weapons.

There is still less to differentiate Bradley from Gore. Both have reaffirmed their commitments to "nuclear deterrence" and to the deployment of NMD and TMD (and here is the difference with the Republicans) "as soon as technologically feasible." Both call for U.S.-Russian negotiations for further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, with Bradley going somewhat further than Gore by stating he hopes the upper limits of START III would be in the 2,000 to 1,000 range. One thousand hydrogen bombs. It makes me feel so secure! Bradley also attempts to differentiate himself from Gore by expressing greater interest in -not yet support for - de-alerting nuclear weapons, and he points to a greater role for the United Nations□ in resolving regional conflicts.

The US Peace Movement

In several weeks, my former classmate will travel to South Asia to seal a series of military and "soft power" agreements to update the "pattern of relationships" which enable U.S. and allied elites "to maintain" their privileges and existing global disparities. The Rand Corporation, which has powerful ties to the White House and Pentagon, has warned that NGOs are challenging the "globalization of capital, business and governments꿣y the globalization of the opposition." Not a bad summary of the task before us! As governments collude, our task is to collaborate to create a non-nuclear, more equal and just, and liberating "pattern of relationships."

Like the United States itself, the U.S. disarmament movement is an ungainly and largely individualist array of researchers, think tanks, publications, national and grassroots organizations, and

conscientious individuals. During the Nuclear Weapons Freeze movement of the early and mid-1980s, Randy Forsberg developed a wonderful schematic chart that more or less accurately illustrated how U.S. activists, researchers and policy analysts, and policy makers influenced one another in something like a single system. We뭨e hardly a single system today!

I am a believer in the law of unintended consequences, and it is undeniable that valuable contributions to disarmament, peace and justice can come from all points of the continuums that constitute our societies. I also agree that there are periods or areas in which the contributions of an individual or a particular segment of the movement are more critical than other뭩 □ for example Dick Falk뭩 role initiating the campaign for a World Court advisory opinion on the use and threatened use of nuclear weapons -- and the roles of lawyers in promoting it. But, despite the changes wrought by Indian and Pakistani nuclearism, I believe that Joseph Rotblatt put it well when he said that there is an emerging international elite consensus for nuclear weapons abolition. What is missing, he stressed, is the organization and manifestation of people뭩 power from below, which is ultimately the only thing that will move governments - especially the nuclear powers - to rid the world of these genocidal and omnicidal weapons. This is our most important labor.

I want to give you a quick, unscientific and non-encyclopedic overview of the U.S. disarmament movement. Hopefully it will serve our networking and planning during the conference and in the future. I뭠l begin with an institutional summary - probably neglecting groups that should be mentioned. I뭠l then turn to the range of issues currently being addressed.

In the U.S., the nuclear disarmament movement is one of two wings that have evolved over many years within the peace movement. One of our major obstacles is that the two primary wings of our movement have little understanding or engagement with the other뭩 priorities. Disarmament scholars and activists are overwhelmingly white, male and of the middle class or wealthier. These scholars and activists tend to be less likely to identify with and to act in solidarity with people suffering from economic or social injustice or from "conventional" U.S. military interventions - usually people of color. It is rare that they express an anti-imperialist critique of U.S. culture and society. Resistance to injustice, including "conventional" U.S. foreign military interventions, tends to be the work of less privileged, racially more diverse and more radical activists who often have difficulty conceptualizing the scale or immediacy of the dangers posed by nuclear weapons. Both wings have difficulty recognizing or engaging the "deadly connection" between nuclear and interventionary war.

As in Europe, U.S. national and local peace organizations have atrophied, primarily as a result of disorientation and "affluenza." For many in the U.S., these are confusing times. Having viewed the world through a Cold War paradigm rather than with a longer term anti-imperialist perspective, the collapse of familiar Cold War frames of reference left many unable to perceive - let alone respond to - the Age of U.S. Hegemony. Combined with fatigue, many of these skilled and long-dedicated activists have retreated into the comforts and preoccupations of their private lives. With the ostensibly "booming" U.S. economy, many are victims of affluenza, a character disorder common in consumer societies which leads people to accord greater priority to material consumption and the preoccupations of wealth than to human solidarity. (In some cases people actually die from affluenza, for example from having their clothes dry cleaned too often in dangerous chemicals or from dangerous chemical fertilizers used to keep their not-so-spacious lawns green.)

As people living within the metropolitan center of the global hegemon, we are also confronted by multiple urgent demands for action: to work for the freedom of many of the two million people consigned to the U.S. gulag - usually as a result of institutionalized racism and poverty; to challenge the U.S. military budget and nuclear weapons infrastructure within the United States - both of which truncate human lives and opportunities; to oppose U.S. "conventional" military interventions from Latin America to the Persian Gulf; to work in solidarity with people in Okinawa, Japan, Korea, the Philippines and other countries who have long endured the dangers, crimes, complicities, "abuses and usurpations" of U.S. military bases and installations. And that just begins the list.

One recent hopeful development is the commitment that students are bringing to the campaign against sweatshop labor. While the campaign has its weaknesses, as we saw in Seattle, it is opening them to understanding and confronting the savage inequities of the global economy.

You are probably most familiar with U.S. think tanks and publications working for disarmament. Some are large, well funded, and to my mind establishment-oriented, for example the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and the Stimson Center. There are livelier, more engaged, and usually smaller operations like the Center for Defense Information in Washington which is comprised primarily of retired military officers, which produces excellent videos and a monthly newsletter as well as doing more conventional research and lobbying. The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development in Berkley focuses on East Asia and includes a new "Nuclear Policy Project" and produces a remarkable quantity of valuable papers, reports and media summaries. There are operations like Arjun Makhijani Institute for Energy and Environmental Research and Randy Forsberg뭩 Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies which do invaluable research. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists is a kind of life blood for the movement as a whole, while Arms Control Today뭩 reach is limited to researchers.

There are a myriad of national and nation-wide organizations which sometimes find ways to collaborate but more frequently pursue their own agendas. Some are highly specialized like the National Committee for Radiation Victims, The Alliance for Nuclear Accountability (which focuses on nuclear weapons production and waste clean up,) the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and the Fourth Freedom Foundation. Professional organizations like Physicians for Social Responsibility and the Lawyers Committee for Nuclear Policy have the resources and status to continue playing central roles in the nuclear disarmament and abolition movement. Peace Action, grew out of the fusion of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy and the National Freeze Campaign, and it claims to be the largest U.S. peace organization. It tends to function as the disarmament oriented left wing of the Democratic party, campaigning for incremental nuclear arms control, reductions in U.S. military spending, and sometimes against U.S. armed interventions. Somewhat to the left of Peace Action is the U.S. chapter of the Women뭩 International League for Peace and Freedom, a multi-issue group with small but very dedicated chapters across the country.

The American Friends Service Committee and the Fellowship of Reconciliation are religiously based peace and justice organizations, whose integrity and histories extend their reach far beyond the Quakers and pacifist Protestants who launched and continue to sustain these organizations. With offices and chapters scattered across the country, we are multi-issue organizations working across the justice and peace, "conventional" military intervention and nuclear weapons spectrums. Unfortunately, the relative autonomy of our local offices and chapters means that we are usually less than fully coherent force, but when we do pull together we, have the standing and resources to have a profound influence on public thinking and policy making. There are groups which work even more against the grain such as Pax Christi which works for peace within the Catholic church and Plowshares affinity groups who focus on prophetic civil disobedience.

Local organizations range from groups like Tri-Valley Cares, which focuses on stopping the National Ignition Facility, Western States Legal Foundation which develops excellent resources and plays important networking roles within the U.S. and internationally, and groups like Nebraskans for Peace which have been around since the Vietnam war and do invaluable education and organizing work.

I wish I could report to you that we have built an almost coherent coalition, with focused goals and an integrated strategic campaign for nuclear weapons abolition. Unfortunately, this is not the case. We await the crisis, insight, or push from funding sources that could serve as a catalyst.

The range of issues our movement is addressing and its methods are still more diverse than groupings I have described so far. As we meet here, people in the U.S. are preparing for the NPT Review conference and the occupation of the Nevada nuclear test site in April, pressing for White House or Congressional action to de-alert nuclear weapons, laying the foundation for future Senate ratification of the CTB Treaty, doing essential education about the dangers of National Missile Defenses and the U.S. Space Command, prophetically pouring blood on the machines of war and going to jail, meeting with leading state legislative leaders in pursuit of resolutions urging that nuclear weapons abolition become national policy, and pressing members of Congress to co-sponsor legislation that would require the United States to honor its Article VI NPT commitments.

I want to close by briefly describing two initiatives that I believe are among the most important things we are doing. The Nuclear Weapons Freeze Movement of the 1980s developed its critical mass when one of my colleagues took the Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race to town meetings across Vermont. New England town meetings lie at the heart of the U.S. democratic myth. Even before the American Revolution, town meetings were open to all registered voters of a community, and they made decisions on issues vital to community life. In 1981, seventeen cities and towns in Vermont voted for the Freeze, providing a model for people across New England and the United States. The following year, in the face of Reagan뭩 accelerating nuclear warfighting preparations and rhetoric, people voted for the Freeze in more than 300 New England cities and towns and in eight state-wide referenda across the country.

Our political environment is certainly different a generation later. Nevertheless last year AFSC and WILPF went back to Vermont town meetings, this time calling for Washington to make nuclear weapons abolition national policy. A year ago, 33 Vermont town meetings voted for abolition, and the state legislature followed soon thereafter, making Vermont the first state in the United States to call for abolition. This year AFSC and WILPF are going back to still more town meetings, and they are organizing a parallel campaign to force the state뭩 Senators to work seriously for Abolition. Our challenge is to inspire people in other states to build on this model.

The second initiative is about breaking through the abstractions and denial that make it difficult for people to understand the urgency of turning their life energies toward the abolition of nuclear weapons. During the Civil Rights and Vietnam era peace movements, people were moved to action by photographs and stories of victimized people, and in some cases the opportunity to meet, listen to, and engage with them. Within that AFSC we have made this a priority. In fact, the Vermont town meeting campaign was preceded by a speaking tour of Hiroshima and Nagasaki Hibakusha which took Tanaka-san across the state. He stayed in the home of the man who went on to become the campaign뭩 principle organizer.

Among the tragedies we live with is that the world뭩 Hibakusha are no longer limited to survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs. In the United States they include perhaps a million people: Native Americans victimized by the mining and milling of uranium, down winders and Atomic Veterans who were consciously exposed to fallout, and workers in nuclear weapons assembly plants. There are Hibakusha in Korea, Russia, Kazakhstan, the Marshall Islands, Tahiti, Canada and quite possibly in India and Pakistan, as well as other countries. Last year, with the help of Japanese organizations we organized a "Global Hibakusha" delegation, to engage many of the thousands of participants at the Hague Appeal for Peace conference. We are now in the process of organizing a second delegation which will come to the United Nations in May to campaign for a General Assembly resolution requiring the nuclear powers take responsibility for the Hibakusha they have created. They will also speak in cities and communities to help us touch people뭩 hearts and to build the commitment needed to challenge and transform the nuclear powers.

I know no better way to move people "to consider murder" and to respond with their full beings.

<key documents>12

The Peace Movement, sunny side up, please.

Sonia Jabbar

Scoundrels of the first order they may be, but they have my grudging admiration for their amazing ability to organise, their skill in handling propaganda, their magnificent manipulation of the media. One cannot begin talking about Nuclear India without talking about its Dr.Strangeloves, or the Hindu Right.

For the last ten years I find the course of my life being determined by these people. I am not a professional activist and quite frankly, I would rather be walking in the mountains, lazing in the sun or reading a novel, but for the Hindu Right who constantly pull me into their gravitational field by their nasty activities. First it was the Rath Yatra and the Babri Masjid, then Pokhran and Kargil. Each time I뭭e woken up to confront an India, aggressive, hate-filled, which has bewildered me. This is not my country, these cannot be my people. And then I뭭e scrambled, joining other progressive people to recover the ground we suddenly lost, to try and staunch the wound, turn the tide. So then again back to the the mad rush of writing pamphlets overnight, designing posters, organising protest meets...But its always felt like a losing battle. Each time I felt we have lost a little more ground. Each time I뭭e wished that it wasn뭪 just us reacting to the shots they called. Each time I have wished that there was a movement, strong, visible, articulate, already in existence that had its own programmes, attracting people from all over the country, and that it was the Right scrambling to make up for lost time.

But of course that hasn뭪 happened. And it뭩 not about to happen if we carry on the way we have all these years. Time is running out and we have to recognise that we have a formidable adversary, one that will easily crush dissent if that dissent does not have the strength of the people of India behind it. It is with this in mind that I would like to look at what we are up agaist and to critique the Indian anti-nuclear movement in the hope that we can assess our strengths and weaknesses and make for a more efficient movement in the future.

If we look at the Hindu Right뭩 campaigns over the last decade whether it was to drum up support for Ram Janmabhoomi, Pokhran or Kargil they have a common factor for their immense popularity, and that is the commitment of breaking away from a mundane present and catapulting into a glorious future. In other words the promise of Utopia. The Ram Janmabhoomi promised a Ram Rajya or a return to a mythic, halcyon Hindu past; Pokhran promised the immediate promotion of India from the bottom of the Third World to Top Gun amongst the super powers; Kargil was no ordinary war but became a wish-fulfilling mirror for a nation that deeply desired to feel strong, militaristic, proud and powerful.

These events coupled to a growing, very visible and vulgar consumerism have made the people of India-- I won뭪 say everybody, but certainly huge numbers-- suddenly feel empowered. Here, after plodding along for fifty years down a familiar but never-ending road, minding our own business, we뭭e suddenly arrived, or maybe we뭨e not quite there yet but we뭨e nearly there. Utopia is right around the corner.

And how have we on the other side, the progressive forces, responded to these events? Like I described earlier, at best the reaction has been a knee-jerk one-- and this is not to take away from the efforts of thousands of people who have volunteered their time and energy to common causes. It was at the height of the anti-nuclear campaign that I realised we had a serious problem on our hands. The BJP said we were a great nation, a super power and we were saying, no! see what happened in Hiroshima. Once on a street corner a man had considered our Hiroshima exhibit carefully, reflected for but a moment on the possibility of thousands of Indians perishing painfully in the event of a nuclear war, before pointing out that it might be an answer to our population problem. As a people we are majestically inured to death. So, even though there were times that the Hiroshima pictures worked, it was obvious that we couldn뭪 build a movement solely based on the threat of nuclear war. It was simply not enough to present a dystopian future to counter the BJP뭩 Utopian one.

At a more subtle level the projection of a dystopian future imbues the entire Peace Movement with negativity. We may as well stand on street corners proclaiming the end of the world. I was alarmed when an acquaintance called us extremists, putting us firmly on the opposite side of the hawks but somehow painting us in the same colours. I fear we뭨e gaining a reputation as agents of gloom and doom.

I also faced a serious problem as a graphic designer. Last year to mark the nuclear tests many groups came together to organise a peace march from Pokhran to Sarnath. This went over a period of 3 months, covering a distance of over 500km, reaching out to thousands of people in villages and towns across Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. As a central image for the campaign poster there were suggestions that I use a picture of a dove. I said no because I didn뭪 think an image of a dove would signify peace to people of the rural hinterland. So I came up with a poster which asked the question "When have weapons ever brought Peace?" both in English and Hindi. On either side of the poster is a list, a litany of wars from 1899-1999. Though, the poster was well received, I was actually unhappy with it because I was unable to come up with a central image which satisfied me, and ended up settling for an image from the Bangladesh war. But this image could be used equally effectively by someone campaigning against poverty or for development or health issues. It is this inability to come up with a powerful symbol signifying Peace that has been really bothering me. How do you communicate with an audience which largely has some faith or the other on a moral issue like war and peace. Does one employ religious symbols or not?

The idea for the first poster that I made was actually suggested at a meeting the day after the tests and I rushed to design and produce it within three days to be in time for our first public protest on May 16 1998. This poster uses an image of the Buddha in the earth-witness mudra under the mushroom cloud resembling a Bodhi tree, sitting on a bed of skull, and says, "The Buddha would not have smiled" in reference to the obscene secret code used by the scientists in 1974 for communicating the success of the tests. I also produced postcards hoping that people would send them across the country and that the very act of sending this message publicly would be an act of dissent. Now although this image was popular and the poster did well, raising funds for our nascent campaign, there was some criticism leveled against the use of a religious symbol in a secular campaign.

What does one do? Like it or not, the world view of the majority of citizens of this sub-continent is shaped by religion. Could one imagine that people would readily swallow the BJP뭩 naming of the test site Shakti Sthan (the place where the Goddess manifests her power)? Or that the Pakistanis would commemorate their test day as Yaum - e-Takbir (Day of Allah) or that they could speak of the CTBT as an insult to Islam and people would not laugh in their faces? But these things have happened. The response of progressive forces in this country to anything remotely religious is, as Benedict Anderson puts it, one of impatient silence or more vocally dismissive. A prominent theatre person spoke for many on the Left when he wrote in the late eighties:

It is true that our peasantry, our tribals, and even our urban masses are shackled to rites, rituals and religion. Perhaps it is equally true that for most of them the only valid world view is the religious. But equally true is the fact that this is indeed a measure of their backwardness. It will not do to attempt to look at contemporary life in terms of the images, metaphors, archetypes, myths and philosophies drawn from the past. ( Hashmi,1989)

But is it not in confronting the perception of being 멳ackward□ that makes the believers ally with the Right, calling us in turn, pseudo-secularists? And is it not precisely the Right-Wing뭩 use of images, metaphors, archetypes, myths and philosophies drawn from the past that has made such a deep impact on Indian society in the last decade? Conversely, our own campaigns based on rationality and good faith, can we honestly compare with the effect of our adversary뭩 propaganda?

I am not suggesting that we abandon secular language and somehow jump onto the religious bandwagon, manipulating it to suit our agenda. The results of such a marriage of convenience cannot be convincing. Members of the Left have actually cynically, and ignorantly, referred to Sufi-Bhakti poetry as "the fixed deposits on which we can rely on in times of crisis" (Raina). The shrinking popularity of the progressive forces, it seems to me, is proof that such reliance in timesof crisis actually rang hollow and eventually failed.

I think somewhere I뭢 trying to say quite simply that you have to be what you profess to be. When we say we are for peace we really go on to define ourselves as anti-nuclear. Do we articulate a clear vision of the future, a positive, peaceful future or is it the dystopia of ruined cities, contaminated water, mutant children?

Perhaps one of the most successful campaigns was what we called The Friday Campaign which started soon after Pakistan tested and was sustained for 3 months. Every Friday when offices would start closing for the day, between 30-100 people would gather at a street corner or circle in some part of Delhi. Armed with banners and placards, we would stand absolutely silently for an hour, usually on the road divider or in the traffic circle before moving to the pavement for another half hour for discussions with hundreds of people who would stop to question or debate. People are used to noisy demonstrations in Delhi where the protesters usually march shouting angry slogans, but because we were silent, stood still and were very focused, the impact was tremendous. But an incident occurred which somewhat contaminated the campaign and I mark this as the turning point because it was really after this that our enthusiasm waned and we gave up on this form. We were at a busy intersection in East Delhi, and all was fine until, it seems, some BJP types landed up and started shouting at us, calling us traitors. The crowd, that had been really quite peaceful and well-behaved until then suddenly got aggressive. We tried to speak to them calmly, and by now many of us were used to handling such situations, but a few people from our group got upset and angry and started trading insults and abuse. The situation soon got out of control and we were literally chased out of the area. It was a day of reckoning. I think many of us felt deeply ashamed and upset at how things had turned out. For myself, I realised that you couldn뭪 fight for peace. Neither could you build a Peace movement on outrage.

There have been some actions around the country that have emerged from a central, very grounded positive space. I will, for the moment, speak of only a couple.

In Patna, on Hiroshima Day, a school teacher organised what seems to me to be a wonderful event: It was kites against bombs. Imagine hundreds of children writing messages of peace on kites and then flying them into the sky. Imagine the sky being filled with gaily coloured kites bearing peace. Imagine the fun, excitement and joy around the event. It will be something children will look forward to the following year and probably turn up in larger numbers. I contrast this with the way we have to beg and plead, cajole and guilt-trip people to try and get them to come to our events.

There is a group in Delhi called Pravah that works with school and college students on gender, communalism, human rights and peace. In November last year I received a letter asking me to join them and 350 students from all over India in a 3 day event which culminated in something they called the Jolly Jaloos. It said that the Jolly Jaloos would be an antithesis of the traditional "down down" protest march. It would be a carnivalistique procession which would share serious matters with the public in creative, fun and interactive ways. Needless to say, the event was wonderful, attracted huge numbers of young people and has the potential of growing bigger this year.

I see great potential in such events. The Hindu Right has everything going for it but for one major element: it is utterly humourless, devoid of warmth and joy and relies on the whipping up of hatred. It is my belief that such emotions are unsustainable, and that뭩 why, for example, the Ram Janmabhoomi Movement couldn뭪 be sustained beyond a point. That뭩 why they need to keep raising other bogies, whether it뭩 Fire or Water or the Christians or cricket matches in order to keep their stew simmering.

This working group session is called 멒enerating resources to spread the anti-nuclear message.□ I뭗 like to look at the word 멺enerating□ and what it conjures up. What immediately comes to mind are the portable gen-sets sitting outside every shop in Delhi. As soon as there is a power-cut, these start up stuttering and then settle into an unbearably loud racket which is accompanied by the spewing of black, poisonous fumes! A mechanical generator requires large quantities of fuel and the energy output is perhaps not as efficient as we뭗 like it to be. It is also subject to frequent breakdowns. I would like to suggest another metaphor: A magnet. A magnetic field is silent and attracts powerfully, effortlessly, and almost always, inevitably.

If we get our act together, spell out our vision for the future, have a genuine fund of excitement, creativity and joy within us, the resources, whether material or people will come to us quite automatically.-

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