G20 People's Summit - Workshop No.3

초국적 기업에 맞선 노동운동의 전략

International Responses: TNC Structural Adjustment during the Economic Crisis and Labour's Strategies for Resistance

11월 8일 오후 4시 30분 / 서강대 예수회회관

Monday, November 8, 4:30pm / Jesuit Apostolic Center, Sogang Univ.

- 발표

◦초국적 기업의 구조조정과 한국 노동자운동의 대응 _한지원(노동자운동연구소 연구실장)

◦초국적 기업에 맞선 브라질 노동운동의 경험 _퀸티노 마르케스 세베로(브라질노총 사무총장)

- Presentation

◦TNC Structural Adjustment and the South Korean Workers Movement's Strategy

(Jiwon Han, Research Director, Research Institute for Alternative Workers Movements)

◦Brazilian Workers' Experience in Fighting TNC

(Quintino Marques Severo, General Secretary, CUT-Brazil)

- 참고자료

* 발표로 참석하지는 않지만 이탈리아와 아르헨티나에서 자료를 보내주셨습니다.

◦ 이탈리아 제1노총(CGIL), 피아트 그룹의 포밀리아노 공장 구조조정 방안 및 금속산업사용자단체의 2008년 금속노동자 전국 단체협약 이탈에 관한 제1노돛-금속연맹의 입장

◦ 아르헨티나 제2노총(CTA), 세계화가 노동에 미친 영향:아르헨티나노조의 도전과 응답

- References

◦FIOM-CGIL, The FIOM-CGIL position on the FIAT Group’s plan for the Pomigliano plant and the Federmeccanica deviation from the 2008 Metalworkers National Collective Agreement

◦CTA, The globalisation of capital and its impact on the world of formal and informal work: Challenges for and responses from Argentine unions.

PSSP affiliated Research Institute for Alternative Workers Movements

프로그램

사회 임월산 (노동자운동연구소 국제국장)

16:30 ~16:40 인사말

16:40 ~17:00  초국적기업에 맞선 한국 노동자들의 투쟁 (노동자운동연구소 한지원 연구실장)

17:00 ~17:40 브라질 노동자 운동의 투쟁 경험 (CUT 브라질 Quintino Marques Severo 사무총장)

17:40 ~17:55 휴식

17:55~18:05  발제 요약 및 토론 제안

18:05~18:30 질의 응답 및 초국적 자본에 맞선 투쟁 방안에 관한 토론

Program

Moderator: Wol-san Liem, Researcher, Research Institute for Alternative Workers

16:30 ~ 16:40 Welcome Hasoon Park, Executive Director, Research Institute for Alternative Workers Movements

16:40 ~ 17:00 Korean experiences in fighting transnational corporations Jiwon Han, Research Director, Research Institute for Alternative Workers Movements

17:00 ~ 17:40 Brazilian experience in fighting transnational corporations Quintino Marques Severo, General Secretary, CUT Brazil

17:40 ~ 17:55 break

17:55 ~ 18:05 Summary of presentations and proposal from the Research Institute for Alternative Workers Movements Moderator

18:05 ~ 18:30 Q and A and Discussion Moderator

*한글 자료

초국적자본의 구조조정과 한국 노동운동의 대응(한지원) ............................ 1

토론을 위한 제언 ............................. 6

피아트 그룹의 포밀리아노 공장 구조조정 방안 및 금속산업사용자단체의 2008년 금속노동자 전국 단체협약 이탈에 관한 제1노돛-금속연맹의 입장 .............................9

*English Document

TNC Structural Adjustment and the South Korean Workers ............................ 13

Thoughts for Discussion ............................ 20

The FIOM-CGIL position on the FIAT Group’s plan ............................ 24

Challenges for and responses from Argentine unions. ............................ 29

초국적 기업의 구조조정과 노동운동의 대응 전략

www.awm.or.kr

한지원(노동자운동연구소 연구실장)

1. 왜 초국적 기업이 문제인가?

초국적 기업의 가장 큰 힘은 국경을 초월한 이동성이다. 금융 자본은 초단위로 자본을 이동하며 증권시장과 환율 변화에 따라 시세 차익을 획득한다. 전세계 국제 거래의 90% 이상은 실물 생산과 관계없는 금융 거래이다. 유형 자산이 큰 산업 자본의 경우 금융 자본에 비해 이동성에 상대적으로 덜 하지만 이들 역시 현지 시장 상황, 노동 비용 등에 따라 국제적 생산 네트워크를 조정하며 자본 이동을 통해 최고의 수익을 만들어 낸다. 더군다나 이들 초국적 제조업 기업들은 수출입 관련 파생금융상품, 금융 계열사를 통한 자산 투기, 사모펀드를 동원한 인수합병 등에 이르기까지 금융 투기에도 뛰어나다. 80년대 이후 발전한 자본의 세계화는 더 이상 금융 자본과 산업 자본을 예전과 같이 분명하게 구분하는 것을 불가능하게 만들었다.

초국적 기업의 힘은 다른 한 편 민족 국가 수준에서만 작동하는 노동운동의 한계에서도 기인한다. 이들의 초과 수익은 결국 노동자들이 받은 초과 착취의 결과다. 각국의 노동자들이 생산성과 일자리를 놓고 경쟁을 펼치며 바닥을 향한 경주를 계속할수록 초국적 기업의 이윤은 확대된다.

2008~2009년 세계경제위기는 이들 초국적 기업들이 어떻게 노동자들을 경쟁시키며 노조를 무력화하고 자신의 이윤을 확보했는지를 보여주었다. 지엠(GM)은 유럽에서 공장 폐쇄를 두고 독일, 영국, 스페인, 벨기에 노동자들을 경쟁시키는가 하면 각국 정부들로부터 공장 유지를 대가로 막대한 구제금융을 요구하기도 했다. 한국에서는 계열사인 지엠대우(GM-Daewoo)에 파생금융상품(선물환 거래) 손실을 입혀 2조원에 달하는 자본을 본사로 이전시키기도 했다. 폴크스바겐(Volkswagens), 도요타(Toyota), 르노닛산(Renuat-Nissan) 등은 미국과 유럽에서 대규모 구조조정을 통해 비용을 절감하고 다른 한 편 중국에서는 사상 유래 없는 대규모 투자를 단행했다. 미국 유럽 일본의 노동조합들은 양보교섭으로 일자리를 유지해야만 했고, 중국의 노동자들은 초국적 기업의 투자만큼 더 많은 노동자가 저임금 노동착취에 시달려야 했다.

이러한 초국적 기업의 국제적 구조조정과 이에 따른 노동자들의 피해는 앞으로가 더 확대될 것으로 보인다. 세계경제위기가 잠시 소강상태에 들어섰지만 미국의 더블딥, 유럽의 재정위기 등으로 한 동안 세계경제는 반복되는 위기를 겪을 가능성이 크기 때문이다. 시장 근본주의자들을 제외하면 대부분의 주류 경제학자들은 최소 3년 이상의 저성장과 반복되는 위기를 예상하고 있다. 저성장 위기 국면에서 초국적 기업들은 작년 이상의 비용절감 경쟁과 생산 이동을 단행할 것이다.

초국적 기업들의 구조조정은 초국적 기업들에게 납품을 하는 여러 기업들에게도 큰 영향을 미친다는 점에서 단순히 몇 몇 기업의 문제가 아니다. 공급 사슬에 있는 기업들은 초국적 기업들의 구조조정을 척도로 하여 연쇄적으로 구조조정을 단행한다. 2000년대부터 시작된 도요타의 30% 비용절감운동이 동남아시아를 비롯한 국제 하청 업체들에게 미친 효과는 이미 널리 알려져 있다. 한국의 현대기아차그룹(Hyundai-Kia Motors Group)은 2009년 부품사들에게 10% 이상의 단가 인하를 요구했고, 가격 교섭력이 없는 2~3차 하청업체들은 이를 노동자들에게 전가, 노동자들의 실질 임금이 심각하게 하락했다.

경제위기에 따른 초국적 기업의 구조조정은 향후 세계 노동운동에 가장 중요한 쟁점이 될 것이다. 국제적 투기에 따른 부가가치의 이전, 국제적 생산 조정에 따른 고용 문제, 자본 철수를 무기로 한 노조 탄압, 구조조정이 공급 사슬(Supply-chain)에 미치는 파급효과 등 노동운동이 다루어야 할 과제가 만만치 않다. 특히 이들 대부분의 문제가 민족국가 수준에서 다루기 어려운 문제라는 점에서 더욱 그러하다.

2. 한국에서의 초국적 기업의 구조조정과 노동운동의 대응

1) 구조조정의 특징

2009년 이후 세계경제위기 과정에서 한국에 진출해 있는 초국적 기업들 역시 많은 구조조정을 단행했다. 이들 구조조정의 특징은 ① 장기적 구조조정 위한 민주노조 와해 공작 ② 유상감자와 배당금을 통한 자본유출과 자본 철수 등이다.

(1) 장기적 구조조정을 위한 사전 조치: 민주노조 와해 공작

이들 초국적 기업들의 민주노조 탄압은 단기적 임금 노동조건 협상으로 인한 것이라기보다는 장기적 구조조정을 위한 사전 조치 성격이 강하다.

민주노총 금속노조 조합원 중 20%(숫자로는 29,315명. 쌍용차와 지엠대우차 제외시 15,599명)가 초국적 기업에서 일하고 있다. 이들 초국적 기업들은 이전에도 기회만 있으면 민주노조를 탄압해 왔지만 최근 경제 위기 와중에서는 그 정도가 매우 심했다. 발레오전장코리아(Valeo Korea), 파카한일유압, 쓰리엠(3M), 포레시아(FAURECIA), 보워터코리아, 에스피엑스(SPX) 등이 대표적이다.

발레오전장(발레오만도)이 전형적 사례다. 발레오전장은 경제위기 이후 2010년 1/4분기 가동률이 가장 높은 시점에서 생산 차질로 인한 막대한 피해를 감당하며 직장 폐쇄를 단행했다. 2010년 1/4분기는 2009년 생산 저하로 인한 실적 부진을 만회하기 위해 대부분의 제조업 기업들이 가동률을 크게 끌어올리던 시점이었다. 발레오전장 사측이 추진한 서비스부분(경비, 청소, 식당) 아웃소싱은 그리 급할 것도 그렇다고 당시 생산 차질을 감당하면서까지 무리하게 추진할 성질의 것은 아니었다. 오히려 당시 발레오전장 사측은 조합원 대다수와 직접 연관되지 않은 이 문제를 매개로 아웃소싱에 반대하는 노조를 제대로 손 볼 계획이었다. 2009년 프랑스 발레오 본사는 경영위기에 대한 대책으로 국외 공장들에 대한 강력한 구조조정을 발표했었다. 장기적 구조조정 차원에서 민주노조를 먼저 손본 것이다.

(2) 투기적 목적의 인수합병과 자본유출 그리고 한계 상황에서의 자본 철수

많은 초국적기업들이 98년 외환위기 이후 싼 값에 한계 기업을 인수하며 한국에 들어왔다. 발레오전장, 위니아만도, 만도, 쌍용차, 포레시아, 캐리어에어콘, 보워터코리아 등 대부분의 금속노조 사업장이 그러하다. 초국적기업들은 고배당과 유상감자 등을 통해 지속적으로 자본 유출을 진행해 왔다. 그리고 경제 위기 과정에서 매출 감소와 적자가 발생하자 더 이상 자본 유출이 불가능한 기업들은 청산 또는 매각 절차를 밝았다.

쌍용차, 발레오공조는 자본 철수로 인해 노동자들이 대규모로 해고된 사례다. 2004년 쌍용차를 인수한 상하이자동차(SAIC)는 5년간 쌍용차의 기술 유출에만 집중하였다. 상하이자동차는 국내 투자에 관해 2004년 인수 협약, 2005년 특별노사합의, 2006년 특별합의 등을 해왔지만 모두 지키지 않았고, 2009년 경제위기 과정에서 의도적으로 쌍용차를 부도처리하며 한국에서 자본을 철수했다. 발레오공조는 발레오그룹의 국제적 구조조정 계획에 따라 2009년 10월 청산 절차에 들어간 사례다. 발레오그룹은 2003년 대한공조를 인수해 6년 동안 운영하다 영업권만 본사로 이전하고 공장은 부지와 설비를 모두 매각하려 하고 있다.

자본 철수까지 가진 않았지만 배당금과 유상감자 등을 통해 기업을 부실하게 만들고, 구조조정을 통해 짜낼 수 있을 때까지 자본을 쥐어 짜내는 사례는 초국적 기업 대부분에서 보이는 일반적 일이다. 만도의 경우 JP모건의 종이회사 센세이지가 2000년부터 2007년까지 약 8천억 원의 자본을 빼내갔고, 발레오만도의 경우 발레오가 유상감자와 배당을 통해 10년간 약 1,700억 원을 유출한 사례다. 위니아만도 역시 UBS컨소시엄이 99년부터 2005년까지 유상감자와 배당으로 2072억원을 유출했고, 캐리어에어콘 역시 미국 UTC가 같은 기간 당기순이익보다 많은 364억 원을 배당으로 챙겨갔다. 이러한 자본유출은 구조조정으로 이어질 수밖에 없었으며, 이들 기업들은 모두 대대적인 정리 해고와 공장 축소를 단행했었다.

2) 노동운동의 대응

초국적 기업의 구조조정에 맞선 노동자들의 투쟁은 자본 철수 위협, 파업 시 해외공장을 통한 역수입, 모호한 기업 책임자, 자본 유출 및 철수에 대한 제도적 규제 부재 등으로 어려움을 겪었다.

발레오전장의 경우 사측은 노조 파업 전부터 노조가 파업에 들어갈 경우 공장 철수를 하겠다고 협박하여 노조를 흔들었고, 파업 이전부터 주요 납품처였던 현대차에 노조 파업 시 국외공장을 통해 부품을 안정적으로 공급하겠다는 백업플랜(Back Up Plan)을 제시하여 원청의 지지까지 이끌어냈다. 노조가 준법투쟁과 쟁의행위찬반투표를 진행하자 사측은 2월 16일 공격적으로 직장폐쇄를 단행, 98일 동안 직장폐쇄를 계속했고, 이후 경찰은 노조 지도부를 구속했으며, 사측의 공장 철수 협박에 조합원 중 일부가 구사대를 만들어 노조를 이탈하기에 이르렀다. 금속노조 경주지부는 지역 총파업까지 조직하며 대응했지만 발레오 사측은 현대차와 경찰의 비호 속에서 노조 탄압을 지속했고, 현재는 해고자 중심으로 투쟁을 진행 중이다.

캐리어에어컨은 2009년 280여명에 대한 구조조정을 단행했고, 노동조합은 서울과 광주에서 투쟁을 진행했다. 노조는 해고자 복직 문제와 공장 정상화 방안을 가지고 사측과 진정성있게 교섭을 계속했고, 사측과 의견접근을 이루었던 경우도 있지만 한국 사장은 본사 승인 지연을 이유로 교섭을 계속 회피하였다. 이러한 계열사 사장의 책임 회피는 지엠대우나 위니아만도의 사례에서도 볼 수 있는데, 노조와의 중요한 교섭 체결 시마다 본사 승인을 이유로 들어 교섭을 회피하거나 거부하는 사례가 다반사다.

회사청산절차로 100여명의 조합원이 해고된 발레오공조노조는 본사와의 직접교섭 요구를 들고 프랑스 본사로 4차례의 원정투쟁을 진행했다. 프랑스노총(CGT)의 연대투쟁과 유럽발레오종업원평의회의 협조가 있었지만 발레오사측은 한국 노동자와는 대화를 하지 않겠다며 교섭을 회피하고 있는 상황이다. 2009년 프랑스 정부가 구제금융을 통해 살려낸 발레오그룹은 당시 노사정 협상에서 프랑스 고용을 최대한 유지하고 필요할 시 국외공장부터 구조조정을 하기로 약조한 상태였다. 사실상 프랑스 노조들도 쉽사리 나설 수 없는 상황이 되어버린 것이다. 상하이자동차가 철수하고 법정관리 상태에서 공장 점거 투쟁으로 정부 공적 자금 투입과 고용보장을 요구한 쌍용차노조는 중국 노동자 운동이 미약한 상황에서 국제적 대응은 시도 해보지도 못한 경우다. 현재 인도 마힌드라그룹이 쌍용차 인수 협상을 산업은행과 하고 있다. 하지만 공장 안은 어용노조가 장악한 상태이며 해고자와 무급휴직자 중심으로 구성된 노조만으로는 교섭을 여는 것조차 쉽지 않은 상황인데다가, 인도 마힌드라그룹의 노조가 노사협조적 기업노조인 관계로 국제적 공조도 쉽지 않은 악조건이다.

3. 일보전진을 위한 과제들

한국에서 초국적 기업들은 제조업에서만 약 20만 명의 노동자를 고용하고 있다. 한국 민주노조운동의 중심인 금속노조에는 55개 사업장 3만여 명의 조합원이 초국적기업에서 일하고 있다. 경제위기가 빈번하게 발생할 앞으로의 정세에서 초국적기업에 대한 대응 전략이 절박한 이유다. 자본이 국적에 따라 노동자에 대한 태도가 달라지는 것은 아니지만, 초국적 기업은 자본의 이동성과 투기성이 국내 자본에 비해 더욱 심하다는 점에서 특별한 대응이 필요할 수밖에 없다.

국제적으로 초국적 기업에 대한 대응 전략은 크게 국제기본협약(IFA) 체결, OECD가이드라인 등을 통한 국제기구 제소, 노동조합 네트워크를 통한 연대 투쟁 등이 있었다. 하지만 국제기본협약은 지금까지 그 대부분이 강제력 없는 권고사항이나 임금 노동조건 고용에 결정적 역할을 할 수 있는 조항이 부재함에 따라 한계적이었고, OECD가이드라인이나 ILO조항 등은 사실상 국가를 강제할 수단이 없어 사문화되고 있는 실정이다. 초국적 기업의 노동조합 국제 네트워크들 역시 대부분이 정보 공유와 몇 번의 캠페인에 그치고 있다. 아직 노동운동은 자본만큼 세계화하고 있지 못하다.

하지만 이러함에도 초국적기업에 맞서 투쟁하고 있는 노동운동이 다수 존재하고, 세계 곳곳에서 간헐적이나마 승리의 소식을 전해오기도 한다. 작년부터 올해까지 3천여명의 캐나다 구리 광산 조합원들이 브라질 발레(Vale)의 광산 폐쇄에 맞서 국제적 연대 호소와 끈질긴 투쟁으로 승리한 예나, 프랑스 4천여 조합원들이 독일 컨티넨탈(Continental)그룹의 타이어 공장폐쇄에 맞서 대규모 원정 투쟁과 지역적 국제적 연대 속에 승리한 예 등이 있다.

국제적으로 승리한 투쟁들과 한국에서 진행 중인 투쟁들을 평가해 보면 몇 가지 교훈이 있는 것 같다.

첫째, 노동조합의 대응은 구조조정 발생 이전부터 이루어져야 한다는 것이다. 초국적기업의 구조조정은 국제적 수준에서 진행되기 때문에 구조조정이 막상 진행되면 노동조합의 마땅한 대응 수단이 별로 없게 된다. 구조조정 발생 이전부터 초국적 기업 각국의 노동자들이 국제적 교류를 통해 정보를 교환하며 국제적 구조조정의 진행 과정과 대응방안을 함께 논의하는 것이 중요하다. 국제기본협약 체결이나 세계종업원평의회구성이 그 매개가 될 수도 있을 것이고, 이러한 것들이 쉽지 않을 경우 노동조합의 국제적 네트워크를 국제노동조직 또는 각국의 총연맹 혹은 산별노조를 통해서 교류를 추진해 볼 수도 있을 것이다.

둘째, 국내에서의 강고한 투쟁과 동시에 국제적 차원의 연대가 함께 진행되어야 한다는 것이다. 초국적 기업이 국내 노동조합을 무력화시키는 가장 강력한 무기 중 하나는 국제적 생산 조정이다. 국내에서 강고한 투쟁은 국제적 연대를 통해 초국적 기업이 함부로 생산을 이동하지 못하도록 해야 효과를 발휘할 수 있다. 구조조정 해당 사업장의 원정투쟁을 통해서일수도 있고, 사전에 조직된 네트워크를 통한 국제 캠페인일 수도 있다.

셋째, 각국의 노동 조건 차이, 투쟁 문화 차이, 언어 차이, 노조 수준의 차이 등으로 기업 수준의 네트워크가 쉽지 않은 경우가 대부분이니 만큼 총연맹이 초국적기업의 모국 총연맹과 대화를 꾸준하게 진행해나가며 장기적 차원에서 초국적 기업 대응 전략을 다양한 수준에서 마련해야 한다. 초국적 기업 노조의 국제적 재조직화를 장기 전략 과제로 추진해 나가 보는 것이다. 자본의 자유무역협정에 버금가는 노총 간의 연대투쟁협정이 필요하다.

초국적 자본에 맞선 국제적 전략:토론을 위한 몇 가지 논의 제기

우리가 익히 알고 있듯이 초국적 자본은 한국과 브라질, 그리고 세계 모든 곳에서 노동 조건 악화와 노동조합 탄압의 선두에 서있다. 초국적 자본이 노동 탄압에 성공적인 이유는 세계의 노동자들을 바닥을 향한 경주로 내몰 수 있는 능력 때문인데, 공장폐쇄와 생산 재배치 그리고 국제적 아웃소싱 등을 이용한 협박은 노조가 양보교섭을 통해 임금과 노동조건 하락을 받아들일 수밖에 없도록 만든다.

분명 초국적 자본을 규제하기 위한 법과 제도는 강화되어야 한다. OECD가이드라인은 이에 동의한 국가들에서 초국적 기업의 ‘기업 책임’에 대한 기본적 원리를 제공한다. 그러나 가이드라인은 법적 구속력이 없기 때문에 노동운동이나 시민사회가 정부를 압박하여 초국적 기업에 대한 강제를 하거나 자국의 법과 규제를 강화하도록 해야 한다.

국제노조들과 유럽종업원평의회는 국제기본협약(IFA)을 통해 초국적 기업에 대한 압력을 제도화하려 했었다. 국제기본협약은 생산지와 종종 공급 사슬 전체에서 노동자들의 일반적 노동 조건과 권리를 담고 있다. 노동권과 관련한 대부분의 내용은 국제노동기구(ILO)의 핵심 조약을 따른다. 하지만 이들 국제기본협약 역시 강제력에서 한계를 가지는데 특히 노동조합과 노동 관계법이 약한 지역에서 그러하다. 이러한 점에서 강한 지역적 국제적 노동자운동이 있을 때만이 국제기본협약이 상징적 협약 이상의 것이 될 수 있다는 것은 분명하다.

한국에서 발레오전장, 쌍용자동차, 캐리어에어콘 등 많은 초국적기업들은 자본 이동의 자유를 통해 반노동자적 행태를 일삼고 있다. 이들 기업의 노동자들은 수많은 싸움을 만들었지만, 일국  작업장 수준에 한정되어 있는 노동자 조직은 초국적 자본의 국제적 조직에 맞서 성공적인 투쟁을 만들지는 못하고 있다. 예를 들어 국제적 수준의 생산 재조정에 대한 정보 부족으로 뒤늦게 공장 폐쇄와 해고에 대응할 경우 투쟁은 효과적이지 못하다. 또한 원정투쟁 시 본사가 있는 국가에서의 대중적 압력이 없을 경우 구조조정 정책을 바꾸기에는 한계적인 경우가 다반사다. 저개발 국가의 저임금 노동으로 인해 일자리를 둘러싼 남과 북의 노동자들이 갈등적 상황이 되기도 한다. 여러 국가에서 진행되는 초국적 기업의 자본 축적 전략에 대해 각국의 노동자들이 공동의 인식을 갖추지 못한다면 이러한 갈등과 한계는 피할 수 없다.

이러한 한계를 넘어서기 위해 초국적 기업과 이에 종속된 공급 사슬에 있는 각국 노동자들은 강고한 국제적 연대를 만들어야 한다. 브라질노총의 노력은 초국적 기업의 노동자들의 연대를 발전시키기 위한 몇 가지 좋은 예를 보여준다. 2001년부터 브라질노총은 ABN Amro Bank, Dow Chemical, 월마트 등에서 노동조합 네트워크를 만들어 왔다. 이 네트워크의 노동조합들은 임금 조건, 노동자 경영 참여, 노동 조건 그리고 공동 행동 계획에 대해 토론해 왔다. 2008년부터는 브리질노총과 프랑스노총(CGT)이 7개의 초국적 기업에 대한 노조 네트워크와 공동 투쟁 강화를 위한 전략적 대화를 시작하기도 했다. 브라질 기업 발레(Vale)가 캐나다에서 작업장 폐쇄와 구조조정을 진행했을 때 국제적 연대가 효과적 힘을 발휘한 사례도 최근에 있었다.

우린는 오늘 이 자리에서 한국과 세계 각국에서 초국적 기업에 맞선 효과적 투쟁을 진행하기 위한 몇 가지 전략들을 토론해 볼 수 있을 것이다.

1) 초국적 기업의 구조조정과 국제적 생산 재조정, 각국의 노동 조건과 관계법, 노동자 투쟁 등에 관한 정보 공유

정보 공유를 중심으로 국제적 연대를 재조직하려는 흐름은 이미 몇 몇 곳에서 나타나고 있다. 남반구연대회의(SIGTUR)는 인터넷 UnionBook에서 초국적 기업에 맞선 투쟁 그룹을 만들었다. 새로운 노조강화 네트워크는 각국의 노조 정보를 수집하기 시작했고, 초국적 기업의 생산 네트워크에 속해있는 노동자들의 상태와 노동조합 현황, 여러 노동자투쟁들에 관한 정보를 분석하려 하고 있다.

2) 국제기본협약, OECD가이드라인 등 국제적 수단들에 관한 검토

2008년 2월 현재 83개의 국제기본협약이 체결되어있다. 대부분은 유럽계 기업들과 국제노동조직이 맺은 협약이다. 국제기본협약이 체결되어 있는 경우 이를 국내에서 강제할 수 있는 방법을 찾을 수도 있다.(예를 들면 르노 삼성의 경우 2004년에 국제금속노련, 르노 종업원 평의회, 7개의 유럽 노조들과 기본협약을 체결했고, 이 국제기본협약은 기술적으로는 세계 모든 공장에 적용된다. 이를 이용하여 무노조 정책을 고수하고 있는 르노삼성을 압박할 수 있는 방법을 찾아 볼 수 있을 것이다.)

OECD가이드라인의 경우 강제력이 없지만 노동조합과 시민단체가 OECD 국내사무소(NCP)를 통해 초국적 기업의 노동 탄압에 대해 문제제기를 할 수는 있다. 물론 한국의 OECD국내사무소는 정부 담당자 한 명이 전임도 아닌 상태로 운영하고 있어 그 실효성이 매우 떨어지는 상황이다. 각국의 실제 국내사무소 운영 방식에 대해서 조사가 필요하고, 제소를 통해 문제를 해결한 예가 있다면 이 역시 국제적으로 공유되어야 한다.

3) 각국 노조가 개별적으로 진행하는 임단협 투쟁에 대한 공동 전략

1990년대부터 유럽 노동조합들(특히 금속)은 단체협상 전략을 공동으로 토론하기 위한 초국적 네트워크를 발전시켰다. 예를 들면 스웨덴, 노르웨이, 핀란드, 덴마크의 노르디스카(Nordiska) 금속 네트워크나 독일 인근 국가들과 독일금속노조의 네트워크 등이 있다. 이 네트워크를 이용하여 정기적으로 단체협상 전략을 토론하고 공동 행동 계획을 수립한다. 네트워크에서는 직업훈련부터 파업 지지 방안까지 다양한 내용들이 토론된다. 이러한 공동 투쟁이 가능한 것은 지리적 인접성과 더불어 유럽 통합 과정과 유럽금속노련(EMF), 유럽노총(ETUC)이 적극적으로 각국의 임단협 투쟁을 조율하기 때문이다.

유럽의 공동 임단협 투쟁이 다른 지역에 그대로 적용될 수는 없겠지만 각국의 노조들간 좀 더 안정적인 커뮤니케이션이 가져다 줄 수 있는 이점은 생각해 볼만한 것이다. 몇 몇 연구자들의 경우는 초국적 기업의 노동자들이 공동의 여건과 동질감을 가질 수 있도록 만드는 것 자체가 국제 노동자 운동에 있어 가장 중요한 일 중 하나라고 강조한다. 안정적 네트워크를 통한 일상적인 정보 공유와 공동 전략에 대한 토론은 노동자들의 단결과 공동행동 발전에 가장 중요한 지점이다.

4) 초국적 기업을 압박하기 위한 사회운동과의 연대

몇 몇 시민사회단체들은 아시아초국적기업감시네트워크(Asian Transnational Corportation Monitoring Network)와 같은 조직을 만들어 초국적 기업을 감시하고 초국적 기업의 노동권 탄압에 반대하는 캠페인을 펼치고 있다. 초국적 기업의 노동조합들은 이러한 사회운동과의 연대를 강화해야 한다. 우리가 알고 있듯이 시민사회의 지지가 없다면 초국적 기업와 맞서 싸우는 일은 더욱 어려워진다.

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공장폐쇄, 정리해고, 노조 탄압을 막기 위한 노동조합의 다양한 대응 방식은 궁극적으로는 노동자들의 힘을 배가하기 위함이다. 이 과정에서 초국적 기업에 대한 여러 제도적 규제 역시 획득할 수 있을 것이다. 물론 초국적 기업은 자본의 가장 강력한 힘을 대표하는 만큼 노동자들이 투쟁해 승리한다는 것 역시 쉽지 않은 일이다. 하지만 초국적 기업에 맞선 국제적 연대투쟁과 세계 노동운동의 중장기적 연대는 대안세계를 만들어 가는 노동운동에 새로운 기회이기도 하다.

피아트 그룹의 포밀리아노 공장 구조조정 방안 및 금속산업사용자단체의 2008년 금속노동자 전국 단체협약 이탈에 관한 제1노총-금속연맹의 입장

FIOM-CGIL

2010년 6월 11일 피아트(FIAT) 그룹은 입실론(Ypsilon)을 생산하던 테르미니 이메레세 공장 가동을 중단하고 2011년 말 폴란드로 생산 기지를 이전하는 방안을 확정했다. 경영진이 공장 이전 외에 어떠한 대안도 제시하지 않은 탓에, 이 결정에 따라 이탈리아 남부 시칠리아에서 가장 중요한 생산 기지가 폐쇄될 전망이다. 그 결과 2,200명의 일자리가 당장 사라지고 실업·반실업자가 대대적으로 늘어나는 문제가 야기될 것이다.

동시에 피아트 그룹은 [폴란드 공장에서 생산되던] 판다(Panda)를 2012년 초부터 (나폴리 인근 캄파니아 지역의) 포밀리아노(Pomigliano) 공장에서 양산하기 위해 이 공장에 7억 유로를 투자할 의향이 있다고 발표했다. 그 조건으로 사측은 노조가 도저히 수용할 수 없는 노동시간 재조정 방안을 협상 대상으로 제시했다. 이는 금속노동자전국단체협약을 이탈하고 보건·안전 및 교대제에 관한 여타 법령을 위반하는 것이다.

사측이 제시한 조건은 대략 다음과 같다.

- 중식 시간이나 휴일을 줄여서 연간 40-120 시간에 달하는 초과근로를 실시한다. 이는 40시간 노동주를 1주 연장하는 효과를 끼쳐 [8시간 노동일일 경우 하루 24시간의 1/3을 노동하므로 1년 52주의 1/3에 해당하는 17주를 노동하는 셈인데 여기에 1주를 더한] ‘18주차 근무제’가 새로 창출되는 셈이다. 배송망의 비효율성이 문제인데도 사측은 생산을 늘리겠다고 하고 있다.

- 조립 라인 휴게 시간을 1일 40분에서 30분으로 단축한다.

- 피아트 그룹은 노동자가 교대근무나 노동일 사이에 최소한 11시간을 휴식해야 한다는 법률을 위반할 가능성도 있다.

- 사측은 법률에 기초한 금속노동자전국단체협약에 따른 보건·안전 관련 수당을 지불하지 않을 가능성도 있다.

- 사측은 숙련도와 무관하게 직무를 변경할 수도 있다.

- 사측은 순환 배치나 교육 훈련제도를 활용하지 않은 채 구조조정을 위해 CIG(해고자 임시 보호책)를 2년간 활용할 것이다.

또한 피아트 사측 안은 노조는 물론 노동자대표들과 개별 노동자들에게 많은 제재를 부과할 것이 분명하다. 노조에 따르면 사측의 구조조정 안은 각종 근로조건을 위반하는 것은 물론 단체교섭권을 무효화하고 심지어 파업 및 해고에 관한 이탈리아 헌법 조항마저 위반할 소지가 크다.

[카톨릭 계열인] 제2노총-금속연맹(FIM-CISL), [공화·사회민주당 계열인] 제3노총-금속연맹(UILM-UIL), [독립노조인] FISMIC, [우익 계열인] UGL 등은 구조조정 안에 동의한 반면, [좌파 계열인] 제1노총-금속연맹(FIOM-CGIL)은 이 제안을 수용할 수 없다고 선언하고 피아트에게 본 안과 관련한 성실 교섭을 개시할 것을 촉구했다.

상기 조건과 관련한 협상은 불가능하다는 피아트의 입장을 보건대, 피아트는 금속노동자전국단체협약을 무력화하는 것은 물론 노사관계 전반을 근본적으로 변형하려는 의도를 가진 것 같다. 실제로 피아트는 이탈리아 국내 모든 공장에서 근로조건 관련 협약 변경을 요구했을 뿐만 아니라 금속산업사용자단체(Federmeccanica)에게 자신들이 금속노동자전국단체협약에서 이탈하여 자동차 부문(이탈리아의 경우 피아트가 유일하다)에만 적용되는 별도의 전국단체협약을 체결할 것이라는 사실을 통보한 바 있다.

제1노총-금속연맹은 금속노동자전국단체협약·노동법·헌법의 적용을 받지 않을 경우에만 이탈리아 국내에 투자하겠다는 피아트의 입장에 반대하고 있다. 이는 시작에 불과하다. 위기 탈출 방안으로 노동권 축소, 임금 삭감, 사회법·헌법 수정이 줄줄이 이뤄지고 있다. 피아트 그룹이 2010년 4월 21일 발표한 계획을 검토한 뒤, 제1노총-금속연맹은 이탈리아 자동차산업 및 고용을 방어·강화하기 위해 가능한 모든 방안을 발전시켜야 한다고 생각하고 있다. [일례로] 우리는 공적 개입을 통해 전기차와 같은 ‘지속 가능한 이동수단’ 또는 ‘청정기술’과 같은 방안이 협상안에 포함될 것을 요구한다.

피아트 그룹은 포밀리아노 공장에서 근로조건과 생산 조직에 관해 체결된 모든 협약을 무효화하겠다고 통보했다.

금속노동자전국단체협약에 따르면 기업은 직장협의회(RSU)와의 협의를 통해서 ‘18주차 근무제’ 노동시간을 조정할 수 있고 노동자 당 40시간의 초과근로를 변경 배치할 수 있다.

이런 방식으로도 피아트가 포밀리아노 공장에 대한 투자를 공언하면서 제시한 조건인, 연간 판다 28만대 생산, 매일 3교대제로 1,050대의 차량 생산이라는 목표를 달성할 수 있다. 만일 피아트가 이런 방식으로 금속노동자전국단체협약을 이행한다면, 제1노총-금속연맹은 이에 반대하지 않을 것이다. 하지만 피아트가 이에 동의하지 않는다면 이들은 유연하고 상생 가능한 생산을 목표하지 않고 금속노동자전국단체협약과 노동자권리법(노동부장관 사코니와 경제부장관 크레모니가 공포한 법령 300/1970)에서 빠져나가는 것을 목표하고 있음이 분명하다.

나아가 제1노총-금속연맹은 금속노동자전국단체협약의 이탈이나 또는 양도 불가능한 권리에 관한 논의는 국가 수준이든 기업 수준이든 협상 대상이 아니라는 점을 재확인한다. 단체협약의 이탈이나 노사관계 법령 변경이 노동자에게 일자리를 지킬 것인지 아니면 (파업, 보건·안전, 근로조건, 단체교섭과 관련한 헌법상의 권리를 포함하는) 노동자로서 자신의 권리를 포기할 것인지를 강요하는 공갈 협박이 되어서는 안 되기 때문이다. [양도할 수 없는] 노동자의 권리는 이탈리아의 자유와 민주주의의 특징이다.

이상의 이유로 제1노총-금속연맹은 피아트 포밀리아노 공장 및 그룹 전체에 관한 구조조정 방안을 수용할 수 없다.

제1노총-금속연맹은 설비 활용, 시장 변동에 조응하는 노동시간 신축화, 근로조건 및 노동권을 보호하면서도 품질과 생산성을 향상시킬 수 있는 직제 등을 허용하는 단체협약을 통해 포밀리아노 공장의 신축성과 효율성을 보증할 수 있음을 재확인한다.

우리는 금속노동자전국단체협약과 현행 법률을 준수하면서도 이러한 목적을 달성할 수 있다는 것을 재확인하며 이에 기초하여 성실 교섭에 임할 것을 피아트에게 요구한다.

피아트는 애당초 협상 대상이 될 수 없었던 제안에 대해 제1노총-금속연맹이 합의하도록 강제하기 위해 포밀리아노 공장 구조조정 안에 조인한 여타 연맹들로 하여금 노동자 총투표를 실시하도록 촉구했다. 피아트는 총투표 결과가 자기 생각대로 나올 것이라고 믿었다.  (언제나 제1노총-금속연맹이 요구했던) 전국적 단체협약에 관한 노동자 총투표를 대개 반대해왔음에도 불구하고, FIM, UILM, FISMIC, UGL은 보건·안건 및 파업권과 같은 양도할 수 없는 노동자의 권리에 대해 투표를 부치는 것을 반대하는 제1노총-금속연맹의 주장을 무시하고 실제로 이 총투표를 조직했다. 포밀리아노 공장에서 제1노총-금속연맹이 대표하는 노동자 비율이 20%에 불과한 데다 여타 연맹들과 언론, 지역 관청 등 모든 이들이 대대적인 캠페인을 펼쳤음에도 불구하고, 포밀리아노 전체 노동자의 36%, 생산직 노동자의 40% 이상이 피아트의 안에 반대표를 던졌다. 이는 피아트가 예상한 결과가 아니었다. 하지만 그에 대한 [사측의] 반응은 여전히 불투명하다. 기존 포밀리아노 공장을 대체하여 공장을 신축할지, 공장 가동을 중단할지, 아니면 특례 규정에 따라 CIG 형식으로 채용을 제한할지 등등 여러 가능성이 분분한 가운데, 피아트는 언론에 이탈리아 국내 공장의 수익성이 없다고 떠들어대고 있다.

피아트가 포밀리아노 공장에서 금속노동자전국단체협약을 이탈하고 이탈리아 헌법이 보장하는 노동기본권을 부정하는 것은 정부와 사용자단체가 시도하는 포괄적인 위기 대처 전략의 일부다.

이탈리아 정부와 경총(Confindustria)은 몇 달간 위기의 악화를 최소화할 수 있었다. 이들은 이를 경기 회복으로 호도하며 부적절한 낙관주의를 유포하면서도 고용 안전성을 위한 어떠한 조치도 취하지 않았다. 현재 위기 비용은 남부지역을 시작으로 해서 노동자계급, 퇴직자, 실업자, 사회 취약집단에게 전적으로 전가되고 있다.

정부가 취한 수단은 전국적 단체협약에 대한 공격에서 그 전략이 잘 드러난다. 정부가 제안한 노동자권리법 개정안은 사용자에게 해고를 자유롭게 허용할뿐더러 현행 노동권을 해체하는 모든 수단을 허용하고 있다. 정부는 이탈리아 공화국 헌법이 보장하는 연대의 기본 원리를 부정함으로써 위기에 대처하려 하고 있다. 헌법 원리가 낡아빠져 오늘날 현실에 부합하지 않다는 식으로 말이다.

“기업의 자유”라는 이름으로 행해지는 헌법 제41조에 대한 공격은 노동자권리법과 전국적 단체협약에 대한 공격과 병행하고 있다.

포밀리아노 총투표가 실시되기 전, [제1노총-금속연맹을 제외한] 노동조합들이 피아트의 안을 지지하면서 금속노동자전국단체협약의 이탈이 예외적 사례라고 말하는 와중에, 금속산업사용자단체는 제1노총-금속연맹을 제외한 모든 노조를 불러 모아 금속노동자전국단체협약의 이탈을 위한 협상을 벌였다. 그 결과 매우 짧은 “교섭” 후에 (제1노총-금속연맹을 제외한) 전국 단위 금속연맹들은 사측이 금속노동자전국단체협약을 이탈할 수 있도록 허용하는 협약에 조인했는데, 이는 사실상 전국적 단체협약의 ‘사망’을 수용한 것이었다.

제1노총-금속연맹은 이러한 상황에 맞서 여러 방식으로 투쟁하고 있다.

- 법률 영역에서는 금속산업사용자단체와 개별 기업들의 금속노동자전국단체협약 위반을 고소·고발하고 있다.

- 교섭 영역에서는 금속노동자단체협약에 입각하여 기업 수준에서 단협을 체결하도록 노력하고 있다.

- 투쟁 동원의 경우, 10월 16일 로마에서 개최된 대중집회를 비롯하여 기업 및 전국적 수준에서 여러 투쟁이 진행되고 있다.

10월 로마 집회는 비단 노동자들이나 금속연맹, 제1노총뿐만 아니라 여타 사회운동들에게도 중요한 투쟁이었다. 수많은 학생, 연구자, 비정규노동자, 다양한 조직들과 사회운동이 모여서 연대의 메시지를 보냈다. 남한·스페인·프랑스·세르비아·미국·브라질·남아공 금속연맹 등 다수의 해외 노조와 국제금속연맹·유럽금속연맹 등 국제노조연맹체도 연대의 뜻을 표했다.

일자리를 갖거나 유지하기 위해 노동자들은 자신의 기본권을 포기해야 한다. 정부와 사용자는 이러한 경제·사회 체계를 강요한다.

민간·공공 부문을 불문하고 공격이 총체적으로 이뤄지고 있다. 공공기관의 임금 동결은 민간 부문 임금에 대한 공격을 예고한다. 모든 부문과 영역을 망라하여 복지가 축소되고 있다. 연금 수령 연령이 계속 늘어나고 있고, 여성들은 출산 휴가에서 큰 피해를 입고 있다. 고용, 특히 청년고용 문제는 앞으로 더욱 심각해질 것이다. 하지만 부유층은 정부가 취한 위기 대응 조치 중에서 단 한푼도 부담하지 않았다.

단체교섭 이슈는 노동 분야는 물론 국가 전체적으로도 민주주의 이슈와 긴밀히 연관된다.

민주주의는 시간 낭비가 아닌 것이다! 수십년 동안 투쟁을 통해 쟁취한 전국적 단체협약을 금속산업사용자단체가 한 순간에 해지하려는 것에서 잘 알 수 있듯이, 민주주가 없다면 독재가 판치고 사회관계가 쇠퇴하여 노동자들이 자신의 의사를 표출할 능력을 부정당할 것이다.

우리는 노동자가 단협에 대해 투표로 결정할 수 있는 권리를 주장한다. 이와 함께 사측과 동등한 조건에서 근로조건을 규정하는 데 참여할 수 있는 권리를 주장한다. 따라서 우리는 헌법에 보장된 파업권에 대한 공격에 반대한다. 또 노동조합의 대표성에 관한 의안을 발의하고 직장 내 대표성에 관한 토론을 제안할 것이다.

노동의 사회적·경제적 가치에 대한 인정은 인간 존엄의 기초를 이룬다. 그것은 노동자를 단결하게 하고 내부 경쟁을 넘어 연대를 지지하며 사회 정의를 주장한다.

노동자는 필요할 때 쓰다가 버리는 상품이 아니다. 비정규 노동은 금세기 착취의 대명사가 되었다. 안정적인 일자리를 가진 사람들도 시장 수요에 따라 언제든 위험에 처할 수 있다. 계약직이나 실업자는 말할 것도 없다. 이러한 고용 불안의 결과 점점 더 사회적 안전이 파괴되고 민주주의가 흔들리고 있다.

전국적 단체교섭의 규칙으로부터의 이탈은 단체협약의 해지로 귀결되고 있다. 단체협약이 없다면, 노사관계는 노동자를 상품으로 매매하는 상거래와 비슷해질 것이다. 이는 약 두 세기에 걸쳐 발전해온 노동법의 종말을 의미한다.

단체교섭에는 노사 쌍방이 신뢰에 기초해서 대등한 조건에서 벌이는 협상과 분쟁이라는 의미, 그리고 필요할 경우 사회적 중재라는 의미까지 포함된다. 단체교섭은 동일노동에 대해 동등한 권리를 제공하고 과잉착취를 방지한다. 또 사용자에게 성실 교섭 의무를 부과하고 노동자의 근로·생계 조건을 개선한다. 이런 이유로 권리·민주주의·정당성·노동을 보호하기 위해서는 우선 단체교섭이 보호되어야 한다.

2010년 11월 로마에서

TNC Structural Adjustment and the South Korean Workers Movement’s Strategy for Resistance

Jiwon Han

Research Director

Research Institute for Alternative Workers Movements

1. Why Transnational Corporations are a Problem

Transnational Corporations' (TNCs) greatest power arises from the mobility of capital, which transcends national boundaries. Financial capital's most basic maneuver is to move capital as necessary to profit from changes in stock markets and exchange rates. More than 90% of all international transactions are financial transactions, which have nothing to do with the real economy. Industrial capital with large tangible assets has less facility of movement than financial capital, but it also maximizes profits through the movement of capital, adjusting international production networks based on the state of local markets and the cost of labor. Moreover, transnational manufacturing corporations are adept at financial speculation, including trading of export-import derivatives, the use of financial subsidiaries to speculate on assets, and the mobilization of private equity funds for acquisitions and mergers. The globalization of capital after the 1980s has made it impossible to distinguish between financial and industrial capital as it was in the past.

TNCs' power is also based in the limitations of the labor movement, which generally operates at the level of individual nation-states. TNC's surplus profits are the result of the surplus exploitation of workers. The more workers in different countries compete to reach the highest production rates and hold onto jobs in a race to the bottom, the more TNCs' profits expand.

The economic crisis of 2008-9 demonstrated well the way in which TNCs force workers into competition with one another, incapacitating unions and secure profits. For example, GM announced the possibility of plant closures in Europe, forcing workers in Germany, the U.K., Spain and Belgium to compete with each other, while at the same time demanding massive relief funds from thoese countries' governments to keep production sites open. GM forced damages from derivatives (forward exchange transactions) onto its South Korean GM subsidiary GM-Dawoo, making it transfer capital worth 2 trillion won to the head company. Volkwagen, Toyota and Renuat-Nissan carried out massive structural adjustment in the U.S. and Europe to reduce costs, while at the same time invested an unprecedented amount in China. Unions in the U.S., Europe and Japan were forced into concessions bargaining in order to save jobs, while in China increased investment meant that many more workers suffering exploitative low wages.

The victimization of workers by TNC structural adjustment can only be expected to worsen. This is because although the global economy has entered a period of respite, it is likely to relapse into repeated crises in the future do to the United State's 'double dip' and fiscal crises in European countries. Most mainstream economists, save for market fundamentalists, predict low growth and repeating crises for at least the next 3 years. Faced with these prospects TNCs will most likely complete to reduce costs and relocate of production on an even greater scale than last year.

TNCs' structural adjustment measures have a large impact on their suppliers as well as their production sites. They cannot, therefore, be considered merely the problem of a few large firms. Companies along supply chains carry out consecutive structural adjustment in pace with the structural adjustment carried out by TNCs. For example, in 2000 Toyota began a campaign to reduce costs by 30%. The massive impact of these measures on subcontractors around the world, particularly in South East Asia, is well known. In 2009 the South Korean Hyundai-Kia Motors Group demanded a 10% reduction in unite price from suppliers. Second and third-tier subcontractors, who lacked the power to bargain for higher prices, passed this burden onto workers, resulting in a drastic reduction in real wages.

In the future, TNC structural adjustment in reaction to the economic crisis will become the most important issue facing the global labor movement. Transfer of value added through international speculation, unemployment due to readjustment of production systems on an international scale, repression of labor through the withdrawal of capital, ripple effects through supply chains caused by structural adjustment--these are all grave issues the labor movement must confront. The fact that most of them cannot be effectively dealt with at the national level makes them all the more difficult and pressing.

2. TNC Structural Adjustment and Labor's Response in South Korea

1) Characteristics of Structural Adjustment

TNCs with production sites in South Korea began to carry out structural adjustment in response to the economic crisis in 2009. The particularities of this structural adjustment include: 1) measures to bring about the collapse of democratic unions for the purposes of long-term structural adjustment, 2) capital outflow through reduction of capital stock by payment in cash and high dividends/or the withdrawal of capital.

(1) Preparation for long-term structural adjustment: attack on democratic unions

TNCs' repression of democratic unions have had less to do with immediate negotiations on wages and working conditions than with preparations for long-term structural adjustment.

20% of the members of the KCTU-affiliated Korean Metal Workers' Union (KMWU) work at TNC production sites. (In actual numbers, this amounts to 29,315 union members, 15,599 not including Ssangyong Motors and GM-Dawoo workers). While in the past these TNCs used every opportunity presented to them to repress Korean unions, the level of repressio became much more severe after the economic crisis began. Valeo Electronics System Korea, Parker Hydraulics, 3M, Faurecia, Bowater Korea and SPX all exhibited this trend.

In the first quarter of 2010, when is operating ratio was the highest, Valeo Electronics Korea experienced serious losses due to production shortfalls and closed its production site. During the first quarter of 2010 most manufacturing firms were increasing operating ratios in order to make up for production losses in 2009. The management of  Valeo Electronics Korea started outsourcing services at the production site (security, cleaning, cafeteria workers), despite the fact that it was also dealing with production shortfalls. While most union members had no direct relationship to the issue of outsourcing, Valeo's management used the fact that the union opposed outsourcing as an excuse to attack it. In 2009 the Valeo head company in France had announced plans for intensive structural adjustment at overseas production sites as a means for dealing with an operational crisis. In Korea, it sought to out the union out of commission in order to enable this long-term structural adjustment.

(2) Speculation-oriented acquisitions and mergers and capital diversion; Withdrawal of  capital in limit situations

After the foreign exchange crisis of 1998 many TNCs entered South Korea by acquiring bankrupted corporations at fire sale prices. These moves primarily affected workplaces in the metal sector including Valeo, WiniaMando, Mando, Ssangyong Motors, Faurecia, Carrier Aircon and Bowater Korea. TNCs diverted  capital outflow through payment of high dividends and reduction of capital stock by payment in cash . Moreover, once the experienced reduction of sales and deficits during the economic crisis made the outward diversion of capital impossible, these TNCs moved forward with the liquidation or sale of production sites.

SAIC signed a contract of acquisition in 2004, a special agreement between labor and management in 2005 and a special agreement in 2006, but it did not uphold any of them. In 2009 it filed for bankruptcy and withdrew from Korea. In October 2009, Valeo Climate Control carried out liquidation procedures in accordance with Valeo Group's international structural adjustment plan. Valeo Group had taken over Daehan Gongjo in 2004. After operating the company for 6 years it transferred operation jurisdiction to the head company and is now planning to sell the plant land and equipment.

While not always going as far as to withdraw capital, most TNCs make it a normal practice to drive a given production site to the brink of bankruptcy through the payment of dividends and reduction of capital stock by payment in cash, and to strangle them to the last breadth through structural adjustment. In the case of Mando, JP Moran's paper company Sensage squeezed out 800 billion won during the period from 2000 to 2007. In the case of Valeo-Mando, Valeo squeezed out 170 billion won over the course of 10 years through payment of dividends and reduction of capital stock by payment in cash. UBS Consortium diverted 207.2 billion won from WiniaMando during the period from 1999 to 2005 The U.S.-based TNC UTC brought in 36.4 billion won through payment of dividends, more than it made in net profits during the same period. This sort of capital outflow can only but lead to structural adjustment; all of these factories carried out large-scale layoffs and downsizing.

2) The Labor Movement's Response

With lack of institutional regulations concerning the threat of capital withdrawal, regaining profits through overseas production sites during strikes, the party responsible in the case of a labor dispute, and the diversion and withdrawal of capital, the workers' movement has faced an uphill battle.

In the case of Valeo Electronics Korea, management used the threat that the factory would be closed down in the event of a strike against the union, even before a strike was declared. It also informed Hyundai Motors, its main customer, of its 'backup plan' to securely supply parts through overseas factories in the event of a strike, thus securing Hyundai's support. When the union carried out a vote on a labor action and work-to-rule measures, management responded by closing the factory on February 16, and kept the factory closed for 98 days,  after which police arrested the union leadership. When management threatened to withdraw capital, a portion of the union members left the union and went over to the side of management. The KMWU Gyeongju Branch went so far as to organize a regional strike in response, but the Valeo management, under the protection of Hyundai Motors and the police, continued to repress the union, such that now the struggle is being carried out mostly by fired workers.

In 2009 Carrier Aircon carried out structural adjustment affecting 280 workers. The union responded with struggles in Seoul and Gwangju. The union continuously engaged in sincere negotiations with management regarding the reinstatement of fired workers and a plan for normalization of the plant. There were moments at which communication occurred, but the Korean president repeatedly used delay in approval from the head company as an excuse to avoid negotiations.  The situation at GM-Dawoo and WiniaMando was the same, with the presidents of the Korean subsidiaries avoiding taking responsibility. Cases where lack of approval from the head company is used as an excuse to avoid or refuse negotiations are frequent.

In the case of Valeo Climate Korea, where plant liquidation led to the layoffs of 100 workers, the union made 4 trips to France to demand direct negotiations with the head company. The union had support from CGT and the European Valeo Works Council, but the Valeo management has refused to speak with the Korean workers and is avoiding negotiations.  The Valeo Group, which had been rescued by a French government bailout in 2009, had agreed during tripartite negotiations to do its best to preserve jobs in France, and had promised it would carry out structural adjustments at overseas plants first. This made it difficult for the union in france to show solidarity in a determined manner. With SAIC capital withdrawn from Korea and the Ssangyong factory in receivership, the KMWU Ssangyong Motors Branch carried out a plant occupation demanding introduction of public funds and the protection of workers' jobs. Given that the weakness of the Chinese workers movement, the union did not attempt to bring the struggle to the international level. The Indian company Mahindra and Mahindra is currently in negotiations with the Korean Development Bank to take over Ssangyong Motors. With a yellow union having taken control inside the factory and the KMWU Ssangyong Motors Branch composed only of laid-off workers and those on unpaid leave, it is difficult even to beginning negotiations. In addition, because the union representing Mahindra Group workers is friendly to the company, conditions are not favorable to international cooperation.

3. Tasks for Moving Forward

In South Korea, TNCs in manufacturing alone employ roughly 200,000 workers. The KMWU, which is at the heart of South Korea's democratic union movement, has roughly 30,000 members working at 55 production sites who are employed by TNCs. With crises likely to occur frequently in the future, a strategy for responding to TNCs is urgent. While capital's attitude towards workers does not change based on its national character, TNC's capital mobility and speculative nature make them more vicious than national capital and thus makes the need for a particular method of response all the more pressing.

On the international scale, responses to TNCs included: 1) conclusion of International Framework Agreements (IFAs), 2) complaints based on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and, 3) solidarity struggles based on networks between unions. Most IFAs are limited, however, in that they take the form of non-binding recommendations and lack provisions that can have decisive impact on wages and working conditions. Similarly, the OECD guidelines and ILO conventions include no means for forcing compliance from states. Most international networks between unions at TNCs exist only at the level of exchange of information or stop at a few campaigns. Labor has still not been able to globalize to the extent capital has.

Despite this fact, however, most labor movements are fighting against TNCs and we do, on occasion, here stories of success. Last year some 3000 Canadian copper mining working faced the closure of a mine by the Brazilian company Vale. They organized international solidarity and, after a tenacious struggle that went into this year, they were victorious. In France, 4,000 union member fought against closure of a tire factor by the German Continental Group. They organized a large scale struggle mission and local and international solidarity and in the end also succeeded in stopping the plant closure.

We can draw some lessons from looking at the successful struggles in other countries and the struggles underway in Korea.

First, unions' responses must start before structural adjustment is carried out. Because TNC structural adjustment takes place at the international level, once it is underway there are very few adequate methods for responding. Workers in countries where TNCs have production sites must build relationships with each other and exchange information before structural adjustment begins so that it is possible for them to discuss responses quckly when structural adjustment occurs. Conclusion of an IFA or formation of a World Works Council might be one means to achieve these sorts of relationships. When such structures are not feasible, unions can attempt to create networks through global labor organizations or national centers and industrial unions in each country.

Secondly, resolute struggles within Korea have to be coupled with solidarity on the international level. One of TNCs' strongest weapons against unions is their ability to adjust production internationally. International solidarity for the struggles of local unions can weaken TNCs' ability to relocate production at will. International campaigns can be build through struggle missions, or through dialogue over preexisting networks.

Finally, the differences in working conditions, movement culture, language, and level of organization between countries means that networks at the level of individual factories are generally difficult to build and maintain. KCTU (and national centers in other countries) must, therefore, take responsibility for regular dialogue with the national centers in the countries where TNC head offices are based. Through regular dialogue, national centers should develop multifaceted strategies for responding to TNCs. We have to see the international reorganization of unions representing workers at TNCs as a long-term task and strategy. We should strive to develop "solidarity/struggle agreements" between national centers that are something akin to capital's free trade agreements.

Towards an International Strategy for Responding to TNCs:

Thoughts for Discussion

As we have seen, TNCs have been at the forefront of deteriorating working conditions and repressing labor rights in Korea, Brazil and indeed around the world.  They have been overwhelmingly successful because of their capacity to force workers into a ‘race to the bottom’ in a competition for work, to shutdown plants and relocate production at will, and to use the threat of the relocation and outsourcing to repress wages and working conditions and force concessions from unions

Clearly, the institutional/legal structures for holding TNCs accountable must be strengthened. The OECD guidelines for multinational corporations provide a basic set of principles for ‘corporate responsibility’, which member nations agree to promote in principle. They are not binding, however, and pressure from below is needed to get governments to enforce them and to strengthen national laws and regulations.

Global Unions and European Work Councils have attempted to strengthen formalized pressure on TNCs through the conclusion of International Framework Agreements (IFAs). IFA’s set general standards for conditions and rights in production sites and often in supply chains, and are usually drawn from ILO core conventions. Questions, however, have been raised about the effectiveness and enforceability of IFAs, especially in areas that have weak trade union structures and legalized protections for labor rights. It is clear, therefore that strong workers movements locally and internationally are necessary to force TNCs to abide by IFAs and thus make them more than symbolic measures.

We have seen transnational capital use its power and freedom of movement again and again against workers in South Korea in the cases of Valeo Korea, Carrier, Ssangyong Motors and many more. While workers in these factories fought courageously against layoffs and plant closures, they were largely unsuccessful in preventing them, demonstrating the absolute difficulties workers organized at the level of a single workplace face when up against globally organized transnational capital. Without detailed prior knowledge of structural adjustment strategies, struggles against layoffs and plant closures often come too late to be effective. Struggle missions to countries where TNC headquarters are located, such was used in Velao Korea, can have only very limited impact unless it is possible to mobilize enough mass-based support from workers and common people in those countries to exert real pressure. This is difficult, however, since TNCs’ tendency to deviate production to less developed countries where production costs are lower, means workers in the North and South experience their interests as diametrically opposed, and will continue to do so unless they recognize they are being used as different parts of the same strategy for capital accumulation.

All of these limitations point to the need for strong international solidarity between workers linked together through TNC production sites and supply chains.

Efforts by CUT-Brazil provide a good example of how some unions have begun to develop this type of solidarity. Since 2001, CUT has been forming networks of unions representing workers employed by TNCs such as ABN Amro Bank, Dow Chemical and Wal Mart. Union members use these networks to discuss wage regulation, worker participation in company management and working conditions, and plan coordinated actions. In 2008 CUT began a strategic dialogue with CGT (France) through which the two national centers are working towards a collective plan for fighting against attacks on conditions and rights at 7 different TNCs. CUT’s international network was also instrumental in stopping a plant foreclosure at the Canadian production site of the Brazilian mining company Vale in 2010.

We can translate the lessons from today’s discussion into the outline of an international strategy for responding more effectively to TNCs in South Korea and elsewhere. This outline is suggested as a basis for discussion and will need much fleshing out based on the experience of unions in other countries and more concrete research:

1)  Exchange of information about TNC structural adjustment plans, conditions at production sites, labor law, and on-going labor disputes in Korea and countries to which it is connected through TNC production chains.

Exchange of information of this type has begun in a few places. SIGTUR has begun a group aimed at following struggles against TNCs on the new social network union book. The New Unionization Network has also begun a project gathering concrete information on unions and union membership around the world, which the network seeks to coordinate with information about the TNCs whose workers these unions represent. This type of research needs to be expanded.

2)  Choice of a test-case production at which to investigate enforcement of existing standards (IFAs, OECD guidelines)

As of Feb. 2008, 83 IFAs had been concluded mostly with headquarter companies in Europe. Rather than investigate the conclusion of new IFAs work should go into finding methods for enforcing IFAs at production sites they already supposedly cover. (An IFA concluded by IMF, the Ranault Work Council and 7 European unions in 2004 technically covers Ranault Samsung, yet the latter continues to enforce a no union policy.)

Although the OEDC guidelines on multinational corporations are not legally binding, they do include procedures for implementation, follow-up and monitoring through national contact points (NCPs), and a system by which NGOs and trade unions can raise complaints against companies. Since the composition of NCPs are decided by national governments and may include government officials and employers organizations, this strategy cannot stand alone. Union’s experiences using these procedures should be compiled.

3)  Discussion of concrete conditions, collective bargaining strategies and collective bargaining agreements at the level of individual unions

Since the 1990s (as early as the 1970s in the Scandinavian region) European unions in the metal and other sectors have developed transnational networks for the purpose of coordinating collective bargaining. Particularly active networks include the Nordiska Metal network between Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark, and networks between the German IG Metall and unions in border countries. Through these networks, representatives from partner unions meet regular to discuss collective bargaining strategy and establish collective bargaining action programs. Networks are also used to discuss issues outside of collective bargaining such as vocational training and cross-border support for strike actions.

There are several conditions that facilitate this type of cooperation between European unions including regional proximity, wider processes of European integration, and the establishment of coordinate rules for wage bargaining by the EMF and ETUC. Still, European collective bargaining coordination networks provide an inspiration, if not a model, for more structured forms of communication and exchange between unions in other areas.

Several scholars have emphasized the importance of a “sense of common situation or identity” between workers to the development of an international workers movement. Another important strong point of regular information sharing through formalized networks is its contribution to the development of such an identity as a precursor to collective action.

4)  Links with social movement forces in TNC headquarter and production site countries.

Some civil society and social movement forces, for example the Asian Transnational Corporation Monitoring Network, conduct monitoring of and/or campaigns related to TNCs. Investigation of ways to form closer links with these groups is important, especially since actions against TNCs cannot succeed without wide-based popular support.

*****

The goal of these various steps is to empower workers to come together in the face of TNCs’ attempts to pit them against one another, and enable joint strategizing at the time, or in advance of layoffs, plant closures and union repression. These steps also aim towards creating the base of power necessary for demand strengthening of legal regulations on TNCs.

TNC’s represent the dramatic increase of capital’s power vis-à-vis labor on a global scale. In a way, however, they also represent an opportunity for workers. Through effective networking and exchange, workers at TNC can expand international solidarity from the level of symbolic statements and one-day actions to effective long-term coordination and cooperation.

The FIOM-CGIL position on the FIAT Group’s plan for the Pomigliano plant and the Federmeccanica deviation from the 2008 Metalworkers National Collective Agreement

CGIL-FIOM

On June 11th  2010 the FIAT Group confirmed its choice to stop the activity of Termini Imerese plant and to the production of the Fiat Ypsilon to Poland by the end of 2011. As the management didn’t offer any alternative industrial proposals, this decision will erase 2,200 direct jobs and one of the most important industrial activities in Sicily, an island in the South of Italy, with huge problems of unemployment and underemployment.

On the same day the FIAT group proposed an investment of € 700 millions in the Pomigliano plant (near Naples, region Campania), to produce “Panda” beginning from 2012, conditional to the acceptance of a non negotiable proposal, defining a new organisation of working hours, which deviates from the Metalworkers National Collective Agreement and other legal commitments in the field of health and safety and on shift work.

For example, these conditions provide:

- seconded overtime increases from 40 to 120 hours per year, which may have to be taken as 18th weekly shift; during the break for lunch and the rest days; to recover gaps of production even when cases are not linked to work activity (as in delays on delivery);

- breaks on assembly line decrease from 40 minutes to 30 minutes daily;

- Fiat group can deviate from the law provision that workers must rest for at least 11 hours between two shifts or working days;

- the company can decide not to pay the illness treatment provided by the Metalworkers National Collective Agreement on the basis of law;

- the company can change the workers’ tasks irrespective of skills levels;

- the company will use 2 years of Cig (temporary unemployment protection) for restructuring without workers’ rotation and without any wage integration for compulsory training.

The definitive FIAT Group’s proposal would also impose sanctions on the Unions,

Workers’ representatives and the single worker who, in its opinion, has violated its conditions, nullifying their right to collective bargaining and even violating the Italian Constitution on right to strike and employees’ dismissal.

While FIM-CISL, UILM-UIL, FISMIC and UGL agreed to the FIAT position, FIOM-CGIL declared such proposals unacceptable and asked FIAT to open genuine bargaining on its plan.

The FIAT choice not to negotiate its conditions seems to be a move to a radical phase in industrial relations, involving the entire sector, with the aim of overcoming the Metalworkers National Collective Agreement. In fact, Fiat not only asked to change the negotiated working conditions in all its Italian plants, but informed the Metalworkers Employers’ Association (Federmeccanica) about its decision to withdraw from the Metalworkers National Collective Agreement to go toward a particular National Collective Agreement devoted only to the automotive sector (which in Italy means only Fiat).

FIOM-CGIL is opposing the FIAT concept that investing in Italy is only possible when deviating from the Metalworkers National Collective Agreement, the labour laws and the Italian Constitution. This claim risks open an abyss. It can only mean to show a reduction in working rights and wages, and a modification of social law and the state Constitution as the way to exit from the crisis.

FIOM-CGIL, taking into account the industrial plan presented by FIAT Group on 21st

April 2010, considers it essential to develop all the useful initiatives to defend and strengthen automotive production in Italy and its jobs. We ask for a definition of a negotiated plan of public, coordinated intervention for sustainable mobility and new clean technologies, including electrical mobility.

FIAT group has given notice to quit all the agreements signed for Pomigliano plant on working

conditions and production organization.

The enforcement of the Metalworkers National Collective Agreement allows the company to organize the working time also on 18 weekly shifts, through discussion with the RSU (plant workers’ representatives) and the use of 40 hours seconded overtime per worker.

All that guarantees the yearly production of 280,000 Pandas and the daily production of 1,050 cars on 3 shifts which are FIAT’s declared conditions to achieve the investment in Pomigliano.

If FIAT will decide to enforce the Metalworkers National Collective Agreement in this way, FIOM-CGIL will not oppose it. If this is not the solution, it’s evident that the aim of FIAT is not to produce with flexibility/compatibility but to overcome the Metalworkers National Collective Agreement and the Workers Rights’ Statute (law n. 300/1970), as declared by the Italian Labour Minister, Mr. Sacconi, and the Economy Minister, Mr. Tremonti.

FIOM-CGIL reaffirms furthermore that the deviation of the Metalworkers National Collective Agreement and the discussion on inalienable rights are non negotiable elements both at national and company level. They cannot become blackmail elements for the workers forced to choose between keeping their job or giving up to their rights, including constitutional rights regarding strikes, illness treatment, working conditions’ and collective bargaining. These all are elements that characterize freedom and democracy in our country.

For all these reasons FIOM-CGIL considers the FIAT document unacceptable for the Pomigliano plant and the group as a whole.

FIOM-CGIL reaffirms its availability to guarantee flexibility and efficiency for the Pomigliano plant through a collective agreement that allows the use of equipment, flexibility on

working time in answer to the market fluctuations, a working organization which produces quality and productivity but at the same time safeguards the workers’ rights and conditions.

We reaffirm that it’s possible to reach these goals in accord with the Metalworkers National Collective Agreement and the existing laws and we ask FIAT to open a real negotiation on this basis.

In order to obtain also the FIOM-CGIL consensus to its non negotiable proposal, FIAT urged the Federations who signed the agreement on Pomigliano to organize a referendum among the workers, believing that it could reach a plebiscite on its position. Despite their usual opposition to any workers’ vote in case of national collective agreements (as always requested by FIOM-CGIL) FIM, UILM, FISMIC and UGL actually organized such a referendum, ignoring the FIOM-CGIL claim against a vote on inalienable workers’ rights, such as illness treatment and the right to strike. While FIOM CGIL represents about 20% of the Pomigliano workers and despite the huge campaign held by all the other trade unions, all of the media and all the local authorities, etc. , more than 36% of FIAT Pomigliano employees voted against the FIAT plan and more than 40% among blue collar workers. That was not the result FIAT expected, and its reaction is still unclear, with the aim to build up a new company, replacing the existing one in Pomigliano, the decision to stop plant production and put employees in the restricted form of CIG, with extraordinary rules, and declaring to the media that the plants in Italy are not contributing to the positive earnings of the FIAT automotive group.

The choice of FIAT to impose the deviation of Metalworkers National Collective Agreement and the waiver of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Italian Constitution on the workers of the Pomigliano plant, is part of a wider strategy started by the Government and the employers’ associations at the time the crisis worsened.

Both Government and Confindustria (the main employers’ association) have minimized the worsening of the crisis for months, talking about a recovery, spreading inappropriate optimism, and renouncing any measures on job security.

Now that the crisis is showing all its weight, this weight has totally fallen on the shoulders of working class, retired people, unemployed people, and all the weakest parts of society, starting from the Southern regions of the country.

The measures taken by the Government are part of a strategy that shows the attack on the National

Collective Agreements, the proposed rules to change the Workers Rights’ Statute to a new one allowing free dismissal by the employers, all instruments to dismantle the present structure of labour rights. They think to confront the crisis by overcoming the fundamental principles of solidarity guaranteed by the Constitution of the Italian Republic, which today – and it’s not a case – is put in discussion as old and inadequate.

The attack on article 41 of the Constitution in the name of the “freedom of the company” goes together with the attack on the Workers Rights’ Statute and the National collective agreements.

While before the Pomigliano referendum the trade unions’ supporting the FIAT plan were saying that the deviation from the Metalworkers National Collective Agreement was an exceptional case, the employers’ association, Federmeccanica, invited the Unions, all except FIOM-CGIL, to negotiations for a national agreement on deviations. So, after a very short “bargaining”, the national Federations of metalworkers (all except FIOM) signed an agreement to allow all enterprises to deviate from the Metalworkers National Collective Agreement, accepting, de facto, the death of any National Collective Agreement.

FIOM-CGIL is fighting in many ways against this situation: in the legal field, denouncing Federmeccanica and the enterprises for the violation of the Metalworkers National Collective Agreement; in the bargaining field, signing agreements at company level on the respect of the Metalworkers National Collective Agreement, without any deviation; in the company and national mobilisation field, including the mass rally held in Rome on October 16th, gathering hundreds of thousands of workers.

This rally has been un important mobilisation not only by the workers, the FIOM and the CGIL, but by many other social movements too. Thousands of students, researchers and precarious workers; many associations and social movements gathered and/or sent their supporting messages. Many foreign and international Unions expressed their solidarity, including Fism, Fem and metalworkers Federation from South Korea, Spain, France, Serbia, Usa, Brazil, South Africa, ect.

To have or keep a job, the worker has to renounce their fundamental rights: this is the

economic and social system government and employers want to impose.

The attack is a general one, involving both private and public employees. The block for wage increase for public employees already announces the attack on the private sector wages, while the cuts on the welfare state are spread in all the branches and aspects. The pension age continues to be extended, women particularly are most damaged in their leaving

provisions. The employment, especially for young people, will pay a high price for all these choices.

Not one cent in all the measures taken by the government is paid by the rich.

The collective bargaining issue is strictly linked with the democracy issue, in the world of work and, more in general, in our country as a whole.

Democracy is not a waste of time! Without democracy there is authoritarianism and decline of social relationships, as shown by Federmeccanica who want to cancel the National Collective Agreement, achieved after decades of struggle, and denies workers the ability to express their opinion.

We reclaim the workers’ right to decide with a vote (ballot) about platforms and agreements and to participate on equal basis in defining their working conditions.

Therefore, we reject the attack on the right to strike, a constitutional right, and we propose a parliamentary bill about unions’ representation and the issue of representation within the work place.

The acknowledgement of the social and the economic value of everybody's work is the basis of people’ s dignity; it unifies workers, supports solidarity against internal competition and reclaims social justice.

Workers must not be considered as a commodity, to be used just until needed and then thrown away. Precarious work is the brand of this century’ s exploitation, for people with a stable job, but at risk according to market demands, for people with a contract job, for people with no job at all. The consequence of this precariousness is more and more social insecurity and democracy's fragility.

The logic of deviating from the national collective agreement’s rules opens the way to its cancellation. Without collective agreements, employer-employees relationships become like a trade relationships, based on selling labour as a commodity. It is the end of the labour law as developed during almost two centuries.

The collective bargaining implies a negotiation between two parts on equal basis and in good faith, conflict, if needed, and social mediation; the collective bargaining provides equal rights for equal work, rejects blackmails and obliges the employers to discuss about their interests, improving and not worsening working and living conditions. For this reason the protection of the collective agreements is a priority, in order to protect rights, democracy, legality, work.

For more information

www.fiom.cgil.it    www.cgil.it

Rome, November 2010

The globalisation of capital and its impact on the world of formal and informal work: Challenges for and responses from Argentine unions.

Dr. Isabel Rauber

The Argentine Workers Federation (Central de Trabajadores Argentinos, CTA) came into being in the midst of the establishment of a neo-liberal economic model in Argentina. It was part of a search for alternatives by workers hit hard by the crumbling of the country’s production sector, the downsizing of social welfare programmes run by the state, the repeal of progressive labour laws and growing unemployment and destitution. The programme of action of the CTA included the recognition, affiliation and representation of all workers, employed and unemployed; direct affiliation, without having to belong to a specific industrial sector; coordination with other social sectors for re-establishing workers’ social power, the redefinition of production and work as the basis for nation-building. Underlying the programme is that  political solutions be linked to political unionism. Of course, unionism would allow for the organisation of working class members on a wide scale: from isolated and far-flung communities to migrant workers from other countries. By creating worker unity, it is hoped that it might be possible to build a movement strong enough to effect significant historical change. In this chapter, the next section will outline the challenges for the Argentine working class, resulting from neo-liberal globalisation, before the various responses are discussed with a specific focus on the CTA.

THE IMPACT OF NEO-LIBERAL GLOBALISATION ON THE WORKING CLASS

From the second half of the 1970s, Argentina underwent a process of structural and super-structural adaptation to the neo-liberal capitalist model. This process was imposed through violent military dictatorships, particularly, the one led by Videla in March 1976. The blood of thousands stained the ‘magic’ carpet of the triumph of capital in the 1980s in Argentina. The international socialist system was replaced with an era of globalisation – a stage of re-colonisation that began in the 1990s. Capital applied itself to reforming the organisational and structural functions of countries in the North and South, in line with the economic conditions that governed each. In the Latin American region, Argentina had neo-liberal economic conditions, and not surprisingly, a popular uprising that made international headlines, took place in December 2001. The traits of the structural transformation of capital in Argentina can be summed up as follows: deindustrialisation; stagnation; concentration of production and centralisation of capital, and a resizing and redefinition of the industrial profile; reforms in the content and functions of the state and growing restrictions on its social responsibilities. Since the mid-1970s, manufacturing has had an increasingly smaller share in the overall GDP of the country. In 1975, industry represented approximately 30 per cent of the total GDP. By the late 90s, that percentage was about 16 per cent. As Basualdo and Lozano affirm:

The decrease in the relative influence of industry on global production and employment, as well as the accompanying expansion of services, is seen by some authors as an indicator of increased degree of modernization and/or development of an economy. Regarding such affirmations, it is asserted that ‘developing countries’ should be more focused on the creation and fostering of services than on primary and manufacturing activities. However, from an analysis of what happened in Argentina over the last few decades, important questions emerge regarding the validity of such affirmations, insofar as ‘deindustrialization’ – and its correlate: a greater aggregate gravitation of services – has been much more associated with the dismantling of production and the regressive restructuring of the sector that took place, and associated with that, with a bigger gap separating the Argentine economy from that of developed countries (relative stagnation), than with a greater level of development (Basualdo and Lozano 2002).

In the business sector, small and medium-sized businesses were greatly affected by the direction of economic policies, while a small group of oligopolistic businesses significantly intensified their participation in and control over various branches of industry. This situation – the way in which ‘deindustrialization’ impacted on large as well as small- and medium-sized companies and workers – reflected the subordination of the state apparatus to the interests of the most concentrated sections of capital. The notable expansion of leading industries in the last quarter of the century was closely tied to the reinvestment of all profits, in accordance with state policy. The intention was to achieve the following: industrial growth; the settling of foreign debt; influencing state purchasing policies; and the initiation of wealth-creation schemes (but that would only benefit the already wealthy) to open up the economy.

From the National Economic Censuses, it emerges that between the mid-1970s and the early 90s more than 15,000 productive units closed down. This meant an almost 25 per cent decrease in employment in the production sector. The dramatic fall of industrial employment in the early 1970s occurred at a time when the manufacturing sector had an employment/production elasticity of 0.65 (in other words, for each percentage point of production growth, employment increased by 0.65 per cent). This indicates that the concentration on local manufacturing (as opposed to imports) not only promoted an expansion of production itself. It also generated jobs. In the 1990s, that coefficient was about -3.7; that is, the reduction of a significant number of jobs.

THE INFORMALISATION OF WORK IN THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL SECTORS: GROWING DETERIORATION OF WAGES AND THE LOSS OF EFFECTIVE WORKING-CLASS POWER

In the 1990s, the growth of the Argentine economy ran concurrently with a profound deterioration of the job market. In a context in which the global GDP expanded by an average annual rate of 4 per cent, significant increases were registered in the unemployment and underemployment rates (about 11 per cent and almost 8 per cent in the cumulative year, respectively). As a result almost 30 per cent of the economically active population was experiencing serious problems with employment by the turn of the century, when in the 1970s it was less than 14 per cent. As Basualdo and Lozano explain, in this period two clearly differentiated stages may be recognized: Between 1991 and 1994, the domestic economy grew by almost 23 per cent, while the unemployment rate doubled and the underemployment rate grew by a bit more than 30 per cent. Based on the crisis stemming from the so-called ‘Tequila effect,’  a new stage opened, characterized by the following dynamic: when the economy grows, unemployment falls (although never to rates below 12 per cent) and underemployment rises, while when domestic activity contracts (as was the case with the recession that began in early 1998), unemployment grows significantly, but underemployment remains unchanged.

Between 1970 and 1996, the economically active population – that is, the population able to work – grew by 56 per cent, but the number of unemployed grew by practically 470 per cent during these 26 years. This suggests that the unemployed population grew among all sectors of workers.

(…) the subsistence self-employed, those who try to survive individually with a given activity in the economic process and are not connected with direct dependence, grew by about 80 per cent. That is, also over the average growth of the economically active population. What is also shown is that the number of family members who work without receiving remuneration -- that is, those who work in a subsistence family unit as a means of support and don’t even receive a salary -- grew by 143 per cent, also well beyond the average growth of the economically active population. And it may be noted that the number of wage-earners over those 26 years grew by barely 18 per cent, very much below the average, and moreover, not even reaching 1 per cent annually (in Rauber 1998: 50-51).

In relative terms, there was a constant decline in the number of formally employed workers. It is important to note that wage-earner refers to both formal wage-earners and those wage-earners who have neither welfare nor social coverage, are not registered, and receive their wages in cash so it is not registered for administrative or legal purposes. It must be considered that during this period the highest growth in the number of wage-earners was among informal wage-earners. The number of formal wage-earners decreased to less than 18 per cent. Within this framework, formal wage-earners constitute only 40 per cent of the total working class. It is this differentiation that creates the difficulties for a traditional union model to operate as a bargaining structure for the majority of workers. The organizing strategy of unions is focused exclusively on formal workers (see Rauber 1998: 50-51).

Wages

These unprecedented levels of unemployment, as well as the growing precariousness of a considerable number of new jobs, have had negative repercussions on remuneration. The combination of a shortage of jobs and falling wages meant that producers could make higher profits while unemployment grew. According to figures of the CTA’s Studies Institute, in 1975 wages amounted to 43 per cent of GDP, while currently that figure is no more than 20 per cent. Considering the 1990s as a whole, the population with an income below the poverty line grew by 7 per cent. This amounts to 75 per cent of the population. Between 1991 and 1999, the total income of the poorest 40 per cent of the country’s largest urban agglomerate, Greater Buenos Aires, diminished by 10 per cent, and in the same period the income gap between the richest 10 per cent of the country’s urban population and the poorest 10 per cent grew by almost 50 per cent. An increasing number of workers entered the labour market, which brought with it an increase in the labour supply; these newcomers to the labour market were desperate enough to undercut existing wages and to work under, what had previously been considered unacceptable working conditions. This led to higher unemployment and a deterioration of job conditions for employed workers.

Argentina before the mid-1970s was oriented in economic terms basically toward the domestic market. It had an economy with an industrial base, in which wages played a large, significant role within the whole of domestic demand. Wages were a central component in maintaining and expanding domestic demand, and rationality marked the strategy for agreements between union sectors and certain business sectors. (…) This is what was broken in Argentine beginning in the mid-1970s (Basualdo and Lozano 2000).

By the late 1990s, average wages were almost 10 per cent lower than in the mid 1990s. Naturally, this persistent wage deterioration had an undisputable ‘disciplining effect’ on employed workers’ behaviour. They were subject to unreasonable and inhumane working conditions, but accepted these in order to retain their jobs in a job market where there was an oversupply of labour.

RESPONSES BY UNIONS TO THESE CHALLENGES

The end of traditional (corporate) unionism

During the 1990s, the labour relations, the model of which was forged between 1950 and 1990, went into crisis. This model consisted of many labour regulations drafted by the state to ensure centralised negotiations. It meant there was state protection of business and the associated sectoral unions; negotiations were top-down; unions cooperated with business even though they were under pressure from their members; unions operated away from the workplace, taking action only when they needed to obtain a collective agreement.  Unions, instead of being class-based, belonged to the state, providing services to what was effectively an agreed state-union structure to benefit specific sectors. ‘Today, the labour relations model tends toward more precarious employment; the decentralization of collective bargaining; flexibility; union decertification and privatization of unions’ social projects (…)’ (Garza Toledo 2001).

As Garza Toledo notes further,

Corporatism was correlative to the social state, although not every social state implied corporatism. To this extent, corporatism came out of the attempt to reconcile economic growth with social peace, specifically labour peace, under the leadership of the state. As a result, labour relations were nationalized; state vigilance, institutionalization and coercion were placed at the service of labour governability, and relations between the state, unions and workers were greased with macro-, medium- and micro exchange systems. In underdeveloped countries, the exchange systems, in many aspects, had hereditary aspects (Garza Toledo 2001).

It is important to remember that before neo-liberalism Argentina had low levels of unemployment, poverty and marginalisation. It had high levels of wage-earners, and industrial workers were particularly important. This was a workers’ movement that was homogeneous and had an important structural presence. The level of organisation and ability to influence through the structure of their unions and based on Peronism permitted workers to fight for income levels substantially higher than those present in other Latin American countries. That produced the formation of a domestic market in which wage demand played a very important role. Today, the consumption profile indicates that about 23 per cent of consumer spending is done by wage-earners. The rest is by high-income or middle-to-high income layers. This pattern of consumption also impacts on industry. In the past the domestic market determined which industries would be profitable. In addition, any increase in wages benefited certain business layers and the business owners of that sector. The type of union model that operated was that workers were organised within sectors and workers and bosses were familiar with each other. Collective agreements  were bargained according to sectors or levels within sectors. In short, economic accumulation in Argentina was industrial accumulation. Stopping the industrial bargaining process meant stopping the accumulation process, and consequently, it created a power base for the workers. The power of the workers’ movement was based on its ability to throw the accumulation process into crisis.

The relationship between the unions and employers in the industrial sectors need to be seen against the backdrop of the relationship between industry and the powerful agricultural bourgeoisie. The considerable friction between these two sectors meant that a united and harmonious relationship between the industrial capital/workers movement was indispensable. This, of course, increased the power of the union movement. Unionism also had economic strength, because unions financed their activities not only with workers’ contributions, but also through relatively lucrative social projects . The tripod on which the union model of that period was built consisted then of sectoral unions, collective negotiations and social projects that increased financial power. (Rauber 1998: 47-50).

It is important to emphasise the strong political identity that workers embraced: Peronism. In reference to that, Víctor De Gennaro, general secretary of the CTA, explained: ‘Peronism was the political unity that expressed and contained the working class. Union power was not only the structure, but the key identity: “Peron to power.”’  The loss of power experienced by the union movement also had to do with representation, in the sense that traditional unions were constituted of formal wage workers, a sector that during the 1990s was hit very hard by neo-liberalism. Not only were they no longer a majority, but the nature of shopfloor battles had changed to such an extent that the movement was no longer at the centre of social struggles. As Lozano says: ‘(…) for traditional unionism, the centre of organizing has always been formal wage-earners; therefore, while this today represents 40 per cent of all workers, it means that most of the working class is outside of the traditional union organizing’ (quoted in Rauber 1998: 51). Today it would be impossible to reconstitute the political/organisational unity of workers firstly because of the above-mentioned reasons, but also largely because only a small minority of the formal wage-earning working class are currently union members. Thus harbouring traditional ideas of unionism is not only futile, but also places them in opposition with non-unionised workers of the informal sector and it, thus, serves the needs of global capital.

In response to the crisis, corporate unions attempted at first, to rebuild their old and obsolete alliance with the State, now under conditions of neo-liberalism. They yielded their ability to control wages to the state so that the economic and labour policies favourable to neo-liberalism could be established. The general result was – together with the important loss of labour victories, wage levels and living conditions – the loss of unions’ status among workers. In any case, corporate-business unionism

(…) became an obstacle to market flexibility and the work process (…) because the neo-liberal states reduced the space for union intervention in the design of economic, social and labour policies, in the party system, and in the institutions of workers’ social reproduction; because collective contracts and labour laws became less protective of jobs, working conditions and wages. And finally, because the common sense recreated by neo-liberalism identified the unions as monopolisers of the job market, protectors of the privileges of a minority of wage workers, the unionized. All of this led to isolation of the unions with respect to political parties, but above all in relation to the non-unionized majority of the population (Garza Toledo 2001).

The rapid establishment of neo-liberalism signified, as Garza Toledo says,

(…) the decline of old union concepts and projects: for class agents, the collapse of the idea of state socialism; for the corporations, that of the authoritarian social state. (…) Nevertheless, neo-liberalism, which has prostrated the unions, has not resolved basic contradictions and has developed others. One of the most important is the tension between the world of politics, with its representations of citizens, and that of work (Garza Toledo 2001).

In many Latin American countries, the unions – essential political actors in the fall of dictatorships and in the first stage of the not-yet neo-liberal transition – became protagonists that have been dismantled, discredited and immersed in impotence and/or corruption. But that does not mean that they are going to disappear. From the perspective of workers who aspire to building their own alternative to the crisis and brutality imposed by neo-liberalism, the challenge is to build a new type of unionism. The question that arises is: have options emerged in Latin America that are different from traditional unionism?

The CTA: a new strategy for organizing and representing workers

In 1991, in the town of Burzaco, right at the height of neo-liberalism, what would soon become the Argentine Workers Federation (CTA) began to take shape. That was where workers’ indignation consolidated in response to being sold out by the state, with the complicity of traditional corporate unionism, which had now become business unionism. Confidence sprouted in the idea that another country was possible, if workers took responsibility for building and developing it according to their interests and aspirations. Resistance to the handover of the country to the expansionist, imperialist voracity of capital, and in open opposition to corporate business unionism under the auspices of the General Labour Confederation (CGT) –  resulted in the decision of a group of unions to build a union organisation capable of organizing and representing all workers, employed and unemployed. Among the group were the Association of State Employees (Asociación de Trabajadores del Estado, ATE) and the Confederation of Argentine Education Employees (Confederación de Trabajadores de la Educación de la República Argentina, CTERA). The Burzaco developments and then the CTA laid the foundations for a new type of unionism, which later would be affirmed and would mature into the constitution of the CTA. In addition to reorganizing the employed and unemployed, a basic class alliance, the CTA set out to organise and coordinate with other social and political actors to build a new political and social order for Argentina. The CTA decided to design and construct a strategy that would enable it, first, to unify the working class as a whole, believing this to be the central force for any possible alternative to neo-liberalism. Second, they recognised the need for a broad-based political movement that would include all those social organisations committed to end the imperial aims of global capital. Today, out of a total of 13 million workers in Argentina, approximately 1.3 million are organised by the CTA, while the CGT has about 2.5 million members.

The foundation of the CTA

The Argentine Workers Federation charted a line clearly different from traditional unionism. It strongly advocated political unionism, presaged by some experiences of the mid-20th century – like, for example, that of the CGT de Los Argentinos . The new unionism strove to combine aspects of traditional unionism with the agenda of a national struggle. In other words, political unionism undertook to go beyond defending the sectoral interests of union members and committed itself to reach out to other groups such as the unemployed as well as social groups such as peasants and intellectuals in order to overcome the social fragmentation of society. The goal is the formation of a broad-based organisation representing all aspects of labour. Responsible citizens with an awareness of their interests and rights, who want to decide their own future would, make up the membership. It acknowledged both employed and jobless as workers and by so doing, it aims to eliminate the potential for transnational employers to ‘blackmail’ workers into working under dire conditions, using the threat of unemployment. ‘We understood at that moment, and today we reaffirm, that it wasn’t enough to have unions, however decent they were in their conduct and however brave they showed themselves to be in defence of their comrades, if they did not break with the framework of corporatism by activity or by branch of activity, and if they didn’t set themselves to working together with the unemployed who were beginning to organise themselves’ (Micheli 2004).

It should not be forgotten that neo-liberalism has produced -- along with a multitude of diverse groups of workers -- intense individualism among employed workers, those who, in keeping with their workers’ own strength, which is the embryo of the new historical subject in mercantilist logic, are identified as winners. Thus, for the CTA the rebuilding of the labour movement required coordination between employed workers and the unemployed.  The General Labor Federation (CGT), the union federation that advocated business unionism did not, nor does it acknowledge the unemployed as members of the working class. It did not promote their organisation, or support roadblocks when these were needed for the urgent defence of lives. It remained, even in its most progressive aspects such as the Argentine Workers’ Movement (MTA), within traditional unionism. Direct membership establishes this unity among workers in the CTA’s constitution. It opens up the possibility for all workers, employed and unemployed, to be members of the federation, without necessarily having to belong to one of its unions. And this is a central, strategic proposal. The primary objective is to confront the structural fracturing of the world of work and recover the identity as the working class as workers. The concealment and distortion of the marginalization of the unemployed and their families has to be counteracted and the CTA is turning its thought and action toward work. This is the central axis of the national problem, and consequently, also its solution. This assumes relationships with capital, with technology, with the markets, and, as part of all this, the relationship between people: between the owners of capital and those who, in order to survive, sell them their labour power. The acknowledgement of the structural transformation of the world of work as the starting point for the transformation of the relationship of power between the main classes of Argentine society and the effort to build and accumulate power for negotiating, challenging and ‘creating a different socio-political project’ by the workers, are the constituent elements of the CTA.

Rebuilding a popular movement

As Garza Toledo says, the challenge consists in representing the actors in the plurality of their spaces of action: productive, political/electoral, reproductive, environmental, of gender, ethnicity, etc. The plurality of spaces also implies a plurality of friends and enemies, flexible, possible to reorganise in their alliances and conflicts. This leads to a reconsideration of the concepts of representation, legitimacy and democracy of workers’ organisations that prevailed throughout almost the entire 20th century … (Garza Toledo 2001).

The CTA anticipated that by [re]building a strong and unified working class capable of leading change firstly for the nation, but also for the continent and finally encompassing a global labour force transformation might become possible. Such a project would require that workers realise their own power through a raised consciousness, systematic organisation and a sustained sense of unity. In 1999, referring to the CTA Congress held in Mar del Plata, its general secretary affirmed: ‘It is the first consolidation of the CTA’s identity. [Because] It is the first congress where discussion began on the strategy for power with our own strength starting with the workers.’ This congress marked the beginning of a new era in South American politics: that of building a union federation. It meant going out to look for the millions of ordinary men and women who had to be won, to organise other sectors so that a collective movement capable of designing a new national and popular project could be created. These were the actions taken by the CTA during the period of 1999-2001. Big national marches, marches by the unemployed, roadblocks, encampments on roads and in fields spelt out the issues of unemployment and exclusion. The anti-neoliberal movement is not restricted to the capital of the country but is spreading. The building of a broad-based labour movement focuses on consolidation and on building from the bottom up.

Union, political and cultural action has been developed in a multiplicity of spaces, forms of organisation and representation. Each one of them is particular and at the same time collective. Representatives and the process of organisation take place away from the workplace, which creates a freedom of expression and a diversity of action. It means a far higher profile and general awareness of the conglomerate that does not accept the ‘virtues’ of a neo-liberal democracy ruled by the market. The aim has been to have a large number of progressive groupings to buy into the building of an alternative society. The purpose is, as the federation’s builders say, to counterpoise the society of the market with the society of humanistic production so that social justice, equality of rights, solidarity, respect for differences, and environmental equilibrium can be sustained. Barriers regarding the meaning and reach of politics and what is political have to be renegotiated, especially within the framework of a diverse group of participants, so that alternatives that encompass the demands and possibilities of the 21st century can be conceptualised. Union-led resistance has grown in Argentina, but that does not imply a mature alternative project. Defensive resistance continues to be predominant. The CTA aims to ensure that the labour movement can recover confidence that change is possible. Because there ‘still is great scepticism among people regarding many politicians, union leaders. (…) My concern is that with the excuse of not believing, they end up not believing in themselves. They end up believing that it is not worth the trouble to show solidarity, to organise themselves, to be leaders, to fight for their freedom, for the rights that are theirs. This is our problem. Our problem is not convincing those who hold power that they have to modify and open the doors so that we can find our paths and figure out how to survive better (…) Our challenge is to begin to convince our comrades that the only way to be able to change this situation and transform society is to believe again that it is possible, and to believe again that our only strength is in us. And with that perspective, it is the crisis that is worth confronting, because it is the crisis that can really resolve our peoples’ problems (De Gennaro 2001).

International integration, it is believed, must form part of the programme. The CTA works in conjunction with the region, mainly with the union organisation of MERCOSUR, and with workers’ organisations and networks of the continent and the world.

We need better integration, greater communication for organizing not only unemployed workers, those in precarious conditions, but also for imagining new organisational forms. Today, a company has the ability to decide where it wants to go to exploit, because there are places where politicians offer the best conditions to exploit their people. They even compete to see who offers the best conditions, playing with the lives of our compatriots. We need regional and international organisations that are capable of restoring a different project, not just in our countries but also for the world (De Gennaro 2001).

MAIN CURRENT CHALLENGES

After December 2001, and particularly after Kirchner’s victory and his assumption of the presidency in May 2004, the process of building the federation confronted the obstacles that come with all social construction in politically receptive situations. ‘When spaces are opened, our weaknesses and what we are lacking also show. It is a higher discussion.’  Having emerged under the banner of opposition to neo-liberalism, when some components of the neo-liberal model are called into question by some government sectors, it is no longer enough to be the opposition. The ability to propose and build alternatives is fundamental. Proposals are not ideas, but, as Víctor De Gennaro says, relationships of forces. That is why, he states, ‘it is no longer enough to be the opposition. Now you must have proposals and assume the responsibility of maintaining what you propose.’  This implies the ability to integrate the interests of the configuration of social forces, or perhaps, as a necessary previous step, the creation of such an ability. That is for the CTA as for so many social actors of the continent an urgent and central unresolved task.

The CTA’s current challenges include the need to identify internal obstacles and contradictions, and seeking to overcome them positively, empowering members to tackle problems and to believe in the possibility of labour victories. New political definitions determined by union actions will emerge as a new type of union federation operates within the confines of a market-driven economy in the current situation of the country, the region, the continent and the world. Transforming itself to transform while transforming would be, perhaps, the description that comes closest to the process of growth and constitution/self-constitution of the social actors that characterized the years of resistance, struggles and advances of the CTA. That process became at the same time, an educational exercise in the formation of consciousness, organisation, proposals, of power and although still in a fragmented way, of the project, itself. The construction of a broad, plural and multi-sectoral social liberation force, together with the initiation of an alternative project that aims to transform the nature of the economy, sums up the greatest political, social and ethical challenges for the CTA at this point in time in the 21st century.

References

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______. Claves para una nueva estrategia, construcción de poder desde abajo, Pasado y Presente XXI, Santo Domingo, June 2000.

______. Movimientos sociales y representación política, Ediciones Desde Abajo, Third edition, Bogotá, 2003.

______. Sujetos Políticos, Pasado y Presente XXI CTA, Buenos Aires, 2005.

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